418 U.S. 24 (1974)
In 1972 three individuals who had been convicted of felonies and had completed their terms of incarceration and parole sought to register to vote in California.1 Respondent Ramirez, convicted in Texas of robbery by assault, applied in San Luis Obispo County.2 Respondent Lee, convicted in California of heroin possession, applied in Monterey County.3 Respondent Gill, convicted in California of burglary and forgery, applied in Stanislaus County.4 Each was refused registration by the respective county clerk or registrar on the ground of their prior felony convictions.5
The three respondents filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Supreme Court of California in May 1972, invoking that court's original jurisdiction.6 They brought the action on behalf of themselves and all other ex-felons similarly situated whose terms of incarceration and parole had expired.7 The petition named as defendants the three county election officials who had refused registration, individually and as representatives of the class of all county clerks and registrars, as well as the California Secretary of State.8
The three named county clerks did not contest the action and indicated they would register the named plaintiffs and similarly situated ex-felons.9 Petitioner Viola Richardson, County Clerk of Mendocino County, moved to intervene, alleging the suit was collusive and noting a pending lawsuit against her by an ex-felon in her county.10 The California Supreme Court denied the motion to intervene but added Richardson as a named defendant.11 The Secretary of State appeared and denied the essential claims.12
The California Supreme Court determined the case was not moot despite the relief afforded the named plaintiffs, exercised its original jurisdiction, and addressed the constitutional challenge.13 It denied the peremptory writ of mandate.14 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision.15
Whether the case presents a live case or controversy after the named plaintiffs obtained the relief they sought and the named defendants acquiesced?16
The case-or-controversy requirement of Article III limits federal courts to adjudication of actual disputes between adverse parties.17 A definite and concrete controversy must touch the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.18 A case is not moot where the Supreme Court of California treated the action as brought for the benefit of a class of all ex-felons similarly situated.19 The court added petitioner Richardson as a defendant because class members resided in her county and continued to seek registration.20
No. The three named plaintiffs obtained registration from the clerks in their counties after those officials acquiesced. Yet the Supreme Court of California added petitioner Richardson as a named defendant precisely because unnamed members of the class of ex-felons resided in Mendocino County and were seeking to register there. This included the ex-felon who had sued Richardson in a separate action pending in the Court of Appeal.21
The alternative writ of mandate issued by the California Supreme Court directed the named clerks individually and as representatives of the class of all other county clerks to register all ex-felons whose terms of incarceration and parole had expired.22 This demonstrated that the court treated the action as one brought for the benefit of the entire class described in the petition rather than solely the three named plaintiffs.23 The briefs of the parties before the United States Supreme Court confirm that the adverse alignment between petitioner Richardson and the class of ex-felons continues.24
The Supreme Court of California exercised its inherent discretion to resolve the question of broad public interest even though the named plaintiffs had received relief.25 Its judgment binds petitioner Richardson while deciding the federal constitutional question for the unnamed class members whose continuing controversy led that court to conclude the case was not moot.26
The case presents a live case or controversy and is not moot.27
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Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall contended that the judgment of the California Supreme Court rests on an adequate and independent state ground.28 The court denied the peremptory writ of mandate after the named plaintiffs had already been registered.29 This rendered any discussion of the federal constitutional question advisory.30
He further argued that the California court never treated the case as a class action in its opinion.31 The opinion described the proceeding simply as one brought by three ex-felons.32 No live controversy existed between the named plaintiffs and petitioner Richardson because none of the named plaintiffs resided in Mendocino County.33
Justice Douglas agreed with Part I-A of Justice Marshall's opinion regarding the adequate and independent state ground.34 He dissented from reversal of the judgment below.35 He could not say that the judgment does not rest on an independent state ground.36
See Hayakawa v. Brown, 415 U. S. 1304 (DOUGLAS, J., in chambers).37
His agreement with the jurisdictional analysis of the dissent underscores his view that the Court should not have reached the merits because the state court judgment rests on independent state grounds.38
Whether section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment exempts from the equal protection guarantee state laws that disenfranchise persons convicted of crime?39
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly exempts from the sanction of reduced representation any denial of the right to vote for participation in rebellion or other crime.40 The framers intended this language to mean what it says on its face.41 Floor debates in the 39th Congress support the plain meaning.42 Twenty-nine state constitutions at the time of adoption contained felony disenfranchisement provisions.43 The Reconstruction Act and subsequent readmission statutes excepted felony disenfranchisement from the conditions imposed on former Confederate states.44
Yes. The particular language of section 2 was first proposed by Senator Williams of Oregon to a meeting of the Joint Committee on April 28, 1866.45 The Joint Committee approved this proposal by a lopsided margin.46 The draft Amendment was reported to the House floor with no change in the language of section 2.47 The language was never altered throughout the floor debates despite numerous other proposed changes to section 2.48 Congressman Bingham of Ohio, a principal architect of the Amendment, explained that if a state discriminates against its colored population as to the elective franchise except in cases of crime it loses representative power.49 Representative Eliot stated that political power shall be lost because of denial not imposed because of participation in rebellion or other crime.50 Representative Eckley observed that persons convicted of crime against the laws of the United States are disfranchised.51 Senator Johnson of Maryland and Senator Henderson of Missouri made similar comments confirming the plain meaning.52
At the time of adoption twenty-nine states had constitutional provisions prohibiting or authorizing prohibition of voting by persons convicted of felonies or infamous crimes.53 The Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867, and the enabling acts readmitting Arkansas, North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Virginia, Mississippi, and Texas all excepted from the required franchise provisions those disfranchised for participation in the rebellion or for felony at common law.54
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment exempts from the equal protection guarantee state laws that disenfranchise persons convicted of crime.55
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Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall argued that section 2 was intended as a limited political compromise to induce Southern states to enfranchise Negro voters or lose representation.56 It was not meant to limit the other sections of the Fourteenth Amendment or to freeze the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause to conceptions of voting rights prevalent in 1868.57 The special remedy of reduced representation for disenfranchisement of Negroes does not imply approval of other forms of electoral discrimination to which the section 2 remedy is inapplicable.58
One form of disenfranchisement specifically authorized by the Reconstruction Act, durational residence requirements, has already been held unconstitutional.59
Whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits California from denying the franchise to ex-felons who have completed their sentences and paroles?60
The exclusion of felons from the franchise has affirmative sanction in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.61 This distinguishes such laws from other state-imposed restrictions on the franchise invalidated under the Equal Protection Clause in cases such as Dunn v. Blumstein, Bullock v. Carter, Kramer v. Union Free School District, and Cipriano v. City of Houma.62 The understanding of the framers reflected in the language of section 2 and in historical and judicial interpretation is of controlling significance.63
No. The Supreme Court of California erred in concluding that California may no longer, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, exclude from the franchise convicted felons who have completed their sentences and paroles.64 The affirmative sanction in section 2 was not present in the voting-rights cases on which respondents relied.65 The Court has indicated approval of felony disenfranchisement in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections by listing previous criminal record as an obvious example of a factor a state may consider in determining voter qualifications.66 The Court has summarily affirmed district court decisions upholding such laws in Fincher v. Scott and Beacham v. Braterman.67
The Court declined to accept the view that section 2 is the only part of the Amendment dealing with voting rights.68 It rested on the proposition that section 1 could not have been meant to bar outright a form of disenfranchisement expressly exempted from the less drastic sanction imposed by section 2.69 Arguments that restoration of the franchise is essential to rehabilitation of ex-felons are properly addressed to the legislative forum rather than the judiciary.70
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit California from denying the franchise to ex-felons who have completed their sentences and paroles.71
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall argued that the disenfranchisement of ex-felons must be measured against the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of section 1.72 Section 2 provides only a supplementary remedy for a particular form of electoral abuse and does not immunize other discriminations from evolving equal protection scrutiny.73 He concluded that the state failed to meet its heavy burden of showing a compelling interest because the classification is overinclusive and underinclusive.74
Many election-law violators are treated as misdemeanants and not barred from voting.75 Less burdensome means such as criminal sanctions exist to prevent fraud.76 Modern authorities including the National Conference on Uniform State Laws, the American Law Institute, and the President's Commission on Law Enforcement have endorsed full suffrage rights for former felons.77
He would expressly disavow continued adherence to the notions expressed in Murphy v. Ramsey and Davis v. Beason that a state may disenfranchise voters to withdraw political influence from those hostile to the existing order.78