20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978)
In the early hours of October 31, 1970, Kirk Daly, a 36-year-old attorney, was driving his Opel automobile southbound on the Harbor Freeway in Los Angeles at a speed of 50-70 miles per hour.1 The vehicle collided with and damaged 50 feet of metal divider fence.2 After the initial impact between the left side of the vehicle and the fence, the Opel spun counterclockwise.3 The driver's door was thrown open, and Daly was forcibly ejected from the car, sustaining fatal head injuries.4 It was undisputed that had the deceased remained in the Opel his injuries would in all probability have been relatively minor.5 There were no eyewitnesses to the accident.6
Plaintiffs, who are decedent's widow and three surviving minor children, sued General Motors Corporation, Boulevard Buick, Underwriter's Auto Leasing, and Alco Leasing Company.7 These defendants were the successive links in the Opel's manufacturing and distribution chain.8 The sole theory of plaintiffs' complaint was strict liability for damages allegedly caused by a defective product.9 The product was an improperly designed door latch claimed to have been activated by the impact.10 It was further asserted that but for the faulty latch decedent would have been restrained in the vehicle and although perhaps injured would not have been killed.11
At trial the jury heard conflicting expert versions as to the functioning of the latch mechanism during the accident.12 Plaintiffs' principal witness testified that the Opel's door was caused to open when the latch button on the exterior handle of the driver's door was forcibly depressed by some protruding portion of the divider fence.13 It was his opinion that the exposed push button constituted a design defect.14 Plaintiffs also introduced evidence that other vehicular door latch designs used in production models of the same and prior years afforded substantially greater protection.15 Defendants' experts countered with their opinions that the force of the impact was sufficiently strong that it would have caused the door to open, resulting in Daly's death even if the Opel had been equipped with door latches of the alternative designs suggested by plaintiffs.16
Over plaintiffs' objections, defendants were permitted to introduce evidence indicating that the Opel was equipped with a seat belt-shoulder harness system and a door lock, either of which if used would have prevented Daly's ejection from the vehicle.17 Daly used neither the harness system nor the lock.18 The 1970 Opel owner's manual contained warnings that seat belts should be worn and doors locked when the car was in motion for accident security.19 Daly was intoxicated at the time of collision.20 The evidence was admitted for the limited purpose of determining whether decedent had used the vehicle's safety equipment.21 After relatively brief deliberations the jury returned a verdict favoring all defendants.22
Plaintiffs appealed from the ensuing adverse judgment to the Supreme Court of California.23 They contended that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that plaintiffs' recovery could be barred or diminished by decedent's contributory negligence and in refusing to instruct on the theory of crashworthiness.24
Whether the principles of comparative negligence apply to actions founded on strict products liability?25
Comparative negligence principles apply to strict products liability actions.26 A plaintiff's recovery is reduced in proportion to his own fault rather than barred entirely.27 The goals of strict liability to protect consumers and spread costs are not frustrated by apportionment.28 Fairness requires allocating loss according to responsibility.29
Yes. In this case the decedent Kirk Daly drove at 50-70 miles per hour.30 He was intoxicated and failed to use the seat belt-shoulder harness or door lock that would have prevented ejection after the door latch opened on impact with the divider fence.31 The jury received evidence of these facts and returned a defense verdict.32
Under the comparative rule the recovery is diminished only by the percentage of fault attributed to the decedent's conduct rather than eliminated.33 This preserves manufacturer liability for the defect while accounting for the user's contribution to the injury.34
Comparative negligence principles apply to strict products liability actions.
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Clark concurred under the compulsion of Li but emphasized that comparing fault remains inherently difficult whether between negligent acts or between negligence and a product defect.35 He observed that logic and common experience provide no basis for determining how much of the loss each party should bear.36 Juries lack any consistent measuring standard, producing arbitrary and unpredictable results.37
This impairs the ability of attorneys to evaluate cases for settlement and substantially impairs the efficient administration of justice.38 He suggested that a uniform discount system might achieve greater consistency and predictability than the comparative fault approach.39
Joined by Bird, C.j.
Justice Jefferson concurred in the reversal on evidentiary grounds but dissented from extending comparative principles.40 He argued that comparing a plaintiff's negligence with a defendant's defective product is logically impossible because the two concepts are fundamentally different.41 The jury process necessarily relies on speculation, conjecture, and guesswork rather than any rational formula.42
This produces only an unfair reduction in the plaintiff's total damages suffered from a defective product.43 He concluded that the defendant's liability for a defective product should not be diminished by such an untenable comparison.44
Justice Mosk dissented.45 He contended that injecting comparative negligence into strict products liability erodes the doctrine by shifting the focus from the product defect to the plaintiff's conduct.46 Defendants will assert contributory negligence in every case, turning the pleading of affirmative defenses into boilerplate.47
The policy of placing the full cost of defective products on manufacturers rather than injured consumers is undermined.48 He viewed the decision as a retreat from the pure products liability doctrine the court had developed over the prior decade and a half.49
Whether evidence of a driver's intoxication and failure to use available safety devices is admissible in a strict products liability action?50
Evidence of a plaintiff's intoxication and failure to use safety devices is inadmissible in a strict products liability action when offered to establish contributory negligence as a complete bar.51 Such evidence would subvert the rule that contributory negligence does not defeat recovery.52 It may improperly lead the jury to deny all recovery.53
No. In this case defendants introduced evidence that Daly was intoxicated and did not use the seat belt or door lock.54 The evidence was admitted ostensibly for limited purposes but presented at length without proper limiting instructions.55 The jury could readily have treated the evidence as authorizing a complete bar under pre-comparative rules.56 The court held the admission prejudicial because it was reasonably probable that exclusion or proper limitation would have produced a different result.57
Evidence of intoxication and nonuse of safety devices was not admissible under the rules applicable at trial and its admission constituted prejudicial error.58
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the theory of crashworthiness?59
No. The trial court instructed the jury that if the door latch was defective and the defect was a proximate cause of the decedent's injuries, plaintiffs could recover even though the defect did not cause the initial collision. This instruction adequately covered the crashworthiness theory.63 Plaintiffs' expert testified that the exposed push button constituted a design defect that caused the door to open on impact.64 The given instruction sufficiently addressed the second-collision enhancement of injury.65
The trial court did not err in refusing a separate crashworthiness instruction because the proximate-cause instruction adequately covered the theory.66
Whether the issue of defective design is to be determined with respect to the product as a whole rather than an isolated component?67
Yes. In this case the trial court instructed the jury to consider all equipment on the vehicle, including safety features, when determining whether the Opel was defective.71 Plaintiffs challenged the instruction as improperly allowing consideration of the seat belt and door lock alongside the latch.72 The court held that the overall design, not an isolated component, must be evaluated to decide whether the vehicle was crashworthy.73
Defective design is determined with respect to the product as a whole.74
Whether comparative fault principles apply retroactively to cases in which trial has already begun?75
Comparative fault principles apply to all cases in which trial has not begun before the opinion becomes final.76 Judgments from trials already commenced are not reversible solely for failure to apply comparative principles.77 The principles apply on retrial only if reversal occurs for other reasons.78
No. In this case the trial had already occurred without any request for or instruction on comparative fault.79 The issue was raised for the first time on appeal.80 The court therefore held that comparative principles could not be applied retroactively to justify admission of the intoxication and nonuse evidence.81 If any such judgment is reversed on appeal for other reasons, the principles herein expressed shall be applicable to any retrial commenced after this opinion becomes final in this court.82
Comparative fault principles do not apply retroactively to justify the admission of evidence in a trial that has already begun.83