684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004)
Wayne County initiated condemnation actions in late April 2001 against nineteen parcels of land south of Metropolitan Airport owned by the defendants.1 The dispute originated from the county's two billion dollar renovation of the airport, which included a new terminal and jet runway.2
To address noise concerns from increased air traffic, the county used a twenty one million dollar partial grant from the Federal Aviation Administration to purchase approximately five hundred acres of neighboring properties through voluntary sales in a checkerboard pattern.3 Wayne County's agreement with the FAA required that properties acquired under the noise abatement program be put to economically productive use.4
The county therefore developed the Pinnacle Project, a one thousand three hundred acre business and technology park adjacent to the airport that would include a conference center, hotel accommodations, and a recreational facility.5 After acquiring an additional five hundred acres through further voluntary sales, the county determined that forty six more parcels were needed and adopted a Resolution of Necessity and Declaration of Taking on July 12, 2000, to acquire the remaining three hundred acres.6
The county filed the condemnation actions under the Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act after some additional voluntary sales reduced the number of parcels still needed to nineteen.7 Each property owner responded by filing a motion to review the necessity of the proposed condemnations.8
An evidentiary hearing on the consolidated cases was held over four weeks in the Wayne Circuit Court.9 On December 19, 2001, the trial court affirmed the county's determination of necessity.10 The trial court denied defendants' motions for reconsideration on January 24, 2002.11
Defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, which granted leave on April 24, 2003, and affirmed the trial court's decision.12 The Michigan Supreme Court granted defendants' applications for leave to appeal on November 17, 2003.13 Our grant order directed the parties to the following issues.14
Whether Wayne County possesses statutory authority pursuant to MCL 213.23 to condemn the defendants' properties?15
MCL 213.23 authorizes any public corporation to take private property necessary for public purposes within the scope of its powers for the use or benefit of the public.16
Yes. Wayne County qualifies as a public corporation under the statute.17 The Pinnacle Project advances public purposes within the county's home-rule powers by creating jobs, broadening the tax base, and stimulating economic development.18 The takings are necessary because voluntary sales left a checkerboard pattern of parcels that prevented assembly of the required contiguous land for the business and technology park.19 The project supplies a public benefit through projected employment and tax revenue.20
Wayne County possesses statutory authority under MCL 213.23 to condemn the defendants' properties.21
Whether the proposed takings are for a public use within the meaning of Const 1963, art 10, § 2?22
Const 1963, art 10, § 2 permits condemnation only for public use; transfer of condemned property to private entities satisfies this requirement only when the taking involves public necessity of the extreme sort otherwise impracticable, the property remains subject to public oversight, or the property is selected on the basis of facts of independent public significance such as blight removal.23
No. The Pinnacle Project is a business and technology park whose existence does not depend on land assembly achievable only through central government coordination.24 The private entities that will receive the land will not be subject to public oversight ensuring continued public use.25 The selection of defendants' parcels rests solely on the county's desire to transfer them to private developers rather than on any independent public purpose such as removal of blight.26
The proposed takings are not for a public use within the meaning of Const 1963, art 10, § 2.27
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Markman dissented on this issue. He argued that economic development has long been recognized as a legitimate public purpose justifying eminent domain.28 Courts must defer to legislative determinations of public use.29
The Pinnacle Aeropark project promises to bring thousands of jobs and millions of dollars in investment to an economically distressed area of Wayne County.30 These are legitimate public purposes that have long been recognized as sufficient to satisfy the public use requirement. He would have affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and upheld the proposed condemnations as a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.31
Justice Weaver concurred in the result but dissented from the majority's interpretive method.32 She maintained that public use must be understood according to the common understanding of the ratifiers rather than the perspective of those sophisticated in the law.33 She agreed that the transfer of defendants' properties to private entities without public access or control violates the constitutional limitation.34
Proper application of the public use limitation requires that the Court abandon Poletown's holding that land can be taken by the government and transferred to a private entity upon the mere showing that the economy will generally benefit from the condemnation.35 Wayne County's attempt to use its eminent domain authority to transfer defendants' properties to private developers violates the public use limitation of art. 10, § 2 even though the park might benefit the region's economy.
Whether the test set forth in Poletown Neighborhood Council v Detroit is consistent with Const 1963, art 10, § 2 and should be overruled?36
A prior decision is overruled when it is inconsistent with the original meaning of a constitutional provision as understood at ratification and has produced an erroneous expansion of governmental power.37
Yes. Poletown held that generalized economic benefit alone satisfies the public-use requirement.38 That holding finds no support in pre-1963 eminent-domain jurisprudence and contradicts the common understanding that public use requires either extreme collective-action necessity, ongoing public control, or independent public significance in the selection of the land.39 Because Poletown rendered the constitutional limitation meaningless, it must be overruled.
The test set forth in Poletown Neighborhood Council v Detroit is inconsistent with Const 1963, art 10, § 2 and should be overruled.40
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Corrigan concurred in the result.41 She wrote separately to emphasize that the power of eminent domain is an extraordinary power that must be used with great caution.42 The government should not be in the business of taking land from one private owner and giving it to another private owner simply because the latter promises to make better use of the land or generate more tax revenue.43
Such takings violate the fundamental principle that private property is sacred and may not be taken except for true public uses.44
Justice Taylor joined the majority opinion in full.45 He agreed that Poletown was wrongly decided and should be overruled.46 The public use requirement of the Constitution is not satisfied merely because a taking is expected to result in economic benefits to the community.47
The primary use of the condemned property must be by the public, not by private parties.48
Whether a decision overruling Poletown should apply retroactively or prospectively only?49
A decision that returns the law to the rule that existed at the time of constitutional ratification applies retroactively to all pending cases in which the issue has been preserved.50
Yes. The decision restores the public-use limitation as it was understood when the 1963 Constitution was ratified.51 It does not announce a new rule but corrects an erroneous departure.52 Retroactive application therefore follows the ordinary practice and applies to all pending cases raising a preserved challenge to Poletown.53
A decision overruling Poletown applies retroactively.54
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Cavanagh concurred in overruling Poletown but dissented on retroactivity. He argued that Wayne County had spent approximately fifty million dollars in reliance on Poletown and that the effect of retroactive application on the administration of justice and on communities that followed the prior precedent warranted prospective application only.55 While he agreed that Poletown improperly interpreted and applied the law, Wayne County's reliance on this Court's decision in Poletown is clear and he did not believe that Wayne County and its taxpayers should be penalized because the county followed this Court's guidance.56
He would apply the decision prospectively only.57