Also known as: inconsistent obligation · conflicting obligations
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A risk that an existing party in litigation faces when an absent person's claimed interest in the subject of the action may subject that party to conflicting duties imposed by multiple judgments. The risk arises when compliance with one court's order would require breach of another court's order concerning the same incident. Courts assess whether the risk is substantial rather than merely theoretical or speculative.
Ismael Ibrahim sued his insurer for coverage after a fire damaged his warehouse. The insurer moved to join a second insurer that had issued an overlapping policy on the same property. Without joinder the first insurer risked paying the full loss while the second insurer later obtained a judgment denying any duty to contribute.
Igor Ito obtained a judgment requiring his employer to promote him and pay back wages. The employer later faced a separate suit by other employees claiming the promotion violated a prior consent decree limiting promotions. The employer argued that the second suit exposed it to inconsistent obligations that could have been avoided by joining the decree beneficiaries in the first action.
In 1974 and 1975, the Ensley Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and seven black individuals filed separate class-action complaints against the City of Birmingham and the Jefferson County Personnel Board. They alleged racially discriminatory hiring and promotion practices in public service jobs including the fire department in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other federal law. After a bench trial in 1976 on some issues and a second trial in 1979 focused on promotion practices but before judgment, the parties negotiated two consent decrees. One was between the black individuals and the City, and the other was between them and the Board. These proposed decrees set forth an extensive remedial scheme including long-term and interim annual goals for the hiring of blacks as firefighters and goals for promotion of blacks within the fire department. The District Court entered an order provisionally approving the decrees and directing publication of notice of the upcoming fairness hearings. Notice of the hearings with a reference to the general nature of the decrees was published in two local newspapers. At that hearing the Birmingham Firefighters Association appeared and filed objections as amicus curiae. After the hearing but before final approval the BFA and two of its members moved to intervene on the ground that the decrees would adversely affect their rights. The District Court denied the motions as untimely and approved the decrees in August 1981. Seven white firefighters, all members of the BFA, then filed a complaint against the City and the Board seeking injunctive relief against enforcement of the decrees. The District Court denied relief. Both the denial of intervention and the denial of injunctive relief were affirmed on appeal in 1983. A new group of white firefighters, the Wilks respondents, then brought suit against the City and the Board. They alleged that because of their race they were being denied promotions in favor of less qualified blacks in violation of federal law. The Board and the City admitted making race-conscious employment decisions but argued that the decisions were required by the consent decrees. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss after trial, concluding that the promotions of the black individuals were in fact required by the terms of the consent decree. On appeal the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that because the Wilks respondents were neither parties nor privies to the consent decrees their independent claims of unlawful discrimination are not precluded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1988.
View caseIra Irving and other citizens sued members of Congress who held reserve commissions in the armed forces. The plaintiffs alleged that the dual roles created inconsistent obligations that could force the members to choose between congressional duties and military commands. The Court examined whether the claimed injury satisfied standing requirements.
The Reservists Committee to Stop the War, a national unincorporated association of present and former officers and enlisted members of the Reserves organized for the purpose of opposing United States military involvement in Vietnam, along with five individual members who were California residents, United States citizens, and taxpayers, filed a class action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the Secretary of Defense and the three Service Secretaries. The complaint sought an order in the nature of mandamus requiring petitioners to strike from the rolls of the Reserves all Members of Congress presently thereon, a permanent injunction preventing petitioners from placing on the rolls of the Reserves any Member of Congress while serving in Congress, and a declaration that membership in the Reserves is an office under the United States prohibited to Members of Congress by Article I, Section 6, Clause 2. The plaintiffs sought to represent four classes: all persons opposed to United States military involvement in Vietnam and purporting to use lawful means to end that involvement, all officers and enlisted members of the Reserves who were not Members of Congress, all taxpayers of the United States, and all citizens of the United States. At the time suit was filed, 130 Members of the 91st Congress were also members of the Reserves. By the end of the 92d Congress, 119 Members were reservists. As of November 2, 1973, the 93d Congress has seen the number of its reservists reduced to 107, all but one of whom are commissioned officers, and none of whom can occupy the Ready Reserve status of the individual respondents. Of the 107, 20 are in the active, and 12 in the inactive, Standby Reserve; and 73 are in the Retired Reserve. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that respondents lacked standing and that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The District Court denied standing to respondents as reservists, as opponents of our Vietnam involvement, and as taxpayers, but held that their status as citizens conferred standing. The court rejected the contention that the claim presented a nonjusticiable political question and granted partial summary judgment for respondents by declaring that the Incompatibility Clause renders a Member of Congress ineligible, during his continuance in office, to hold a Reserve commission. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court in an unpublished opinion on the basis of the memorandum opinion of the District Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
View caseIsabella Ingram sought to represent a class of parolees challenging parole revocation procedures. The parole commission argued that certification was needed to protect it from inconsistent obligations that could arise if individual class members later obtained conflicting rulings on the same procedures. The Court considered how the class mechanism addresses such risks.
In 1973 the United States Parole Board adopted explicit Parole Release Guidelines that established a customary range of confinement by combining a parole prognosis score with an offense severity rating. On January 25, 1974, respondent John M. Geraghty was convicted in the Northern District of Illinois of conspiracy to commit extortion and making false material declarations to a grand jury and was sentenced to concurrent terms of four years and one year. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. Geraghty later obtained a reduction of his sentence to 30 months through a Rule 35 motion. Geraghty applied for parole in January 1976 and again in June 1976. Both applications were denied because his offense behavior was rated very high severity, his salient factor score was 11, and the guidelines indicated a range of 26-36 months. He then instituted this civil suit as a class action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the guidelines as inconsistent with the PCRA and the Constitution, and questioning the procedures by which the guidelines were applied to his case. The case was transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania where Geraghty was incarcerated. The district court denied class certification as neither necessary nor appropriate and granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims. Geraghty appealed to the Third Circuit individually and on behalf of the proposed class. Another prisoner represented by the same counsel moved to intervene. On June 30, 1977, before any briefs were filed, Geraghty was mandatorily released after serving 22 months of his sentence. The Parole Commission moved to dismiss the appeals as moot. The Third Circuit held the litigation was not moot, reversed the denial of class certification, and remanded for further proceedings including evaluation of subclasses. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the courts of appeals on whether a class action challenging parole guidelines becomes moot when the named plaintiff is released from prison while the appeal from denial of class certification is pending.
View caseInconsistent obligations occur when a party cannot comply with one court's order without breaching another court's order on the same incident. Inconsistent adjudications or results alone do not trigger the rule.
No. The rule focuses on whether disposing of the action in the absentee's absence creates a substantial risk that the existing party will face conflicting duties. Prior settlements or potential future suits can supply the necessary concrete risk when the same subject matter is involved.
The movant must demonstrate more than theoretical inconsistency. The risk must be concrete and arise directly from the absent person's interest in the subject of the action so that the existing party could be forced to violate one judgment to satisfy another.
Supporting sources
Contractual indemnity may reduce the practical risk but does not automatically negate the substantial-risk finding. Courts examine whether the indemnity provides an adequate avenue to mitigate conflicting duties arising from the same interest.
…rendered in the absence of a person may "leave. . . persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring . . . inconsistent obligations. . . ." Rule 19(b) sets forth the factors to be considered by a court in deciding whether to allow an action to proceed in the absence of an interested party. Joinder as a…