Also known as:important governmental objective · important government objectives · intermediate scrutiny
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A required element of the intermediate scrutiny standard applied to gender classifications under the Equal Protection Clause. The classification must serve an interest that qualifies as important and must be substantially related to achieving that interest. The government bears the burden of demonstrating both the importance of the objective and the substantial relationship.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Marital Property Control Statute
Ivy Ibarra and her husband jointly own a duplex purchased as a marital investment. A state statute designates the husband as head of household and permits him alone to encumber the property. Ivy challenges the statute after a lender accepts a deed of trust signed only by her husband. The court applies intermediate scrutiny and finds that the statute fails to advance any important governmental objective because it rests on outdated assumptions about male control of family assets.
Cable Must-Carry Regulation
Iris Energy operates a cable system and objects to a federal rule requiring carriage of local broadcast stations. The company argues the rule burdens its editorial choices. The court subjects the content-neutral mandate to intermediate scrutiny and holds that the government has shown important interests in preserving free television and promoting fair competition that are unrelated to suppressing speech.
India Inoue applies to a state-supported military college that excludes women. The state defends the policy by citing the school's adversative training method. The court requires the state to prove an exceedingly persuasive justification and finds that the asserted interest in single-sex education is not genuine and relies on overbroad generalizations about the capacities of men and women.
Violence Against Women Remedy
Imani Idowu sues her assailant under a federal civil remedy for gender-motivated violence. The defendant contends Congress lacked power to create the cause of action. The court examines whether the remedy can be justified as enforcing equal protection and concludes that state-sponsored gender discrimination must serve important governmental objectives with substantially related means.
United States v. Morrison529 U.S. 598 (2000)
In September 1994 Christy Brzonkala enrolled as a student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. Within thirty minutes of meeting fellow students Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, both members of the varsity football team, Brzonkala alleges that the two men assaulted and repeatedly raped her. Morrison allegedly told Brzonkala after the attack that she had better not have any diseases. He later announced in a dormitory dining room that he liked to get girls drunk and made other vulgar remarks about women.
Brzonkala became severely emotionally disturbed and depressed after the incident. She sought assistance from a university psychiatrist who prescribed antidepressant medication. She stopped attending classes and withdrew from the university. In early 1995 she filed a complaint against Morrison and Crawford under the university's Sexual Assault Policy. Virginia Tech conducted a hearing under its Sexual Assault Policy and a second hearing under its Abusive Conduct Policy. The first found Morrison guilty of sexual assault and suspended him for two semesters. The second hearing again found him guilty but changed the offense description to using abusive language. University officials later set aside the punishment.
In December 1995 Brzonkala sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. Her complaint alleged that the attack violated 42 U.S.C. §13981, the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, which creates a federal cause of action for compensatory and punitive damages against persons who commit crimes of violence motivated by gender. She also asserted Title IX claims against the university.
The district court dismissed the Title IX claims for failure to state a claim. It also dismissed the §13981 claim on the ground that Congress lacked authority to enact the provision under either the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed in part, but the en banc Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact §13981.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the constitutionality of the civil remedy provision.
Interlink Communications seeks a permit to operate a supervised residence for adults with intellectual disabilities. The city denies the permit citing safety concerns without supporting data. The court applies rational basis review but notes that gender classifications would require important governmental objectives substantially related to the classification, underscoring the lower threshold applied to disability classifications.
City of Cleburne, Texas, et al. v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., et al.473 U.S. 432, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985)
In July 1980, respondent Jan Hannah purchased a building at 201 Featherston Street in Cleburne, Texas.
Hannah intended to lease the property to Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC) for use as a group home.
The home would house thirteen mentally retarded men and women under constant staff supervision.
The building contained four bedrooms and two baths, and CLC planned to add a half bath while complying with all applicable state and federal regulations for an Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded.
The site lay in an R-3 Apartment House District.
The city's zoning ordinance permitted apartment houses, boarding houses, hospitals, and nursing homes in that district without special permission.
However, the ordinance required a special use permit, renewable annually after a public hearing, for hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded.
The city classified the proposed group home as a hospital for the feeble-minded and informed CLC that a permit was required.
After a public hearing, the City Council voted three to one to deny the application.
CLC and its prospective residents filed suit in federal district court against the city and its officials.
They alleged that the ordinance and its application discriminated against the mentally retarded in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The district court upheld the ordinance and the denial.
It found that the council's decision was motivated by the residents' mental retardation yet rationally related to legitimate interests such as neighborhood safety and property values.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that mental retardation is a quasi-suspect class and that the ordinance was invalid both facially and as applied.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the equal protection issues raised by the zoning ordinance and its application to the proposed group home.
Infinity Bank challenges a city zoning ordinance that prevents expansion of its facilities on religious grounds. The bank claims the ordinance imposes a substantial burden. The court explains that under strict scrutiny the government must show a compelling interest, contrasting this with the important governmental objectives required under intermediate scrutiny for gender classifications.
City of Boerne v. Flores521 U.S. 507 (1997)
St. Peter Catholic Church was built in 1923 in Boerne, Texas. Its structure replicates the mission style of the region's earlier history. The church seats about 230 worshippers, a number too small for its growing parish. Some 40 to 60 parishioners cannot be accommodated at some Sunday masses.
To meet the needs of the congregation, the Archbishop of San Antonio gave permission to the parish to plan alterations to enlarge the building.
A few months later, the Boerne City Council passed an ordinance authorizing the city's Historic Landmark Commission to prepare a preservation plan with proposed historic landmarks and districts. Under the ordinance, the commission must preapprove construction affecting historic landmarks or buildings in a historic district.
Soon afterwards, the Archbishop applied for a building permit so construction to enlarge the church could proceed. City authorities, relying on the ordinance and the designation of a historic district which they argued included the church, denied the application.
The Archbishop brought this suit challenging the permit denial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The complaint contained multiple claims, but to this point the litigation has centered on RFRA and the question of its constitutionality. The District Court concluded that by enacting RFRA Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA to be constitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and now reverses.
Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith. RFRA prohibits government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. Unless the government can demonstrate that the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, it must also show that the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The Act applies to all federal and state law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the enactment of RFRA.
What must the government prove to satisfy the important governmental objectives prong?
The government must identify a genuine objective that is important rather than hypothesized or based on stereotypes. It must also show that the gender classification is substantially related to achieving that objective.
Does administrative convenience qualify as an important governmental objective?
No. The Court has repeatedly held that administrative ease and convenience are insufficient to justify gender-based classifications under intermediate scrutiny.
Who bears the burden of proof under the important governmental objectives test?
The government bears the burden of proving both that the objective is important and that the classification is substantially related to it. The justification must be exceedingly persuasive.
Can a statute survive if it relies on overbroad generalizations about gender roles?
No. Interests that rest on archaic or overbroad generalizations about the talents or preferences of men and women do not qualify as important governmental objectives.
521 U.S. 507 (1997)
…holding attempted by RFRA. Even assuming RFRA would be interpreted in effect to mandate some lesser test, say, one equivalent to intermediate scrutiny, the statute nevertheless would require searching judicial scrutiny of state law with the attendant likelihood of invalidation. This is a considerable congressional intrusion into the…