Also known as: fair trials · right to a fair trial
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A proceeding conducted before an impartial and disinterested tribunal according to established procedures. It protects a party's constitutional and legal rights throughout the process, especially in criminal prosecutions where the defendant's interests are at stake.
Judge Harlan posted online comments praising the prosecution's evidence in a pending fraud case against Freya Freeman. Defense counsel moved to recuse the judge, arguing the statements created an appearance that could sway public perception and jury attitudes before trial began. The court granted the motion to preserve the proceeding's integrity.
Felix Franco faced murder charges and sought to introduce a deceased witness's reliable statement exonerating him. The trial court applied strict hearsay rules to bar the evidence despite its trustworthiness. On appeal the court held that exclusion deprived Franco of his right to present a complete defense.
After Flora Ford's conviction a juror reported that another panel member had voiced explicit racial animus toward Ford during deliberations. The trial court refused to consider the evidence under the no-impeachment rule. The reviewing court ordered a new trial because the bias statement undermined the guarantee of an impartial jury.
In 2007, two teenage sisters were sexually assaulted in the bathroom of a Colorado horse-racing facility. The girls identified the assailant as a racetrack employee, and police arrested Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez. Each girl separately identified him as the man who assaulted her. State prosecutors charged Peña-Rodriguez with harassment, unlawful sexual contact, and attempted sexual assault on a child. Before the jury was empaneled, members of the venire received a written questionnaire asking if anything would make it difficult to be a fair juror. The court and defense counsel repeatedly asked prospective jurors whether they could be fair and impartial. None of the empaneled jurors expressed reservations based on racial bias. After a three-day trial, the jury convicted Peña-Rodriguez of unlawful sexual contact and harassment but failed to reach a verdict on the attempted sexual assault charge. When the jury was discharged, the court gave the mandated instruction that whether jurors discussed the case was their own decision. Following discharge, two jurors remained in the jury room to speak privately with defense counsel. They reported that during deliberations another juror, identified as H.C., had expressed anti-Hispanic bias toward Peña-Rodriguez and his alibi witness. With the trial court's supervision, counsel obtained sworn affidavits from the two jurors. The affidavits stated that H.C. said Mexican men had a bravado that caused them to believe they could do whatever they wanted with women. The affidavits further stated that nine times out of ten Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and young girls. H.C. believed Peña-Rodriguez was guilty because he is Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want. H.C. did not find the alibi witness credible because the witness was an illegal. The trial court acknowledged H.C.'s apparent bias. It denied Peña-Rodriguez's motion for a new trial on the ground that Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) generally prohibits a juror from testifying about statements made during deliberations in a proceeding inquiring into the validity of the verdict. A divided panel of the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the statements did not fall within an exception to the rule. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed by a 4-3 vote. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether there is a constitutional exception to the no-impeachment rule for instances of racial bias.
View caseFaye Fuller was charged with a serious misdemeanor carrying a potential two-year sentence. The state court denied her request for a jury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the right to a jury trial in such cases is fundamental to a fair proceeding and applies to the states.
In October 1966, nineteen-year-old Gary Duncan stopped his car on Highway 23 in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, after seeing his two younger Negro cousins talking with four white boys near a formerly all-white high school that had recently experienced racial incidents. Duncan approached the group, spoke with the white boys, encouraged his cousins to leave, and was about to drive away when a dispute arose over whether he had slapped or merely touched one of the white boys on the elbow. At his trial in the Twenty-fifth Judicial District Court of Louisiana, the white boys and a white onlooker testified that Duncan had slapped Herman Landry, while Duncan and his cousins testified that he had only touched the boy. The trial judge found Duncan guilty of simple battery beyond a reasonable doubt. Under Louisiana law, simple battery is a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum of two years' imprisonment and a three-hundred-dollar fine. Duncan requested a jury trial, but the trial judge denied the request because the Louisiana Constitution provides for jury trials only in cases where capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor may be imposed. Duncan was convicted by the judge alone and sentenced to sixty days in the parish prison and a fine of one hundred fifty dollars. Duncan sought review in the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which denied his application for a writ of certiorari. He then petitioned the United States Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), alleging that the denial of a jury trial violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument along with a related case.
View caseFelicia Fuentes, an indigent defendant, was tried for a felony without appointed counsel. She was convicted after representing herself. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, ruling that the absence of counsel at trial violated her fundamental right to a fair proceeding.
Petitioner Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in a Florida state court with having broken and entered a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor. This offense is a felony under Florida law. Appearing in court without funds and without a lawyer, Gideon asked the court to appoint counsel for him. The court denied the request, stating that under the laws of the State of Florida the only time the Court can appoint Counsel to represent a Defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense. Put to trial before a jury, Gideon conducted his defense about as well as could be expected from a layman. He made an opening statement to the jury, cross-examined the State’s witnesses, presented witnesses in his own defense, declined to testify himself, and made a short argument emphasizing his innocence to the charge contained in the Information filed in this case. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and petitioner was sentenced to serve five years in the state prison. Later, petitioner filed in the Florida Supreme Court this habeas corpus petition. The petition attacked his conviction and sentence on the ground that the trial court’s refusal to appoint counsel for him denied him rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights by the United States Government. Treating the petition for habeas corpus as properly before it, the State Supreme Court, upon consideration thereof but without an opinion, denied all relief. Since 1942, when Betts v. Brady was decided by a divided Court, the problem of a defendant’s federal constitutional right to counsel in a state court has been a continuing source of controversy and litigation in both state and federal courts. To give this problem another review here, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Since Gideon was proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court appointed counsel to represent him and requested both sides to discuss in their briefs and oral arguments whether this Court’s holding in Betts v. Brady should be reconsidered.
View caseThe prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove all Black prospective jurors from Fatou Fall's venire. Defense counsel objected and established a prima facie case of discrimination. The trial court required the prosecutor to provide race-neutral explanations, and the Supreme Court held that purposeful exclusion violates equal protection and the right to an impartial jury.
Petitioner, a black man, was indicted in Jefferson Circuit Court on two counts of second-degree burglary and one count of receipt of stolen goods. On the first day of trial, the judge conducted voir dire examination of the venire. He excused certain jurors for cause and permitted the parties to exercise peremptory challenges. The prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all four black persons on the venire. A jury composed only of white persons was selected. Defense counsel moved to discharge the jury before it was sworn. The motion claimed that the prosecutor's removal of the black veniremen violated petitioner's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to a jury drawn from a cross section of the community and under the Fourteenth Amendment to equal protection of the laws. Counsel requested a hearing on his motion. Without expressly ruling on the request for a hearing, the trial judge observed that the parties were entitled to use their peremptory challenges to strike anybody they wanted to. The judge denied the motion. The jury convicted petitioner on both counts. He was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment on each count with the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, petitioner argued that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges violated his right to trial by an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner also contended that the facts showed the prosecutor had engaged in a pattern of discriminatory challenges. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the conviction. It relied on Swain v. Alabama and held that petitioner had failed to show that the prosecutor had engaged in a pattern of discrimination in the selection of jurors in a series of cases. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA judge's public statement that could reasonably affect the outcome or impair fairness of a pending matter violates the rule. Nonpublic statements that substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing are also prohibited. The rule extends to statements by court staff under the judge's control.
Strict application of hearsay rules may violate due process when it excludes reliable and critical exculpatory evidence. The Constitution can require admission of trustworthy hearsay if exclusion would deprive the defendant of a fair trial.
The right to a jury trial is fundamental to a fair proceeding in serious criminal cases. This guarantee applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment when the offense carries a potential sentence of more than six months.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches once formal adversary proceedings begin and applies at critical stages where counsel's absence could impair the fairness of the trial. Failure to provide counsel at those stages violates the defendant's constitutional rights.
Purposeful racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges violates equal protection and the right to an impartial jury. Once a prima facie case is shown the prosecutor must offer race-neutral explanations for the strikes.
…jury trial for serious offenses is a fundamental right, essential for preventing miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair trials are provided for all defendants. We would not assert, however, that every criminal trial—or any particular trial—held before a judge alone is unfair or that a defendant may never be as…