Facts

On August 14, 1964, Sandra Adickes, a white schoolteacher from New York volunteering at a Freedom School in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, accompanied six black students to the Hattiesburg Public Library. The librarian refused to allow the black students to use the library and called the police, who ordered the group to leave, claiming the library was closed.

The group then went to the S.H. Kress & Co. store in Hattiesburg to eat lunch at its restaurant. A policeman entered the store and observed Adickes with the students. A waitress took the students' orders but refused to serve Adickes because she was a white person in the company of Negroes. The students were offered service, but Adickes was not, leading the group to leave without eating.

Upon exiting, the same policeman arrested Adickes on a groundless charge of vagrancy. Adickes suffered humiliation, emotional distress, and reputational harm from the refusal and arrest.

Adickes filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of her Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. The complaint included two counts: first, that Kress refused service pursuant to a state-enforced custom of racial segregation in public eating places; second, that the refusal and arrest resulted from a conspiracy between Kress employees and Hattiesburg police.

The District Court granted Kress's motion for summary judgment on the conspiracy count, ruling that Adickes failed to allege facts inferring a conspiracy. After trial on the substantive count, the District Court directed a verdict for Kress, finding Adickes unable to prove a specific custom of refusing service to whites with blacks, enforced by state law. A divided Court of Appeals affirmed both decisions. Adickes petitioned for certiorari, arguing errors in both rulings, and the Supreme Court granted review.

Analysis

Issue #1

Issue

Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to Kress on the conspiracy count alleging that Kress and the Hattiesburg police conspired to deprive Adickes of her equal protection rights under § 1983?

Legal Rule

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of such issues, with facts viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. To establish a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show (1) deprivation of a constitutional right and (2) that the deprivation occurred under color of state law, which can include a private party's joint activity with state officials in a conspiracy.

Rule Analysis

Kress, as the moving party, argued that uncontested facts showed no conspiracy, relying on depositions and affidavits from its store manager and police officers denying communication or requests for arrest. However, Kress failed to submit affidavits from key employees like the waitress or food counter supervisor who might have interacted with police, and the police affidavits did not deny the presence of an officer in the store during the refusal or foreclose the possibility of communication.

This left unexplained gaps, as Adickes's complaint, deposition, and other materials alleged a policeman was in the store observing her with the students and later arrested her, creating a possibility of a 'meeting of the minds' to refuse service or cause arrest due to her association with blacks. Viewed in the light most favorable to Adickes, these circumstances allowed an inference of conspiracy, and Kress did not foreclose the material fact of the policeman's presence or communication.

The 1963 amendment to Rule 56(e) did not shift the initial burden; summary judgment must be denied if the movant fails to show no genuine issue, even without opposing affidavits. Since Kress did not meet this burden, Adickes was not required to provide additional affidavits to oppose the motion.

Conclusion

Yes, the District Court erred in granting summary judgment because Kress failed to carry its burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding a potential conspiracy. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this count.

Issue #2

Issue

Did the District Court err in directing a verdict for Kress on the substantive count alleging that the refusal of service violated Adickes's equal protection rights under § 1983 due to a state-enforced custom of racial segregation?

Legal Rule

Under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) deprivation of a constitutional right, such as equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) that it occurred under color of state statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage. A 'custom or usage' requires state involvement, meaning persistent practices of state officials giving it the force of law, and private discrimination compelled by such a state-enforced custom constitutes state action violating the Fourteenth Amendment.

Rule Analysis

The legislative history of § 1983, derived from the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 and linked to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, showed that 'custom or usage' was intended to cover deprivations under color of state law, not mere private habits, as confirmed by congressional debates and prior court interpretations requiring state involvement.

Adickes alleged the refusal stemmed from a state-enforced custom of segregating races in Hattiesburg restaurants, which, if proven, would establish state action, as private acts compelled by state law or custom violate the Fourteenth Amendment, similar to cases where states enforced segregation through statutes or practices.

The District Court erroneously limited proof to enforcement via Mississippi's criminal trespass statute and required evidence of a specific custom refusing service to whites with blacks statewide, but customs can be enforced through various means like police harassment or tolerance of violence, and proof of a local Hattiesburg custom of racial segregation in restaurants sufficed, without needing statewide application or prior identical incidents post-Civil Rights Act.

If Adickes proved (1) a state-enforced custom of segregation in Hattiesburg public eating places at the time and (2) that it motivated Kress's refusal, she would establish a § 1983 violation.

Conclusion

Yes, the District Court erred in directing a verdict because it applied incorrect standards for proving a state-enforced custom and its enforcement. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with the opinion, including a new trial on this count.

Additional Opinions

Mr. Justice Black: Concurrence

Mr. Justice Black concurs in the judgment reversing the Court of Appeals and remanding for a new trial on both counts of petitioner Adickes' § 1983 claim against S.H. Kress & Co. He agrees that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the conspiracy allegation, as the existence of a conspiracy between Kress employees and a police officer is a factual issue for the jury, not the judge, emphasizing the importance of jury trials, live witnesses, cross-examination, and the inadequacy of trial by affidavit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). Black also finds error in the directed verdict on the custom allegation, arguing that petitioner's testimony about instances of discrimination and her conclusion about a custom of not serving whites with Negroes in Hattiesburg provided sufficient evidence to submit to the jury, securing her Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. Assuming the trial court's interpretation of 'custom or usage' under § 1983 is correct, Black believes the evidence warranted jury consideration without needing to address the validity or interpretation of the provision itself.

William O. Douglas: Dissent

Justice Douglas dissents in part from the Court's narrow interpretation of 'custom or usage' under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing it emasculates the statute by requiring customs to have 'the force of law' through persistent practices of state officials, which he views as too restrictive and artificial. He contends that § 1983 protects against deprivations under color of state custom reflecting dominant communal sentiment, not necessarily backed by state law, drawing from cases like Garner v. Louisiana where segregation was enforced by a mosaic of laws and customs in Mississippi, including statutes promoting segregation in various public facilities. Douglas interprets 'custom' broadly as pervasive unwritten commitments or 'cake of custom' in communities, supported by social sanctions, not just state enforcement, citing anthropological concepts and historical context from the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, which targeted both official and private racial discrimination under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. He criticizes the Court for not recognizing that § 1983 reaches customs apart from state action in the traditional sense, urging a broader construction to eliminate badges of slavery and racial discrimination without requiring state complicity, and laments the decision as regressive and niggardly in enforcing civil rights.

William J. Brennan, Jr.: Both

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