Also known as: general applicability · generally apply · neutral law of general applicability
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A law or regulation that applies uniformly to all persons or conduct within its scope without singling out religious practices or granting individualized exemptions.
A city enacts an ordinance that prohibits a particular animal-slaughter method used only by a religious group. Gustavo Gutierrez, a practitioner, is prosecuted under the ordinance. The law fails to qualify as generally applicable because it was designed to suppress the religious practice rather than to regulate all comparable conduct.
A state criminal statute bans peyote possession for all persons. Grace Gupta loses her job after using peyote in a religious ceremony and is denied unemployment benefits. The statute qualifies as generally applicable because it regulates all uses of the substance without regard to religious motivation.
A city policy bars foster agencies from rejecting same-sex couples but allows officials to grant case-by-case exemptions. Gavin Grant, who runs a religious agency, refuses to certify such couples. The policy is not generally applicable because the exemption mechanism permits discretionary departures from the rule.
The President issues an order limiting entry of nationals from several countries for national-security reasons. Giselle Guerrero, a contractor affected by the order, challenges it on religious grounds. The order is treated as generally applicable because it rests on a facially neutral security rationale applied across the designated nations.
A city zoning ordinance limits household composition in single-family districts. Greta Goldstein, who lives with extended family, claims the rule burdens her religious living arrangement. The ordinance qualifies as generally applicable because it imposes the same limits on all residents regardless of religious motivation.
In early 1973, Mrs. Inez Moore received a notice of violation from the city of East Cleveland. The notice stated that her grandson John Moore, Jr., was an illegal occupant of her home. It directed her to comply with the housing ordinance. Mrs. Moore lived in her East Cleveland home together with her son Dale Moore, Sr., and her two grandsons Dale Moore, Jr., and John Moore, Jr. John came to live with her after his mother's death when he was less than one year old. When she failed to remove John from the home, the city filed a criminal charge against her. Mrs. Moore moved to dismiss the charge. She claimed that the ordinance was constitutionally invalid on its face. Her motion was overruled. Upon conviction she was sentenced to five days in jail and a $25 fine. The East Cleveland ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. The ordinance defined family to include only a husband or wife of the nominal head of the household, unmarried children of the head or spouse provided they have no children residing with them, a parent of the head or spouse, or not more than one dependent child of the head or spouse along with that child's spouse and dependent children. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction after giving full consideration to her constitutional claims. The Ohio Supreme Court denied review of the case. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of her appeal.
View caseA city denies a church a building permit under a historic-preservation ordinance that applies to all property owners. Glenn Gross, the church leader, seeks an exemption on religious grounds. The ordinance is generally applicable because it enforces uniform preservation standards without targeting religious conduct.
St. Peter Catholic Church was built in 1923 in Boerne, Texas. Its structure replicates the mission style of the region's earlier history. The church seats about 230 worshippers, a number too small for its growing parish. Some 40 to 60 parishioners cannot be accommodated at some Sunday masses. To meet the needs of the congregation, the Archbishop of San Antonio gave permission to the parish to plan alterations to enlarge the building. A few months later, the Boerne City Council passed an ordinance authorizing the city's Historic Landmark Commission to prepare a preservation plan with proposed historic landmarks and districts. Under the ordinance, the commission must preapprove construction affecting historic landmarks or buildings in a historic district. Soon afterwards, the Archbishop applied for a building permit so construction to enlarge the church could proceed. City authorities, relying on the ordinance and the designation of a historic district which they argued included the church, denied the application. The Archbishop brought this suit challenging the permit denial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The complaint contained multiple claims, but to this point the litigation has centered on RFRA and the question of its constitutionality. The District Court concluded that by enacting RFRA Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA to be constitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and now reverses. Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith. RFRA prohibits government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. Unless the government can demonstrate that the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, it must also show that the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The Act applies to all federal and state law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the enactment of RFRA.
View caseA law fails to qualify as generally applicable when it targets religious conduct or permits individualized exemptions that allow officials to grant religious exceptions. In such cases strict scrutiny applies rather than rational-basis review.
Yes. A criminal statute that bans a substance for all persons and does not single out religious uses is generally applicable even when it incidentally burdens religious ceremonies.
The existence of a mechanism allowing officials to grant individualized exemptions destroys general applicability because it creates the possibility of religious discrimination.
Rational-basis review applies. The Free Exercise Clause does not require a compelling interest or narrow tailoring when the law is neutral and generally applicable.
…consistently held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a “valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).” United States v. Lee , 455 U. S. 252, 263, n. 3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring…