Also known as:Fifth Amendment takings · 5th Amendment taking · Fifth Amendment Taking Clause · Takings Clause · eminent domain
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional prohibition barring the government from appropriating private property for public use without paying just compensation. The clause protects both real and personal property against physical invasions and certain regulatory restrictions that deny all economically viable use. Compensation is required whenever the government effects a per se physical taking or a regulatory taking under the applicable doctrinal test.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Condemnation Extinguishes Servitude Benefit
Forrest Falconer owns Blackacre subject to a view easement benefiting Felicia Fuentes's adjacent parcel. The city condemns the burdened estate to build a public highway that will block the view. The taking extinguishes the servitude because the highway use is inconsistent with continued enjoyment of the easement.
Recurring Union Access Effects Taking
Frontier Capital owns an agricultural processing plant. A state regulation grants union organizers recurring weekly entry to the plant's nonpublic areas to solicit workers. The compelled physical invasions appropriate the owner's right to exclude and therefore constitute a per se physical taking requiring compensation.
Fairview Manufacturing grows specialty produce under a federal marketing order. The order requires the company to deliver a fixed percentage of each harvest to a government warehouse while retaining only a contingent interest in later sales proceeds. The compelled transfer of personal property effects a per se taking that mandates just compensation.
Total Regulatory Ban Destroys Value
Flora Ford purchases two coastal lots intending to build single-family homes. A new state statute prohibits all permanent habitable structures on the lots, rendering them valueless for their intended use. The regulation denies all economically beneficial use and therefore constitutes a categorical taking under Lucas.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council505 U.S. 1003 (1992)
In 1986, petitioner David H. Lucas purchased two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina, for $975,000. He intended to construct single-family homes on the parcels, which at the time were zoned for such use and required no building permit for development. No portion of the lots qualified as a critical area under then-existing coastal zone legislation.
Subsequently, in 1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act. The legislation established a baseline and prohibited construction of occupable improvements seaward of a line drawn 20 feet landward of that baseline, directly affecting Lucas's parcels by barring any permanent habitable structures.
Lucas filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas alleging that the Act's restrictions effected a taking of his property without just compensation. Following a bench trial, the court determined that the prohibition rendered the lots valueless and ordered the state to pay just compensation in the amount of $1,232,387.50.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the trial court's judgment. It accepted the legislature's findings that new construction threatened public resources and concluded that a regulation designed to prevent serious public harm could not constitute a taking.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision.
Franklin Foundry owns a historic terminal building it wishes to redevelop with a modern tower. The city designates the structure a landmark, blocking demolition and forcing costly retrofits while still allowing continued rail operations. The restriction leaves economically viable use and therefore does not effect a taking under the Penn Central factors.
Penn Central Transportation Co. et al. v. New York City438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978)
In 1965 New York City enacted the Landmarks Preservation Law, which created an eleven-member Landmarks Preservation Commission and authorized it to designate buildings at least thirty years old that possess special historical or aesthetic interest.
The law required owners of designated landmarks to obtain Commission approval before altering exterior architectural features and imposed an affirmative duty to keep those features in good repair. In August 1967 the Commission designated Grand Central Terminal a landmark and the city tax block it occupies a landmark site; the Board of Estimate confirmed the designation the following month.
Penn Central Transportation Co. and its affiliates owned the Terminal, an eight-story Beaux-Arts structure completed in 1913 that served as the main station for the New York Central and Harlem lines. On January 22, 1968, Penn Central entered a fifty-year renewable lease with UGP Properties, Inc., under which UGP agreed to construct a multistory office building cantilevered above the Terminal and to pay Penn Central at least three million dollars annually after construction.
Penn Central and UGP submitted two plans prepared by architect Marcel Breuer: Breuer I, a fifty-five-story tower resting on the Terminal roof, and Breuer II Revised, a fifty-three-story building that would have removed part of the 42d Street facade. After four days of hearings at which over 80 witnesses testified, the Commission denied this application as to both proposals.
Penn Central filed suit in New York Supreme Court, Trial Term, seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages for a temporary taking. The trial court granted the injunctive and declaratory relief. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Penn Central had failed to prove deprivation of all reasonable beneficial use. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Terminal could still earn a reasonable return and that transferable development rights provided significant compensation. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
Foster Forge owns several parcels in a declining industrial district. The city condemns the land under a comprehensive redevelopment plan and transfers title to private developers expected to create jobs and increase tax revenue. The taking satisfies the public-use requirement because it is rationally related to a legitimate public purpose.
Kelo, et al. v. City of New London545 U.S. 469, 503 (2005)
In the late 1990s the city of New London, Connecticut, confronted severe economic decline after the 1996 closure of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, which had employed more than 1,500 people. The city's unemployment rate stood nearly double the state average and its population had dropped below 24,000 residents from a 1970 high of 30,000. State and local officials therefore designated the Fort Trumbull peninsula for targeted economic revitalization.
In 1998 the New London Development Corporation, a private nonprofit entity, was reactivated to prepare a redevelopment plan covering roughly 90 acres. The plan divided the area into seven parcels designated for a waterfront conference hotel and marinas, retail and entertainment space, research and office facilities, parking and park support, residential units, a Coast Guard museum, and additional office and retail uses. The city council formally approved the plan in January 2000 and authorized the NLDC to acquire needed parcels by purchase or, if necessary, by eminent domain.
Petitioners Susette Kelo, Wilhelmina Dery, and seven other owners held fifteen properties within parcels 3 and 4A; ten of those parcels were occupied by the owners or their family members and none was alleged to be blighted. After negotiations with the NLDC failed, the corporation initiated condemnation proceedings against the remaining properties in November 2000.
In December 2000 the petitioners filed suit in New London Superior Court asserting that the proposed takings violated the public-use limitation of the Fifth Amendment. Following a seven-day bench trial the Superior Court entered a permanent restraining order barring condemnation of the parcel 4A properties but denied relief as to the parcel 3 properties.
Both sides appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, which upheld the validity of all challenged takings. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the federal constitutional question.
Does a regulation granting recurring physical access to private property always require compensation?
Yes. Even temporary but recurring invasions that appropriate the right to exclude constitute per se physical takings under the Takings Clause.
Supporting sources
Does the Takings Clause protect personal property as well as real property?
Yes. Government appropriation of personal property, such as crops or fixtures, effects a per se taking even when the owner retains only a contingent interest in the seized items.
Supporting sources
When does a regulatory restriction on land use amount to a taking?
A regulation effects a categorical taking when it denies the owner all economically beneficial use of the land. Otherwise courts apply the multi-factor Penn Central balancing test.
Supporting sources
Does transferring condemned property to private developers satisfy the public-use requirement?
Yes. A taking satisfies the public-use requirement when it is rationally related to a legitimate public purpose such as economic redevelopment that the government reasonably believes will benefit the public.
Supporting sources
438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978)
…structures (such as the Brooklyn Bridge, City Hall, the Statue of Liberty and the Municipal Asphalt Plant) and thus do not raise Fifth Amendment taking questions. See Landmarks Preservation Commission of the City of New York, Landmarks and Historic Districts (1977 and Jan. 10, 1978, Supplement). Although the Court refers to the New York…