Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7

Petitioner Singer was charged in federal district court with thirty counts of violating the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341. According to the indictment, Singer had used the mails to deceive amateur songwriters by soliciting payments from them for the supposed marketing of their songs. At the start of trial, Singer submitted a written waiver of his right to a jury trial, stating that the purpose was to shorten the proceedings. The district court indicated its willingness to accept the waiver, yet the Government declined to provide its required consent. After the jury trial proceeded, Singer was found guilty on twenty-nine of the thirty counts. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in order to address whether federal criminal defendants possess an unconditional constitutional right to insist upon a bench trial.

In late September 1981, the body of Texas Department of Public Safety Officer David Rucker was found beside his patrol car on a highway near Los Fresnos, Texas. At about the same time, Los Fresnos Police Officer Enrique Carrisalez stopped a speeding vehicle and was shot by the driver, dying nine days later. Petitioner Leonel Torres Herrera was arrested a few days after the shootings and charged with the capital murders of both officers. He was tried in January 1982, convicted of Carrisalez's capital murder, and sentenced to death; he pleaded guilty to Rucker's murder in July 1982. At Herrera's trial for Carrisalez's murder, eyewitness Enrique Hernandez identified him as the shooter from the patrol car. A declaration by the dying Carrisalez to the same effect was admitted. The speeding car was registered to Herrera's live-in girlfriend, and Herrera had keys to it in his pocket when arrested. Herrera's Social Security card was found at Rucker's scene. Blood spatters of type A, matching Rucker but not Herrera's type O, were found on the car and on Herrera's jeans and wallet. A handwritten letter found on Herrera when arrested strongly implied he had killed Rucker. Herrera's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in 1984, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. His state habeas application was denied. A federal habeas petition challenging the identifications was denied by the Fifth Circuit in 1990, with certiorari denied by the Supreme Court. In 1990, Herrera filed a second state habeas petition raising a claim of actual innocence supported by affidavits from attorney Hector Villarreal and former cellmate Juan Franco Palacious, both stating that Herrera's brother Raul Herrera Sr., who died in 1984, had confessed to committing the murders. The state courts denied relief. In February 1992, Herrera filed his second federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, presenting those affidavits plus additional ones from Raul Herrera Jr. and Jose Ybarra Jr. claiming Raul Sr. had confessed and that Raul Jr. had witnessed the shootings. The District Court dismissed most claims as an abuse of the writ but granted a stay of execution to permit Herrera to present his actual innocence claim in state court. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the stay, holding that a claim of actual innocence without an accompanying constitutional violation is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.

On the evening of June 29, 1977, Brian Burbine was arrested by Cranston, Rhode Island, police officers in connection with a local burglary after Detective Ferranti received information from a confidential informant linking a man known as "Butch" living at a specific address to an earlier murder. Burbine, who lived at that address and was known by that name, was taken to the Cranston police station where Cranston detectives advised him of his Miranda rights; he initially refused to sign a written waiver form. At approximately 7:45 p.m. that same evening, Burbine's sister telephoned the Public Defender's Office in Providence to request legal assistance for her brother on the breaking-and-entering charge. Attorney Allegra Munson from that office telephoned the Cranston police station at 8:15 p.m., identified herself as Burbine's counsel, and was told by an officer that the police would not be questioning Burbine or placing him in a lineup and that they were through with him for the night. Munson was not informed that Providence police were present or that Burbine was a suspect in the murder of Mary Jo Hickey. Less than an hour later, three Providence detectives arrived at the Cranston station and began questioning Burbine about the murder. Prior to each of three interview sessions, Burbine was advised of his Miranda rights, and on three separate occasions he signed written forms acknowledging that he understood his rights and expressly waiving them; he then provided three written statements admitting responsibility for the murder. At no time during the questioning was Burbine informed that his sister had retained an attorney for him or that Attorney Munson had telephoned the station. Prior to trial in Rhode Island Superior Court, Burbine moved to suppress the statements. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Burbine had been fully advised of his Miranda rights, had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived them, and that the statements were voluntary. Burbine was convicted of first-degree murder. The Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the conviction, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In August 1972, the Janaf Branch of the United Virginia Bank/Seaboard National in Norfolk, Virginia, was robbed. Witnesses saw two men wearing masks and carrying guns enter the bank while a third man waited in the car. About an hour after the robbery, the getaway car was discovered. Inside was found a rent receipt signed by one "Allen R. Norris" and a lease, also signed by Norris, for a house in Norfolk. Two men subsequently convicted of participating in the robbery were arrested at the rented house with the proceeds of the robbery and the guns and masks used by the gunmen. Government agents traced the rent receipt to respondent Billy Gale Henry. On the basis of this information, Henry was arrested in Atlanta, Georgia, in November 1972. Two weeks later he was indicted for armed robbery under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d). He was held pending trial in the Norfolk city jail. Counsel was appointed on November 27, 1972. On November 21, 1972, shortly after Henry was incarcerated, government agents contacted Nichols, an inmate at the Norfolk city jail who had been engaged to provide confidential information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a paid informant. Nichols informed the agent that he was housed in the same cellblock with Henry. The agent told Nichols to be alert to any statements made by the federal prisoners but not to initiate any conversation with or question Henry regarding the bank robbery. In early December, after Nichols had been released from jail, the agent again contacted Nichols, who reported that he and Henry had engaged in conversation and that Henry had told him about the robbery of the Janaf bank. Nichols was paid for furnishing the information. When Henry was tried in March 1973, Nichols testified that he had an opportunity to have some conversations with Mr. Henry while he was in the jail. Henry told him about going to the Janaf Branch to see which employees opened the vault and described the details of the robbery. The jury was not informed that Nichols was a paid Government informant. On the basis of this testimony, Henry was convicted of bank robbery and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 25 years. His conviction was affirmed on appeal, and his petition to this Court for a writ of certiorari was denied. On August 28, 1975, Henry moved to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He alleged that he had just learned that Nichols was a paid Government informant and that the introduction of Nichols' testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. The District Court denied the motion without a hearing. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for an evidentiary inquiry. On remand, the District Court again denied the motion after reviewing affidavits from the government agents. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the actions of the Government impaired Henry's Sixth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether respondent's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel was violated by the admission at trial of incriminating statements made by respondent to his cellmate, an undisclosed Government informant, after indictment and while in custody.