390 S.C. 203, 701 S.E.2d 5 (2010)
In 1986 Ford Motor Company manufactured a 1987 Ford Bronco II 4x2 that Cheryl Hale purchased used in June 1999 for a nominal sum after it had accumulated 137,500 miles.1
On June 17, 2001, Hale was driving the Bronco II along Cromwell Road in Colleton County with several children as passengers, including her daughter in the front seat and Jesse Branham, III in the backseat; no one wore a seatbelt.2 Hale took her eyes off the road to quiet the excited children, causing the rear right wheel to leave the roadway, then overcorrected to the left, producing a shake that led the vehicle to roll over and eject Branham.3
Branham filed suit against Ford and Hale in Hampton County alleging a defective rear occupant restraint system and a handling and stability design defect related to rollover propensity, each pursued under negligence and strict liability theories.4 At trial Branham introduced internal Ford documents dated 1981 and 1982 concerning stability index calculations, Twin I-Beam suspension selection despite engineer objections, J-turn testing results, and expert testimony from Dr. Melvin Richardson and former Ford vice president Thomas Feaheny describing the MacPherson strut as a feasible alternative design.5
The jury returned a general verdict against both defendants and awarded Branham $16,000,000 in actual damages and $15,000,000 in punitive damages.6 Ford appealed directly to the Supreme Court of South Carolina under Rule 204(b), SCACR.7
Whether the trial court erred in denying Ford's motion for directed verdict on the handling and stability design defect claims?8
In a products liability design defect case under South Carolina law, a plaintiff must present evidence that the product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user when it left the manufacturer's control.9 A plaintiff must also show that a reasonable alternative design was available.10
No. The established facts demonstrate that Branham introduced internal Ford documents dated 1981 and 1982 concerning stability index calculations and Twin I-Beam suspension selection despite engineer objections.11 Branham also presented expert testimony from Dr. Melvin Richardson and former Ford vice president Thomas Feaheny.12 These witnesses described the MacPherson strut as a feasible alternative design that would have increased stability without compromising utility or increasing costs.13 This evidence created a genuine issue of material fact on the design defect claim sufficient to submit the case to the jury.14
The trial court did not err in denying Ford's motion for directed verdict on the handling and stability design defect claims.15
Whether the negligence seatbelt sleeve claim should have been dismissed when the companion strict liability claim was dismissed for lack of a defective condition unreasonably dangerous?16
When a strict liability claim is dismissed because the product was not in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user, the companion negligence claim must also be dismissed.17 Both theories share the common element that the product must be in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user at the time it left the manufacturer's control.18
Yes. The established facts show that Branham alleged a defective rear occupant restraint system under both negligence and strict liability theories.19 The trial court directed a verdict on the strict liability seatbelt sleeve claim for lack of a defective condition unreasonably dangerous.20 The negligence claim rested on the same common element without any additional showing of fault that could survive independently.21
The negligence seatbelt sleeve claim should have been dismissed when the companion strict liability claim was dismissed for lack of a defective condition unreasonably dangerous.22
Whether the risk-utility test with a reasonable alternative design requirement is the exclusive test for design defect claims?23
In design defect cases, the exclusive test under South Carolina law is the risk-utility test requiring proof of a reasonable alternative design.24 The consumer expectations test is ill-suited to design defect analysis.25 The risk-utility test provides objective factors for determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous.26
Yes. The established facts reflect that Branham pursued the handling and stability design defect claim under both consumer expectations and risk-utility theories.27 The court held that the risk-utility test with its reasonable alternative design requirement is the exclusive test for design defect claims going forward.28 The holding is supported by the MacPherson strut evidence presented at trial.29
The risk-utility test with a reasonable alternative design requirement is the exclusive test for design defect claims.30
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Waller
Justice Pleicones concurs that the risk-utility test is the appropriate test for design defect cases.31 He maintains that any shift must occur within the existing statutory framework of S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-73-10 through 30.32
That statute adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A and its consumer expectations comments as legislative intent.33 He argues that the court lacks authority to reject the consumer expectations test by judicial decision even if the legislature might approve the change.34 Pleicones would interpret the consumer expectations test in design defect cases to require manufacturers to weigh foreseeable risks against benefits.35
Whether post-distribution evidence is admissible to prove a design defect in a products liability case?36
No. The established facts indicate that Branham introduced post-manufacture evidence including a 1989 memorandum concerning Consumer Reports testing.39 Branham also introduced a 1989 film comparing the Bronco II to the Chevy S-10 Blazer.40 He further introduced a 1989 document comparing the Bronco II to the Ford Explorer prototype.41 The court found this evidence prejudicial and inadmissible on the issue of liability.42
Post-distribution evidence is not admissible to prove a design defect in a products liability case.43
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Waller
Justice Pleicones dissents from the majority's broad prohibition on post-manufacture evidence.44 He argues that the 1989 memorandum, film, and document were properly admissible to prove foreseeable risk of harm.45 The evidence also showed the viability of the proposed MacPherson and SLA alternative designs.46
Finally, the evidence demonstrated that the omission of those designs rendered the Bronco II not reasonably safe.47 The testing methods were available before manufacture.48 The vehicles tested were substantially similar to the subject vehicle.49
Pleicones concludes that the date of creation does not defeat relevance when the underlying data concerns risks known or knowable at manufacture.50
Whether evidence of other similar rollover incidents must satisfy the substantial similarity test and be limited to pre-manufacture data?51
Yes. The established facts show that Branham introduced voluminous post-manufacture rollover data and comparative accident statistics.54 The court held that this evidence violated both the substantial similarity requirement and the prohibition on post-distribution evidence for proving liability.55 Pre-manufacture data could be relevant if it satisfied the similarity test.56
Evidence of other similar rollover incidents must satisfy the substantial similarity test and be limited to pre-manufacture data.57
Whether Branham's closing argument was improper and requires a new trial?58
Yes. The established facts reflect that Branham's counsel's closing argument repeatedly referenced thirty people killed per year.61 Counsel also referenced six hundred additional deaths over twenty years.62 Counsel urged the jury to punish Ford for risking people's lives and brains.63 The argument relied on inadmissible evidence and invited the jury to punish Ford for harm to others beyond Branham.64
Branham's closing argument was improper and requires a new trial.65
Whether the verdict form requiring the jury to apportion fault between joint tortfeasors was error?66
Yes. The established facts show that Ford and Hale were alleged joint tortfeasors.70 The trial court used a verdict form requiring the jury to apportion 55% fault to Ford and 45% to Hale.71 This improper apportionment occurred despite the applicability of joint and several liability for the 2001 accident.72
The verdict form requiring the jury to apportion fault between joint tortfeasors was error.73