545 U.S. 605 (2005)
In 1994, Michigan voters amended the state constitution to provide that an appeal by an accused who pleads guilty or nolo contendere shall be by leave of the court.1
The Michigan Legislature implemented the amendment through a statute providing that a defendant who pleads guilty, guilty but mentally ill, or nolo contendere shall not have appellate counsel appointed for review of the conviction or sentence, subject to limited exceptions such as when the prosecutor seeks leave to appeal or the sentence exceeds guidelines.2
Antonio Halbert was charged with two counts of criminal sexual conduct.3 He entered a plea of nolo contendere to both counts in the state trial court.4 The trial court sentenced him to two consecutive terms of 20 to 40 years in prison.5 During the plea colloquy, the court advised Halbert that he was giving up any claim of an appeal as of right and described the limited circumstances in which the court must or may appoint appellate counsel, without stating that counsel would be unavailable in his own case.6
After sentencing, Halbert submitted multiple requests for appointment of appellate counsel using state-provided forms, noting his indigency, learning disabilities, mental impairment, and need to raise sentencing scoring issues. The trial court denied the requests, citing the state statute.7 Halbert then filed a pro se application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals, which denied it in a standard order for lack of merit in the grounds presented.8 The Michigan Supreme Court denied his subsequent application for leave to appeal.9
Halbert filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, asserting a Fourteenth Amendment violation from the denial of appointed counsel.10 The district court denied the petition.11 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.12
Whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants seeking leave to appeal from a plea-based conviction?13
In Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963), this Court held that, in first appeals as of right from criminal convictions, States must appoint counsel for indigent defendants.14 In Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600 (1974), the Court held that a State need not appoint counsel to assist an indigent defendant in discretionary appeals to the State’s highest court.15 Michigan’s system for indigent defendants seeking leave to appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals from a plea-based conviction is a first-tier review that requires appointment of counsel under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.16
Yes. The Michigan Court of Appeals sits as an error-correction instance that evaluates the merits of claims presented in applications for leave to appeal.17 This makes its review the first and likely only appellate review guaranteed as a matter of right for plea-convicted defendants.18 Halbert was an indigent defendant with learning disabilities and mental impairments who faced a record unreviewed by appellate counsel.19
Halbert needed to identify arguable issues and prepare a specific application stating facts, issues, and legal support without assistance.20 These circumstances parallel the concerns in Douglas that an indigent defendant may be unable to raise issues without counsel.21 The state procedures therefore denied meaningful access to the appellate system in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.22
The Fourteenth Amendment requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants seeking leave to appeal from a plea-based conviction.23
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice And Justice Scalia
Justice Thomas dissented on the ground that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require States to provide appellate review at all.24 If a State chooses to provide appellate review, it is not required to provide counsel for indigents on discretionary appeals.25 He maintained that Douglas is limited to first appeals as of right and that the Michigan system at issue is a discretionary appeal, so Ross controls.26
Justice Thomas further contended that Michigan's differentiation between defendants convicted at trial and those convicted by plea is a reasoned distinction rather than invidious discrimination.27 He argued that any right to counsel was waivable and was waived by Halbert's plea.28