Also known as: genuine issues as to any material fact · genuine issue of material fact · genuine issues of material fact · genuine dispute as to any material fact
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A factual dispute that precludes summary judgment. The dispute must concern a fact that could affect the outcome under the governing substantive law and must be supported by evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Sean alleged that Global Cargo misclassified him as an independent contractor. Global Cargo supported its summary judgment motion with a dispatcher's declaration describing GPS logs. Sean responded with delivery receipts showing late arrivals that the declaration had not addressed. The conflicting records on the degree of control exercised over drivers left a genuine issue as to a material fact.
A public figure plaintiff sued a magazine for defamation and offered deposition testimony from an editor admitting doubts about the story's accuracy. The magazine moved for summary judgment, citing its own affidavits that the reporting had been careful. The editor's testimony created a genuine issue as to a material fact on whether the magazine acted with actual malice.
In October 1981, The Investigator magazine published two articles entitled "The Private World of Willis Carto" and "Yockey: Profile of an American Hitler," along with a shorter introductory article. These articles portrayed respondent Liberty Lobby, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation and self-described citizens' lobby, and its founder Willis A. Carto as neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and Fascist. Respondents filed a diversity libel action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against petitioners Jack Anderson, the publisher, Bill Adkins, and the Investigator Publishing Co., alleging that 28 statements and 2 illustrations in the articles were false and derogatory. Following discovery, petitioners moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. In support, they submitted an affidavit from Charles Bermant, the author of the articles, stating that he had spent substantial time researching from a wide variety of sources and believed the facts to be truthful, along with an appendix detailing sources for each allegedly libelous statement. Respondents opposed the motion, asserting inaccuracies and that Bermant had relied on patently unreliable sources, and presented evidence that editor William McGaw had told Adkins before publication that the articles were terrible and ridiculous. The District Court held that respondents were limited-purpose public figures to whom the New York Times standards applied. After reviewing the evidence, the District Court granted summary judgment to petitioners. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed as to 21 statements and reversed as to 9. It held that the requirement that actual malice be proved by clear and convincing evidence need not be considered at the summary judgment stage. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the holding conflicted with decisions of several other Courts of Appeals.
View caseA government official moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds after a plaintiff alleged unconstitutional conduct. The official submitted an affidavit describing the events one way. The plaintiff's deposition testimony described the same events differently and suggested the official knew the conduct violated clearly established law. The conflicting accounts left a genuine issue as to a material fact on the immunity defense.
In 1968, Ernest Fitzgerald, a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force, testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress that a new transport plane, the C-5A, was substantially over its projected cost. This testimony apparently embarrassed the Department of Defense and the Air Force. Shortly thereafter, Fitzgerald's job was abolished in a reorganization of the Air Force. Fitzgerald brought suit against a number of officials of the Executive Branch, including petitioners Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield. Fitzgerald alleged that Harlow and Butterfield had participated in a conspiracy to violate his constitutional and statutory rights by arranging to have him dismissed from his position in the Air Force in retaliation for his testimony. As evidence of Harlow's involvement, Fitzgerald relied on a series of conversations in which Harlow discussed Fitzgerald's dismissal with Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. He also relied on a recorded conversation in which the President later voiced a tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for canning" Fitzgerald. As evidence against Butterfield, Fitzgerald cited a May 1969 White House memorandum. In it Butterfield claimed to have learned that Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to public view. Fitzgerald also cited communications between Butterfield and Haldeman in December 1969 and January 1970 as evidence that Butterfield participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful discharge and prevent his reemployment. Harlow asserted that Secretary Seamans had advised him that considerations of efficiency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force. Harlow had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed. Butterfield stated that he was not involved in any decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until more than a month after the termination had been scheduled and announced publicly. Butterfield never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any official of the Defense Department. The District Court denied the motions of Harlow and Butterfield for summary judgment based on absolute Presidential immunity or, alternatively, qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed in part and remanded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA motorist sued a police officer after a high-speed pursuit ended in a crash. The officer moved for summary judgment, relying on a dashboard camera recording. The recording showed the motorist driving at extreme speeds and forcing other vehicles off the road. Because the video conclusively established the motorist's dangerous conduct, no genuine issue as to a material fact remained on the reasonableness of the officer's actions.
In March 2001, a Georgia county deputy clocked respondent's vehicle traveling at 73 miles per hour on a road with a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit. The deputy activated his blue flashing lights indicating that respondent should pull over, but respondent sped away, initiating a chase down what is in most portions a two-lane road, at speeds exceeding 85 miles per hour. Deputy Timothy Scott heard the radio communication and joined the pursuit along with other officers. In the midst of the chase, respondent pulled into the parking lot of a shopping center and was nearly boxed in by police vehicles from the pursuing officers. Respondent evaded the trap by making a sharp turn, colliding with Scott's police car, exiting the parking lot, and speeding off once again down a two-lane highway. Following respondent's shopping center maneuvering, which resulted in slight damage to Scott's police car, Scott took over as the lead pursuit vehicle. Six minutes and nearly 10 miles after the chase had begun, Scott decided to attempt to terminate the episode by employing a Precision Intervention Technique maneuver. Having radioed his supervisor for permission, Scott was told to go ahead and take him out. Scott instead applied his push bumper to the rear of respondent's vehicle. As a result, respondent lost control of his vehicle, which left the roadway, ran down an embankment, overturned, and crashed, rendering respondent quadriplegic. Respondent filed suit against Deputy Scott and others under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging use of excessive force resulting in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied Scott's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. On interlocutory appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to allow respondent's Fourth Amendment claim to proceed to trial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The record includes a videotape capturing the events in question.
View caseA widow sued an asbestos manufacturer after her husband died of mesothelioma. The manufacturer moved for summary judgment, pointing out that the record contained no evidence the husband had ever worked with its products. The plaintiff offered only general testimony that the husband had worked around insulation. The absence of any link between the husband and the manufacturer's products left no genuine issue as to a material fact on exposure.
In September 1980 respondent Catrett, as administratrix of her husband's estate, commenced a wrongful-death action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia against fifteen named corporations including petitioner Celotex Corporation. The complaint alleged that her husband Louis H. Catrett died in 1979 from exposure to asbestos products manufactured or distributed by the defendants. The action was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on diversity grounds. After extensive discovery Celotex filed a motion for summary judgment in September 1981 asserting that respondent had failed to produce any evidence that the decedent had been exposed to Celotex asbestos products. In response respondent produced a transcript of the decedent's deposition taken in a separate California proceeding, a letter from an official of one of Celotex's former insurance companies, and a letter from one of Celotex's customers. In July 1982 the District Court granted summary judgment to Celotex on the ground that respondent had made no showing of exposure to Celotex products in the District of Columbia or elsewhere within the statutory period. Respondent appealed only that ruling. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Celotex had failed to meet its initial burden because it made no effort to adduce affirmative evidence supporting its motion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits concerning the proper standard under Rule 56.
View caseA plaintiff sued a store and a police officer, alleging they conspired to deny her service because of her race. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The plaintiff offered no evidence that the officer and store employees had reached any agreement. Without evidence of an agreement, no genuine issue as to a material fact existed on the conspiracy element.
Sandra Adickes, a white school teacher from New York, was working as a volunteer teacher at a Freedom School for Negro children in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, during the summer of 1964. On August 14, 1964, Adickes went with six of her Negro students to the Hattiesburg Public Library, where the librarian refused to allow the students to use the library and summoned the chief of police, who ordered the group to leave. The group then went to the S. H. Kress & Co. store in Hattiesburg to have lunch. Adickes filed suit against Kress in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After the group sat down at the lunch counter, a policeman entered the store and observed them. A waitress took the orders of the Negro students but refused to serve Adickes on the ground that she was a white person in the company of Negroes. The group left the store without being served. As they reached the sidewalk, the same policeman arrested Adickes on a vagrancy charge. The vagrancy charge against Adickes was subsequently changed, and she was tried and acquitted. Her complaint contained two counts under § 1983. One count alleged that Kress had refused her service pursuant to a custom of the community to segregate the races in public eating places that was enforced by the State. The other count alleged that the refusal of service and the arrest were the product of a conspiracy between Kress employees and the Hattiesburg police. Kress moved for summary judgment on the conspiracy count and submitted depositions from the store manager, the waitress, and the arresting officers, along with affidavits from police officials, all denying any agreement or communication with the police about refusing service or making the arrest. Adickes opposed the motion by pointing to her deposition statement and an unsworn statement from a Kress employee indicating that a policeman had been in the store at the time of the refusal. The District Court granted summary judgment on the conspiracy count, holding that Adickes had failed to allege facts from which a conspiracy might be inferred. After a trial on the custom count, the District Court directed a verdict for Kress because Adickes had not proved other instances of whites being refused service while in the company of Negroes. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's rulings on both counts. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View caseA fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law. Disputes over facts that are irrelevant to the legal elements do not prevent summary judgment.
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The court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. If the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party, a genuine dispute exists.
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Yes. When the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may simply point out that the record contains no evidence supporting an essential element. The nonmoving party must then come forward with admissible evidence creating a genuine issue.
Not automatically. Video evidence eliminates a genuine issue only when it so clearly contradicts the nonmoving party's version that no reasonable jury could believe that version.
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