380 U.S. 24 (1965)
Petitioner Singer was charged in federal district court with thirty counts of violating the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341.1 According to the indictment, Singer had used the mails to deceive amateur songwriters by soliciting payments from them for the supposed marketing of their songs.2
At the start of trial, Singer submitted a written waiver of his right to a jury trial, stating that the purpose was to shorten the proceedings.3 The district court indicated its willingness to accept the waiver, yet the Government declined to provide its required consent.4 After the jury trial proceeded, Singer was found guilty on twenty-nine of the thirty counts.5
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.6 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in order to address whether federal criminal defendants possess an unconditional constitutional right to insist upon a bench trial.7
Whether a defendant in a federal criminal case has a constitutional right to waive a jury trial without the consent of the government and the approval of the court?8
No. The petitioner, Singer, was charged in a federal district court with 30 infractions of the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341.11 The gist of the indictment was that he used the mails to dupe amateur songwriters into sending him money for the marketing of their songs. On the opening day of trial petitioner offered in writing to waive a trial by jury for the purpose of shortening the trial. The trial court was willing to approve the waiver, but the Government refused to give its consent.
Petitioner was subsequently convicted by a jury on 29 of the 30 counts. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. These facts demonstrate that no unconditional constitutional right to a bench trial exists.12
The common law history shows defendants possessed no option to demand trial by judge alone, and the constitutional text designates jury trial as the required mode without creating a correlative right to waive it unilaterally.13 The ability to waive other constitutional protections does not extend to compelling the opposite of the jury right when the government withholds consent.14
A defendant in a federal criminal case does not have a constitutional right to waive a jury trial without the consent of the government and the approval of the court.15
Whether Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is consistent with the Constitution in requiring government consent and court approval for a waiver of jury trial?16
There is no constitutional impediment to conditioning a waiver of the right to jury trial on the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the trial judge when, if either refuses to consent, the result is simply that the defendant is subject to an impartial trial by jury—the very protection the Constitution guarantees.17
Yes. Applying the established facts, the Government refused consent to petitioner's written waiver offered solely to shorten the trial, resulting in a jury conviction on 29 counts that was affirmed on appeal.18 The rule recognizes the government's legitimate interest as a litigant in ensuring trial before the tribunal the Constitution regards as most likely to produce a fair result.19 Conditioning waiver on consent prevents unreasonable departures from the jury system while preserving the defendant's right to an impartial jury when consent is withheld.20
The procedure aligns with other rules governing waiver of constitutional protections and reflects the framers' emphasis on jury trial as the normal mode of determining guilt in federal criminal cases.21
Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is consistent with the Constitution in requiring government consent and court approval for a waiver of jury trial.22