independent and adequate state ground doctrine

In Florida, the State owns in trust for the public the land permanently submerged beneath navigable waters and the foreshore, making the mean high-water line the ordinary boundary between private beachfront property and state-owned land. Littoral owners hold special rights with regard to the water and foreshore, including the right to receive accretions and relictions to their property. In 1961, Florida’s Legislature passed the Beach and Shore Preservation Act, which sets procedures for beach restoration and nourishment projects to deposit sand on eroded beaches. A local government may apply to the Department of Environmental Protection for funds and permits, and when placing fill on the State’s submerged lands, authorization from the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund is required. Once a beach restoration is determined to be undertaken, the Board sets an erosion control line that replaces the fluctuating mean high-water line as the boundary between privately owned littoral property and state property, after which the common law ceases to increase upland property by accretion. In 2003, the city of Destin and Walton County applied for permits to restore 6.9 miles of beach within their jurisdictions that had been eroded by several hurricanes. The project would add about 75 feet of dry sand seaward of the mean high-water line. The Department issued a notice of intent to award the permits, and the Board approved the erosion-control line. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., a nonprofit corporation formed by people who own beachfront property bordering the project area, brought an administrative challenge to the proposed project. After the challenge proved unsuccessful and the Department approved the permits, the corporation challenged the action in state court under the Florida Administrative Procedure Act. The District Court of Appeal for the First District set aside the Department’s final order and certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court. The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative and quashed the First District’s remand. Petitioner sought rehearing on the ground that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision itself effected a taking of the Members’ littoral rights contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, but the request for rehearing was denied. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.

In 1972 three individuals who had been convicted of felonies and had completed their terms of incarceration and parole sought to register to vote in California. Respondent Ramirez, convicted in Texas of robbery by assault, applied in San Luis Obispo County. Respondent Lee, convicted in California of heroin possession, applied in Monterey County. Respondent Gill, convicted in California of burglary and forgery, applied in Stanislaus County. Each was refused registration by the respective county clerk or registrar on the ground of their prior felony convictions. The three respondents filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Supreme Court of California in May 1972, invoking that court's original jurisdiction. They brought the action on behalf of themselves and all other ex-felons similarly situated whose terms of incarceration and parole had expired. The petition named as defendants the three county election officials who had refused registration, individually and as representatives of the class of all county clerks and registrars, as well as the California Secretary of State. The three named county clerks did not contest the action and indicated they would register the named plaintiffs and similarly situated ex-felons. Petitioner Viola Richardson, County Clerk of Mendocino County, moved to intervene, alleging the suit was collusive and noting a pending lawsuit against her by an ex-felon in her county. The California Supreme Court denied the motion to intervene but added Richardson as a named defendant. The Secretary of State appeared and denied the essential claims. The California Supreme Court determined the case was not moot despite the relief afforded the named plaintiffs, exercised its original jurisdiction, and addressed the constitutional challenge. It denied the peremptory writ of mandate. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision.

In March 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun and five bullets. Acting on an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted Lopez, who admitted possessing the weapon. Local police arrested him and charged him under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The following day, state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. A federal grand jury indicted him on one count of knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone. Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress's power to legislate control over public schools. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the statute was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate activities affecting commerce because the business of schools affects interstate commerce. After a bench trial, the court found Lopez guilty and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and two years of supervised release. Lopez appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the conviction, holding that the statute was beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.

Petitioner, a black man, was indicted in Jefferson Circuit Court on two counts of second-degree burglary and one count of receipt of stolen goods. On the first day of trial, the judge conducted voir dire examination of the venire. He excused certain jurors for cause and permitted the parties to exercise peremptory challenges. The prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all four black persons on the venire. A jury composed only of white persons was selected. Defense counsel moved to discharge the jury before it was sworn. The motion claimed that the prosecutor's removal of the black veniremen violated petitioner's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to a jury drawn from a cross section of the community and under the Fourteenth Amendment to equal protection of the laws. Counsel requested a hearing on his motion. Without expressly ruling on the request for a hearing, the trial judge observed that the parties were entitled to use their peremptory challenges to strike anybody they wanted to. The judge denied the motion. The jury convicted petitioner on both counts. He was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment on each count with the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, petitioner argued that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges violated his right to trial by an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner also contended that the facts showed the prosecutor had engaged in a pattern of discriminatory challenges. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the conviction. It relied on Swain v. Alabama and held that petitioner had failed to show that the prosecutor had engaged in a pattern of discrimination in the selection of jurors in a series of cases. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In August 1972, two bicycles were taken from residential garages in the Moyina Heights area of Klamath Falls, Oregon. Respondent Hass was indicted for first-degree burglary with respect to the bicycle taken from the garage attached to the Lehman family residence but was not charged with the second theft. On the day of the thefts, Oregon State Police Officer Osterholme traced an automobile license number to Hass's residence, placed him under arrest, administered the Miranda warnings, and questioned him about the Lehman bicycle. Hass admitted taking two bicycles because he needed money, returning one, and leaving the other at a location he described. While being transported in a patrol car toward the site, Hass stated that he was in a lot of trouble and would like to telephone his attorney. Officer Osterholme replied that Hass could telephone the lawyer as soon as they reached the office. Hass then pointed out a place in the brush where the bicycle was found. At trial the court ruled that statements made by Hass after he requested an attorney, including his identification of the bicycle's location, were inadmissible. The prosecution nevertheless elicited from Officer Osterholme in its case in chief before the jury that Hass had admitted taking two bicycles that day, returning one, and that the other had been recovered. Hass took the stand and testified that he had been riding around in his Volkswagen truck with two friends, that the friends had placed the bicycles in the truck without his prior knowledge, that he had disposed of one bicycle, and that he had not known the locations of the residences from which the bicycles were taken. On rebuttal Officer Osterholme testified that Hass had pointed out the two houses from which the bicycles were taken and that a companion had difficulty identifying the residences until Hass pointed them out. At the defense's request the trial court instructed the jury that the officer's testimony describing Hass's statements could be considered only as it bore on Hass's credibility as a witness and not as proof of guilt. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and Hass received a sentence of two years' probation and a $250 fine. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, feeling bound by its earlier decision in State v. Brewton. On petition for review the Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed by a 4-to-3 vote, reasoning that the situation was distinguishable from Harris v. New York. Because the result conflicted with decisions in other jurisdictions and bore upon the reach of Harris, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.