420 U.S. 714 (1975)
In August 1972, two bicycles were taken from residential garages in the Moyina Heights area of Klamath Falls, Oregon.1 Respondent Hass was indicted for first-degree burglary with respect to the bicycle taken from the garage attached to the Lehman family residence but was not charged with the second theft.2
On the day of the thefts, Oregon State Police Officer Osterholme traced an automobile license number to Hass's residence, placed him under arrest, administered the Miranda warnings, and questioned him about the Lehman bicycle.3 Hass admitted taking two bicycles because he needed money, returning one, and leaving the other at a location he described.4 While being transported in a patrol car toward the site, Hass stated that he was in a lot of trouble and would like to telephone his attorney.5 Officer Osterholme replied that Hass could telephone the lawyer as soon as they reached the office.6 Hass then pointed out a place in the brush where the bicycle was found.7
At trial the court ruled that statements made by Hass after he requested an attorney, including his identification of the bicycle's location, were inadmissible.8 The prosecution nevertheless elicited from Officer Osterholme in its case in chief before the jury that Hass had admitted taking two bicycles that day, returning one, and that the other had been recovered.9 Hass took the stand and testified that he had been riding around in his Volkswagen truck with two friends, that the friends had placed the bicycles in the truck without his prior knowledge, that he had disposed of one bicycle, and that he had not known the locations of the residences from which the bicycles were taken.10
On rebuttal Officer Osterholme testified that Hass had pointed out the two houses from which the bicycles were taken and that a companion had difficulty identifying the residences until Hass pointed them out.11 At the defense's request the trial court instructed the jury that the officer's testimony describing Hass's statements could be considered only as it bore on Hass's credibility as a witness and not as proof of guilt.12 The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and Hass received a sentence of two years' probation and a $250 fine.13
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, feeling bound by its earlier decision in State v. Brewton.14 On petition for review the Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed by a 4-to-3 vote, reasoning that the situation was distinguishable from Harris v. New York.15 Because the result conflicted with decisions in other jurisdictions and bore upon the reach of Harris, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.16
Whether statements made by a suspect who has received Miranda warnings, requested to telephone counsel, and been told he must wait until reaching the station are admissible solely for impeachment purposes after the suspect testifies at trial in a manner inconsistent with those statements?17
Evidence inadmissible against an accused in the prosecution's case in chief under Miranda is not barred for all purposes, provided the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards.18 Such evidence may be used to impeach the defendant's credibility when he testifies inconsistently at trial.19
Yes. The established facts show that Officer Osterholme administered full Miranda warnings to Hass before questioning him about the Lehman bicycle.20 Hass then requested to telephone his attorney while en route in the patrol car and was told he could do so upon reaching the office.21 Hass subsequently identified the bicycle's location.22
When Hass later took the stand, he testified inconsistently with those statements.23 He claimed he had no prior knowledge of the thefts and did not know the residences' locations.24 The trial court properly permitted Officer Osterholme's rebuttal testimony about the statements and the pointed-out houses to be considered solely on credibility after instructing the jury to that effect.25
The statements are admissible solely for impeachment purposes.26
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissents because the decision extends Harris and undermines Miranda.27 Once warnings are given, police have almost no incentive to follow the requirement that interrogation must cease when an accused requests counsel.28 If the requirement is followed, the attorney will advise the accused to remain silent and no statement will result.29
If the requirement is disobeyed, however, the police may obtain a statement usable for impeachment if the accused testifies.30 After today's decision, police interrogation will be vigorously pressed to obtain statements before counsel arrives.31 Brennan would affirm or remand rather than erode Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.32
Whether a decision by a state supreme court in favor of a criminal defendant on federal constitutional grounds is reviewable by the United States Supreme Court?33
A state is an aggrieved party entitled to Supreme Court review when its highest court holds on federal constitutional grounds that the prosecution may not utilize otherwise relevant evidence.34
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals reversal by a 4-to-3 vote.35 The affirmance rested on Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds after distinguishing Harris.36 This rendered the State aggrieved and conferred jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to grant certiorari and reverse.37
The decision is reviewable by the United States Supreme Court.38
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall dissents on jurisdictional grounds.39 The Oregon Supreme Court's opinion leaves open the possibility that it rested at least in part on the independent state constitutional prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination.40 The Court should therefore remand rather than review the federal issue to avoid rendering an advisory opinion.41
Marshall emphasizes that state courts should be asked rather than told what they have intended when the basis of decision is unclear.42 He would permit the state court freedom to strike its own balance between individual rights and police practices.43
Whether a state may impose greater restrictions on police activity than those required by federal constitutional standards when the Supreme Court has specifically refrained from imposing them?44
A state is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than federal constitutional standards require.45 However, it may not impose such greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when the Supreme Court has specifically refrained from imposing them.46
No. The established facts establish that the Oregon courts decided the case solely on federal Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds without citing the state constitution.47 The Supreme Court therefore properly rejected any claim that Oregon could impose greater federal constitutional restrictions than those the Court itself had declined to adopt in Harris.48
A state may not impose such greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law.49