543 U.S. 220 (2005)
Respondent Freddie Booker was charged with possession with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The jury heard evidence that he possessed 92.5 grams in his duffel bag and found him guilty. Based on the jury's findings and his criminal history, the Guidelines called for a base sentence of 210 to 262 months.1
At sentencing, the district judge found by a preponderance that Booker possessed an additional 566 grams of crack and had obstructed justice.2 These findings raised the range to 360 months to life.3 The judge imposed 360 months.
In the companion case, respondent Ducan Fanfan was convicted of conspiracy involving at least 500 grams of cocaine.4 The jury verdict authorized up to 78 months.5 The judge found additional facts that would have raised the range to 188 to 235 months but declined to apply them after Blakely.6
The Seventh Circuit held Booker's sentence violated the Sixth Amendment under Blakely and Apprendi.7 It remanded for resentencing based on jury findings.8 The Government sought certiorari in both cases, which the Court granted.9
Whether the Sixth Amendment is violated when a judge, rather than a jury, finds facts that lead to the imposition of a sentence greater than that authorized by a jury verdict?10
The Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee applies to facts that increase the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, requiring such facts to be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as held in Apprendi v. New Jersey and extended in Blakely v. Washington to determinate sentencing schemes.11
Yes. The established facts show that in Booker's case the jury verdict authorized a range of 210 to 262 months based on 92.5 grams, but the judge's additional findings of 566 grams and obstruction of justice raised the range to 360 months to life, resulting in a 360-month sentence.12 In Fanfan's case the jury verdict authorized 78 months based on 500 grams or more, but the judge's findings of additional quantities and leadership role would have authorized 188 to 235 months, though the judge declined to apply them.13 These judicial findings by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, violated the Sixth Amendment under the rule from Apprendi and Blakely.14
The Sixth Amendment was violated in the application of the Guidelines to Booker and would have been violated in Fanfan if the enhancements had been applied.15
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Ginsburg joined the opinion of the Court with respect to both the constitutional holding and the remedy.16 She agreed that the Sixth Amendment requires jury findings for facts that increase a sentence beyond the range authorized by the jury verdict under the mandatory Guidelines. Ginsburg accepted the majority's conclusion that judicial factfinding by a preponderance violates the jury trial right in this determinate sentencing scheme.
She endorsed the decision to sever the mandatory provisions and treat the Guidelines as advisory. This approach cures the constitutional defect while preserving the overall structure of the Sentencing Reform Act. Ginsburg's position reflects full alignment with the Court's resolution of both the violation and the appropriate remedy.
Justice Scalia dissented in part from the remedy adopted by the Court.17 He maintained that the Constitution does not compel making the Guidelines advisory.18 The Sixth Amendment violation can be remedied by requiring jury findings for all facts that increase a sentence, without discarding the mandatory character of the Guidelines system.19
Scalia argued that the Court's chosen remedy exceeds what the Sixth Amendment demands. He contended that preserving jury factfinding for enhancements would satisfy the constitutional guarantee while retaining the binding nature of the Guidelines. This approach would avoid the broader invalidation of the mandatory scheme that Congress enacted.
Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's opinion in full.20 He argued that the majority's remedy undermines the core goals of the Sentencing Reform Act, particularly uniformity and proportionality in sentencing.21 Thomas emphasized that the mandatory Guidelines were designed to ensure consistent outcomes for similarly situated defendants across the federal system.
By rendering the Guidelines advisory, the Court reintroduces the very disparities the Act sought to eliminate. Thomas viewed the severance of mandatory provisions as contrary to congressional intent to create a structured, predictable sentencing regime. His dissent highlights the practical consequences for sentencing consistency.
Joined by Justice Souter
Justice Stevens agreed with the constitutional holding that the Sixth Amendment applies to the Guidelines but dissented from the remedy.22 He argued that the proper course is to engraft a jury trial requirement onto the Sentencing Reform Act rather than severing its mandatory provisions.23 Stevens believed this approach would better honor congressional intent by preserving the Guidelines structure while requiring jury findings for enhancements.
Stevens contended that the majority's wholesale invalidation of the mandatory scheme goes too far. His preferred remedy would allow the Guidelines to remain binding while complying with the Sixth Amendment through jury factfinding. This method avoids the complete transformation of the federal sentencing system.
Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist And Justices O'connor And Kennedy
Justice Breyer dissented from the constitutional holding.24 He maintained that the Sixth Amendment does not require jury findings for sentencing facts that help determine the manner in which the offender carried out the crime of conviction.25 Breyer found the historical argument unpersuasive, noting that the Framers enacted criminal statutes with indeterminate sentences revealing their acceptance of judicial factfinding at sentencing.26
Breyer argued that extending Apprendi and Blakely to the Guidelines would risk unwieldy trials and undermine congressional efforts to reduce sentencing disparity.27 He concluded that the Court's approach deprives Congress of authority that is constitutionally its own to specify sentencing factors.28
Whether the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 must be modified by severing its mandatory provisions to make the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory?29
When constitutional requirements render parts of a statute inoperable, the Court severs the incompatible provisions if doing so is consistent with congressional intent, leaving the remainder of the statute functional.30
Yes. The mandatory provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act that require imposition of a sentence within the Guidelines range and de novo review of departures are incompatible with the Sixth Amendment.31 Severing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) and § 3742(e) makes the Guidelines advisory, requiring district courts to consider the Guidelines but permitting sentences based on other statutory factors, with appellate review for reasonableness.32 This remedy is more consistent with Congress's intent to achieve uniformity through a Guidelines system than either total invalidation or engrafting a jury trial requirement onto the existing mandatory scheme.33
The Sentencing Reform Act must be modified by severing the mandatory provisions to make the Guidelines advisory.34
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Ginsburg joined the opinion of the Court with respect to both the constitutional holding and the remedy. She agreed that the Sixth Amendment requires jury findings for facts that increase a sentence beyond the range authorized by the jury verdict under the mandatory Guidelines. Ginsburg accepted the majority's conclusion that judicial factfinding by a preponderance violates the jury trial right in this determinate sentencing scheme.
She endorsed the decision to sever the mandatory provisions and treat the Guidelines as advisory. This approach cures the constitutional defect while preserving the overall structure of the Sentencing Reform Act. Ginsburg's position reflects full alignment with the Court's resolution of both the violation and the appropriate remedy.
Justice Scalia dissented in part from the remedy adopted by the Court. He maintained that the Constitution does not compel making the Guidelines advisory. The Sixth Amendment violation can be remedied by requiring jury findings for all facts that increase a sentence, without discarding the mandatory character of the Guidelines system.
Scalia argued that the Court's chosen remedy exceeds what the Sixth Amendment demands. He contended that preserving jury factfinding for enhancements would satisfy the constitutional guarantee while retaining the binding nature of the Guidelines. This approach would avoid the broader invalidation of the mandatory scheme that Congress enacted.
Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's opinion in full. He argued that the majority's remedy undermines the core goals of the Sentencing Reform Act, particularly uniformity and proportionality in sentencing. Thomas emphasized that the mandatory Guidelines were designed to ensure consistent outcomes for similarly situated defendants across the federal system.
By rendering the Guidelines advisory, the Court reintroduces the very disparities the Act sought to eliminate. Thomas viewed the severance of mandatory provisions as contrary to congressional intent to create a structured, predictable sentencing regime. His dissent highlights the practical consequences for sentencing consistency.
Joined by Justice Souter
Justice Stevens agreed with the constitutional holding that the Sixth Amendment applies to the Guidelines but dissented from the remedy. He argued that the proper course is to engraft a jury trial requirement onto the Sentencing Reform Act rather than severing its mandatory provisions. Stevens believed this approach would better honor congressional intent by preserving the Guidelines structure while requiring jury findings for enhancements.
Stevens contended that the majority's wholesale invalidation of the mandatory scheme goes too far. His preferred remedy would allow the Guidelines to remain binding while complying with the Sixth Amendment through jury factfinding. This method avoids the complete transformation of the federal sentencing system.
Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist And Justices O'connor And Kennedy
Justice Breyer dissented from the remedy as well.35 He argued that the Court's severance of the mandatory provisions was unnecessary because the constitutional violation could be avoided by requiring jury factfinding for enhancements while retaining the Guidelines structure.36 Breyer contended that Congress would not have preferred the discretionary system created by the majority over a system that preserved binding Guidelines with jury findings for sentencing facts.37
He maintained that the administrative nature of the Guidelines distinguishes them from statutes and that extending the Apprendi rule would create practical problems without constitutional necessity.38