Also known as: immediate families
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A group of close relatives consisting of a person's parents, spouse, children, and siblings. The category often extends to the corresponding relatives of the person's spouse and to stepchildren or adopted children.
Supervisor Lane announces over the loudspeaker that a machine has killed Iain Irons's child behind tarps. Iain, present on the factory floor, panics and suffers a heart attack from the fright. The resulting bodily harm supports recovery because the shock arose from peril to an immediate family member occurring in Iain's presence.
Supervisor Morgan falsely tells Luis that his wife has burned to death and displays graphic photos. Luis's daughter Ana, seated in the back of the room, is present and immediately suffers severe emotional distress. Recovery is available because Ana is a member of Luis's immediate family who was present at the time.
Irene Ingalls stands at the curb and sees a car strike her daughter. The impact occurs directly in front of Irene, who suffers lasting emotional trauma. The closeness of the parent-child relationship within the immediate family supports her bystander claim for the distress.
On September 27, 1964, at approximately 4:30 p.m., at the intersection of Blue Ridge Road and Chenango Avenue in Sacramento County, defendant David Legg operated his motor vehicle in such a manner that it struck and killed two-year-old Erin Lee Dillon. Plaintiff Cheryl Dillon, the mother of the deceased child, was a pedestrian at or near the intersection in close proximity to the accident and actually witnessed the impact and death of her daughter. Plaintiff Robert Dillon, the minor brother of the deceased, was also a pedestrian in close proximity to the accident and witnessed the impact and death of his sister. The complaint set forth three separate counts seeking recovery for the resulting injuries. In the first count, Cheryl Dillon alleged that as a direct and proximate result of the defendant's negligence she suffered fright, shock, and mental anguish and sustained physical injuries along with great emotional and physical pain and suffering. The second count alleged that Robert Dillon suffered great emotional and physical pain and suffering as a direct and proximate result of witnessing the accident. The third count alleged that Clyde Dillon, the father of the deceased minor, sustained a loss of the affection, society, and companionship of his daughter and incurred funeral and burial expenses. Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant. Plaintiffs appealed from that judgment to the Supreme Court of California. In related proceedings, the trial court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings against the mother's cause of action but denied a similar motion as to the sister's cause of action, and later denied a motion for summary judgment on the sister's claim. The case thus presented claims by a mother who was not within the zone of danger and by a sibling who may have been within it.
View caseA studio releases images of a deceased actor's funeral attended by his widow and children. The surviving spouse and offspring, all members of the immediate family, experience distress from the unauthorized commercial use. The relational tie supplies standing to assert privacy-based claims arising from the publicity.
Bela Lugosi and Universal Pictures Company, Inc. concluded an agreement in September 1930 for the production of the film Dracula in which Lugosi contracted to and did play the title role. Paragraph 4 of the agreement granted Universal the right to photograph and exploit in connection with the photoplay any and all of the artist's acts, poses, plays and appearances and the right to use and give publicity to the artist's name and likeness in connection with the advertising and exploitation of the photoplay. Lugosi died in 1956. Commencing in 1960 Universal entered into many licensing agreements which authorized licensees to use the Count Dracula character in connection with the sale of commercial merchandising products such as plastic model kits, masks, posters, candy dispensers, T-shirts, and beverage stirring rods. The licensing agreements specifically authorized the use of Lugosi's likeness from his portrayal of Count Dracula in Dracula and Dracula's Daughter. On February 3, 1966, Lugosi's widow Hope Linninger Lugosi and surviving son Bela George Lugosi filed a complaint against Universal alleging that they were the heirs of Bela Lugosi and that Universal had appropriated property which they had inherited from Lugosi and which was not embraced in paragraph 4 of the 1930 agreement. The complaint sought damages, an accounting of profits, and an injunction against further licensing without their consent. The trial court found that the essence of the thing licensed by Universal was the uniquely individual likeness and appearance of Bela Lugosi in the role of Count Dracula. It concluded that Lugosi had a protectable property right in his facial characteristics and individual manner of likeness and appearance as Count Dracula that descended to his heirs under his will. The court awarded plaintiffs $53,023.23 in damages for licensing agreements executed after February 3, 1964, and issued a permanent injunction against further unauthorized licensing of Lugosi's likeness as Count Dracula on commercial products. Universal appealed. The Supreme Court of California granted a hearing, conducted an independent study of the issues, and adopted the opinion of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, as its own after appropriate deletions and additions.
View caseNo. The rule permits recovery for severe emotional distress alone when the plaintiff is an immediate family member who is present, even without bodily harm. The bodily-harm requirement applies only to non-family bystanders.
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Parents, spouses, children, and siblings qualify. Stepchildren and adopted children are also treated as immediate family members.
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No. Presence at the scene of the outrageous conduct directed at the family member is sufficient. Physical endangerment of the plaintiff is not required.
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No. The plaintiff must be present at the time the outrageous conduct occurs.
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…person was the plaintiff's beloved niece or nephew, grandparent, fiance, or lifelong friend, more dear to the plaintiff than her immediate family? Next, how "near" must the plaintiff have been to the scene of the accident, and how "soon" must shock have been felt? Indeed, what is the magic in the plaintiff's being actually present?…