Also known as:joint and severally liable · jointly and severally liable · joint and several liability · joint and several · joint liability · several liability
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Liability imposed on two or more parties for the same obligation or harm. Each party remains responsible for the entire amount, so the obligee may recover the full sum from any one of them without first pursuing the others.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Purported Partner Binds Existing Partners
Jacob Jennings joined an existing podcast partnership after the equipment financing contract had already been signed. When the supplier sued for the unpaid balance, the court held Jacob and the original partners jointly and severally liable because the supplier had relied on Jacob's name appearing in all branding materials. Jacob must pay the entire remaining balance even though he joined after the debt was first incurred.
Promoter Liability Before Incorporation
Jerome Jackson signed a multi-year lab lease on behalf of a pharmaceutical company before filing articles of incorporation. After the company was later formed, the landlord sued both Jerome and the new entity for unpaid rent. Because Jerome knew no corporation existed when he signed, he and any other pre-incorporation actors are jointly and severally liable for the full lease obligation.
Judy Jacobs was injured when her vehicle rolled over after a tire tread separation. She sued both the tire manufacturer and the vehicle designer. The court treated the defendants as joint tortfeasors subject to joint and several liability, allowing Judy to collect the entire damages award from either party.
Branham v. Ford Motor Co.390 S.C. 203, 701 S.E.2d 5 (2010)
In 1986 Ford Motor Company manufactured a 1987 Ford Bronco II 4x2 that Cheryl Hale purchased used in June 1999 for a nominal sum after it had accumulated 137,500 miles.
On June 17, 2001, Hale was driving the Bronco II along Cromwell Road in Colleton County with several children as passengers, including her daughter in the front seat and Jesse Branham, III in the backseat; no one wore a seatbelt. Hale took her eyes off the road to quiet the excited children, causing the rear right wheel to leave the roadway, then overcorrected to the left, producing a shake that led the vehicle to roll over and eject Branham.
Branham filed suit against Ford and Hale in Hampton County alleging a defective rear occupant restraint system and a handling and stability design defect related to rollover propensity, each pursued under negligence and strict liability theories. At trial Branham introduced internal Ford documents dated 1981 and 1982 concerning stability index calculations, Twin I-Beam suspension selection despite engineer objections, J-turn testing results, and expert testimony from Dr. Melvin Richardson and former Ford vice president Thomas Feaheny describing the MacPherson strut as a feasible alternative design.
The jury returned a general verdict against both defendants and awarded Branham $16,000,000 in actual damages and $15,000,000 in punitive damages. Ford appealed directly to the Supreme Court of South Carolina under Rule 204(b), SCACR.
Jonathan Jaffe developed cancer after his mother took DES during pregnancy. He could not identify the specific manufacturer of the drug his mother ingested. The court imposed joint and several liability on all manufacturers that supplied the drug in the relevant market, allowing Jonathan to recover his full damages from any one of them.
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories26 Cal. 3d 588 (1980)
Judith Sindell and Maureen Rogers filed separate lawsuits in California against several pharmaceutical companies that manufactured diethylstilbestrol, commonly known as DES. The complaints stated that the plaintiffs' mothers had taken DES during pregnancy to prevent miscarriage, and that the plaintiffs later developed cancerous and precancerous conditions as a result. Sindell alleged exposure led to a malignant bladder tumor requiring surgery and ongoing adenosis necessitating frequent monitoring. Rogers' allegations were substantially similar.
DES was first developed in 1938 and received FDA approval in 1941 for use in preventing miscarriages. Manufacturers produced the drug in multiple forms and strengths under many trade names, but all followed an identical formula set forth in the United States Pharmacopoeia. In 1971 the FDA ordered companies to stop marketing DES for miscarriage prevention after studies linked it to adenocarcinoma in the daughters of women who had used the drug. Hundreds of companies had manufactured DES between 1941 and 1971.
Because of the long latency period between ingestion and the appearance of injuries, and because pharmacists often filled prescriptions with whatever brand was in stock, the plaintiffs could not determine which company had produced the particular DES their mothers received. The trial court sustained demurrers filed by the defendants, including Abbott Laboratories, Eli Lilly and Company, E.R. Squibb & Sons, the Upjohn Company, and Rexall Drug Company, on the basis that the plaintiffs had not identified the manufacturer of the injurious product. The actions were consolidated for appeal to the Supreme Court of California.
Sindell sought compensatory damages of one million dollars and punitive damages of ten million dollars on her own behalf, along with class-wide equitable relief requiring the defendants to warn physicians and establish free clinics for screening. The complaints further alleged that the defendants had continued to market DES without adequate testing or warnings even after they knew or should have known of its carcinogenic properties.
Jorge Juarez suffered severe injuries in a car accident involving both a defective vehicle design and driver negligence. The jury apportioned fault between the manufacturer and the driver. Because the defendants remained jointly and severally liable, Jorge could still collect the entire judgment from the manufacturer alone.
Daly v. General Motors Corp.20 Cal.3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal.Rptr. 380
In the early hours of October 31, 1970, Kirk Daly, a 36-year-old attorney, was driving his Opel automobile southbound on the Harbor Freeway in Los Angeles at a speed of 50-70 miles per hour. The vehicle collided with and damaged 50 feet of metal divider fence. After the initial impact between the left side of the vehicle and the fence, the Opel spun counterclockwise. The driver's door was thrown open, and Daly was forcibly ejected from the car, sustaining fatal head injuries. It was undisputed that had the deceased remained in the Opel his injuries would in all probability have been relatively minor. There were no eyewitnesses to the accident.
Plaintiffs, who are decedent's widow and three surviving minor children, sued General Motors Corporation, Boulevard Buick, Underwriter's Auto Leasing, and Alco Leasing Company. These defendants were the successive links in the Opel's manufacturing and distribution chain. The sole theory of plaintiffs' complaint was strict liability for damages allegedly caused by a defective product. The product was an improperly designed door latch claimed to have been activated by the impact. It was further asserted that but for the faulty latch decedent would have been restrained in the vehicle and although perhaps injured would not have been killed.
At trial the jury heard conflicting expert versions as to the functioning of the latch mechanism during the accident. Plaintiffs' principal witness testified that the Opel's door was caused to open when the latch button on the exterior handle of the driver's door was forcibly depressed by some protruding portion of the divider fence. It was his opinion that the exposed push button constituted a design defect. Plaintiffs also introduced evidence that other vehicular door latch designs used in production models of the same and prior years afforded substantially greater protection. Defendants' experts countered with their opinions that the force of the impact was sufficiently strong that it would have caused the door to open, resulting in Daly's death even if the Opel had been equipped with door latches of the alternative designs suggested by plaintiffs.
Over plaintiffs' objections, defendants were permitted to introduce evidence indicating that the Opel was equipped with a seat belt-shoulder harness system and a door lock, either of which if used would have prevented Daly's ejection from the vehicle. Daly used neither the harness system nor the lock. The 1970 Opel owner's manual contained warnings that seat belts should be worn and doors locked when the car was in motion for accident security. Daly was intoxicated at the time of collision. The evidence was admitted for the limited purpose of determining whether decedent had used the vehicle's safety equipment. After relatively brief deliberations the jury returned a verdict favoring all defendants.
Plaintiffs appealed from the ensuing adverse judgment to the Supreme Court of California. They contended that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that plaintiffs' recovery could be barred or diminished by decedent's contributory negligence and in refusing to instruct on the theory of crashworthiness.
Jacobs Shipping extended credit to a borrower based on financial statements that a bank had helped prepare. When the borrower defaulted, Jacobs Shipping sued the bank for aiding the borrower's fraud. The court held that the securities statute does not impose joint and several liability on secondary actors who merely aid and abet without committing a primary violation themselves.
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.511 U.S. 164 (1994)
In 1986 and 1988, the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority issued a total of $26 million in bonds to finance public improvements at Stetson Hills, a planned residential and commercial development in Colorado Springs. Petitioner Central Bank of Denver served as indenture trustee for the bond issues. The bonds were secured by landowner assessment liens covering about 250 acres for the 1986 issue and 272 acres for the 1988 issue. The bond covenants required that the land subject to the liens be worth at least 160% of the bonds' outstanding principal and interest, and AmWest Development, the developer, was to provide Central Bank with annual reports containing evidence that this test was met.
In January 1988, AmWest provided Central Bank with an updated appraisal of the land securing the 1986 bonds and proposed for the 1988 bonds, showing values almost unchanged from 1986. A senior underwriter for the 1986 bonds soon expressed concern that declining property values in Colorado Springs meant the 160% test might not be met, given the appraisal was over 16 months old. Central Bank asked its in-house appraiser to review the 1988 appraisal, who found the values optimistic and suggested retaining an outside appraiser for an independent review.
After an exchange of letters with AmWest in early 1988, Central Bank agreed to delay the independent review until the end of the year, six months after the June 1988 closing on the bond issue. Before the review was complete, the Authority defaulted on the 1988 bonds. Respondents First Interstate Bank of Denver and Jack K. Naber, who had purchased $2.1 million of the 1988 bonds, sued the Authority, underwriters, an AmWest director, and Central Bank for violations of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, alleging Central Bank was secondarily liable for aiding and abetting the fraud.
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment to Central Bank. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding genuine issues of material fact on recklessness and substantial assistance. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b).
What does joint and several liability allow a plaintiff to do?
It permits the plaintiff to recover the entire judgment from any one of the liable parties. The plaintiff need not sue or collect from every defendant.
Supporting sources
Does a partner admitted after a debt was incurred face personal liability?
A newly admitted partner is not personally liable for pre-admission obligations. Later participation in negotiations does not shift the debt's origin to the new partner's tenure.
Supporting sources
When are pre-incorporation actors jointly and severally liable?
All persons who purport to act for a corporation knowing it has not yet been formed are jointly and severally liable for obligations created while so acting.
Supporting sources
How does joint and several liability interact with contribution among tortfeasors?
A tortfeasor who pays more than its pro rata share may seek contribution from the others. The right exists even if judgment has not been recovered against every defendant.
joint
tort feasors, and thus
jointly and severally liable
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