Also known as: jail · jails · gaol
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A place where persons awaiting trial or those convicted of misdemeanors are confined.
Jordan Jenkins faced a misdemeanor charge carrying a possible jail term. The court imposed a suspended sentence of thirty days. Because the sentence could result in actual deprivation of liberty, Jordan received appointed counsel for the proceedings.
Jason Jung was tried for simple battery after a bar fight. The potential penalty included up to six months in jail. The court therefore granted his demand for a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment.
In October 1966, nineteen-year-old Gary Duncan stopped his car on Highway 23 in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, after seeing his two younger Negro cousins talking with four white boys near a formerly all-white high school that had recently experienced racial incidents. Duncan approached the group, spoke with the white boys, encouraged his cousins to leave, and was about to drive away when a dispute arose over whether he had slapped or merely touched one of the white boys on the elbow. At his trial in the Twenty-fifth Judicial District Court of Louisiana, the white boys and a white onlooker testified that Duncan had slapped Herman Landry, while Duncan and his cousins testified that he had only touched the boy. The trial judge found Duncan guilty of simple battery beyond a reasonable doubt. Under Louisiana law, simple battery is a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum of two years' imprisonment and a three-hundred-dollar fine. Duncan requested a jury trial, but the trial judge denied the request because the Louisiana Constitution provides for jury trials only in cases where capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor may be imposed. Duncan was convicted by the judge alone and sentenced to sixty days in the parish prison and a fine of one hundred fifty dollars. Duncan sought review in the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which denied his application for a writ of certiorari. He then petitioned the United States Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), alleging that the denial of a jury trial violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument along with a related case.
View caseJose Jimenez stood trial for a misdemeanor carrying a jail term. The prosecution bore the burden of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt. The court instructed the jury accordingly before any confinement could be ordered.
On December 27, 1970, Gordon Patterson shot and killed John Northrup in Glens Falls, New York. After a brief and unstable marriage, Patterson had become estranged from his wife Roberta. Roberta had resumed an association with Northrup, a neighbor to whom she had been engaged before her marriage to Patterson. Patterson borrowed a rifle from an acquaintance and went to the residence of his father-in-law. There he observed his wife through a window in a state of semiundress in Northrup's presence. He entered the house and killed Northrup by shooting him twice in the head. Patterson was charged with second-degree murder. At his jury trial in Warren County Court, Patterson raised the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance and presented psychiatric evidence tending to show that he had been extremely emotionally disturbed when he killed Northrup. The jury was instructed that the prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime of murder. The defendant had the burden of proving the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury convicted Patterson of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. While appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was pending, this Court decided Mullaney v. Wilbur. The New York Court of Appeals nevertheless affirmed, distinguishing the Maine statute at issue in Mullaney and holding that New York's allocation of the burden of proof on the affirmative defense was consistent with due process. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question whether the burden of proof placed on the defendant by New York law is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
View caseJustin Jarvis and a codefendant were held in the same county jail. The prosecution sought to introduce the codefendant's out-of-court statement implicating Justin. The court excluded the statement to protect Justin's confrontation rights at trial.
In June 1966, petitioner George William Bruton and codefendant Evans were jointly tried before a jury in the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. They faced a federal charge of armed postal robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2114. A postal inspector testified that during two interrogations at the St. Louis city jail on April 11 and May 4, 1966, Evans orally confessed that he and Bruton had committed the robbery and that Evans had an accomplice whom he would not name. The interrogations followed an April 8 confession Evans gave to local police officers without warnings while held on state charges. Both defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. That court set aside Evans’ conviction on the ground that his oral confessions should not have been received in evidence against him. However, the court affirmed Bruton’s conviction because the trial judge had instructed the jury that Evans’ confession was competent evidence only against Evans and inadmissible hearsay against Bruton. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The trial had begun one week after Miranda v. Arizona, and the Court of Appeals applied that decision to hold the confessions tainted. On retrial Evans was acquitted. The Solicitor General later submitted a memorandum stating that in light of the record the judgment as to Bruton should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
View caseJerome Jackson spent four months in jail awaiting sentencing after conviction. The court applied the guidelines and credited the time served against the final term. The resulting sentence reflected the mandatory adjustments required by the ruling.
Respondent Freddie Booker was charged with possession with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The jury heard evidence that he possessed 92.5 grams in his duffel bag and found him guilty. Based on the jury's findings and his criminal history, the Guidelines called for a base sentence of 210 to 262 months. At sentencing, the district judge found by a preponderance that Booker possessed an additional 566 grams of crack and had obstructed justice. These findings raised the range to 360 months to life. The judge imposed 360 months. In the companion case, respondent Ducan Fanfan was convicted of conspiracy involving at least 500 grams of cocaine. The jury verdict authorized up to 78 months. The judge found additional facts that would have raised the range to 188 to 235 months but declined to apply them after Blakely. The Seventh Circuit held Booker's sentence violated the Sixth Amendment under Blakely and Apprendi. It remanded for resentencing based on jury findings. The Government sought certiorari in both cases, which the Court granted.
View caseJeffrey Jha challenged a privately operated jail's restriction on religious literature. The facility performed a traditional public function under state contract. The court therefore subjected the policy to constitutional scrutiny as state action.
Chickasaw, Alabama, is a suburb of Mobile owned entirely by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. The property includes residential buildings, streets, a sewage system and disposal plant, and a business block containing stores and a United States post office. A deputy sheriff of Mobile County, paid by the corporation, serves as the town policeman. The business block and its sidewalks serve as a regular shopping center for residents and the public. Company-owned roads connect to a nearby four-lane public highway. Nothing distinguishes the area from any other town except corporate title. Grace Marsh, a Jehovah’s Witness, entered the sidewalk in front of the business block near the post office and began distributing religious literature. The corporation had posted notices declaring the property private and prohibiting street vendors, agents, or solicitation of any kind without written permission. Marsh was warned that distribution required a permit, was told no permit would be issued, and was asked to leave. She refused and was arrested by the company-paid deputy. Marsh was charged in state court with violating Title 14, § 426 of the 1940 Alabama Code, which makes it a crime to enter or remain on the premises of another after having been warned not to do so. She was convicted. The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed at 21 So. 2d 558, holding the statute constitutional as applied because title remained in the corporation and public use had not created an irrevocable dedication under Alabama law. The Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari at 246 Ala. 539, 21 So. 2d 564. The case reached the United States Supreme Court on appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 344(a). Many people across the United States live in company-owned towns, particularly in industries such as bituminous coal mining where, in the period 1922–1923, roughly half of miners resided in employer-owned housing.
View caseA suspended jail sentence triggers the right because it may result in actual deprivation of liberty. The Sixth Amendment therefore requires counsel in such misdemeanor prosecutions.
Supporting sources
No right to appointed counsel exists in misdemeanor cases when no imprisonment is actually imposed. The constitutional requirement turns on whether incarceration occurs.
Supporting sources
Time spent in jail awaiting trial is credited against any sentence ultimately imposed. This credit prevents double punishment for the same period of confinement.