Also known as:intermediate scrutiny · intermediate scrutiny test · mid-level scrutiny
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A standard of judicial review that requires a classification to be substantially related to an important governmental objective. The government bears the burden of demonstrating an exceedingly persuasive justification that is genuine rather than hypothesized.
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How its tested
Common Examples
6
Marital Property Sale Dispute
Isaac and India jointly own several rental properties. A state statute permits only the husband to execute a sale deed without the wife's signature. Isaac attempts to sell one parcel, but the recorder refuses to accept the deed. The court invalidates the statute because the gender line cannot survive the required review.
Cable Channel Mandate Challenge
Iris Energy operates streaming platforms subject to a federal rule requiring carriage of a government-curated public-service channel. The mandate displaces some of Iris Energy's preferred programming. The court upholds the rule after finding that it advances important interests unrelated to speech suppression and burdens no more speech than necessary.
Imran Iyer seeks admission to a state military college that excludes women. The state defends the single-sex policy by citing tradition and educational diversity. The court strikes down the policy because the justification rests on overbroad generalizations rather than a genuine important objective.
Paternity Suit Limitations Period
Idris Ives, a nonmarital child, files a support action after the statutory window has closed. Marital children face no comparable deadline. The court invalidates the six-year limit because the state failed to show a substantial relationship to preventing stale claims.
Sign Code Content Distinction
Integrity Partners displays directional signs for its events. A town ordinance imposes stricter size and duration limits on directional signs than on ideological signs. The court applies the standard to the content-neutral aspects of the code and finds the distinctions fail the tailoring requirement.
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz.576 U.S. 155 (2015)
The Town of Gilbert, Arizona, maintains a comprehensive Sign Code that categorizes outdoor signs by the type of information they convey and imposes different restrictions on each category. Ideological signs communicating messages or ideas for noncommercial purposes may be up to 20 square feet and displayed without time limits. Political signs designed to influence elections may be up to 32 square feet and displayed up to 60 days before a primary and 15 days after a general election. Temporary directional signs relating to qualifying events, such as meetings of nonprofit groups, are limited to 6 square feet, may be displayed no more than 12 hours before and 1 hour after the event, and are restricted in placement.
Petitioners Good News Community Church and its pastor Clyde Reed are small nondenominational churches that hold services at various temporary locations in the Town. To advertise their services, the Church posts 15 to 20 temporary signs around the Town early on Saturday mornings displaying the Church name and the time and location of the next service, removing them around midday on Sunday.
The Town's Sign Code compliance manager cited the Church twice for violating the time limits on temporary directional signs and for failing to include an event date on the signs. Town officials confiscated one sign, which Reed retrieved from municipal offices. Reed contacted the compliance department to reach an accommodation, but the manager informed the Church there would be no leniency and promised to punish future violations.
The Churches filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging the Sign Code violated the First Amendment, and sought a preliminary injunction. The District Court denied the motion. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding the Sign Code was content neutral. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Innovate Pharmaceuticals holds copyrights scheduled to expire. A federal statute extends the terms by twenty years. The court reviews the extension under the applicable standard and concludes that the measure advances important interests without burdening more speech than necessary.
Eldred v. Ashcroft537 U.S. 186
In 1998 Congress enacted the Copyright Term Extension Act, which extended the duration of all federal copyrights by twenty years. For works created by identified natural persons the new term runs from creation until seventy years after the author's death. For anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works made for hire the term is ninety-five years from publication or one hundred twenty years from creation, whichever expires first. The statute applied these extended terms both to copyrights already in existence and to works created after its effective date.
Petitioners are individuals and businesses whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have gone into the public domain. They filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaration that the extension of existing copyrights exceeded Congress's power under the Copyright Clause and violated the First Amendment. On cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings the district court entered judgment for the Attorney General.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. A majority of the panel upheld the statute against both challenges, while Judge Sentelle dissented in part on the Copyright Clause issue. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the extension of existing copyrights exceeds Congress's power under the Copyright Clause and whether the extension violates the First Amendment.
What burden does the government carry under intermediate scrutiny?
The government must demonstrate an exceedingly persuasive justification that is genuine and not hypothesized. It must also show that the classification is substantially related to an important governmental objective.
Does intermediate scrutiny apply to content-neutral speech regulations?
Yes. Content-neutral rules such as must-carry obligations receive intermediate scrutiny. The government must prove that the regulation advances important interests unrelated to suppressing speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary.
How does intermediate scrutiny differ from rational basis review?
Intermediate scrutiny demands a substantial relationship to an important objective and places the burden on the government. Rational basis review requires only a rational relationship to a legitimate interest and places the burden on the challenger.
Can a gender classification survive intermediate scrutiny?
A gender classification survives only if the government supplies an exceedingly persuasive justification showing a substantial relationship to a genuine important objective. Overbroad generalizations about the sexes will not suffice.
521 U.S. 507 (1997)
…holding attempted by RFRA. Even assuming RFRA would be interpreted in effect to mandate some lesser test, say, one equivalent to intermediate scrutiny, the statute nevertheless would require searching judicial scrutiny of state law with the attendant likelihood of invalidation. This is a considerable congressional intrusion into the…