Also known as: failure to state a claim · fails to state a claim · failing to state a claim · 12(b)(6) · failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A ground for dismissal when a complaint does not allege facts that, if true, would entitle the plaintiff to relief under applicable law.
Forrest Falconer filed a federal complaint against Fulton Shipping alleging misclassification as an independent contractor. The complaint stated only that he worked full time under company control on exclusive routes. Fulton Shipping moved to dismiss before answering. The court granted the motion because the bare assertion supplied no facts about schedules, supervision, or equipment that could support an inference of employee status.
Felicia Fuentes sued six federal narcotics agents in district court alleging an unreasonable search that violated the Fourth Amendment. The complaint sought damages but contained no facts showing congressional authorization for a damages action against individual officers. The agents moved to dismiss. The court granted the motion because the pleading failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted.
On the morning of November 26, 1965, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics entered Webster Bivens's apartment in the Bronx. The agents broke open the door, handcuffed Bivens in front of his wife and young children, and thoroughly searched the apartment. They then transported Bivens to the federal courthouse in Brooklyn, where he was interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip search. Several days later Bivens was released on his own recognizance, and he was never indicted or prosecuted for any offense. Bivens filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the six agents in their individual capacities. His complaint sought fifteen thousand dollars in damages from each agent and alleged that the arrest and search were effected without a warrant, that unreasonable force was employed, and that the arrest was made without probable cause. Bivens claimed to have suffered great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering as a result of the agents' conduct. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review the judgment.
View caseFaith Fitzgerald sued a former classmate in federal court under the Violence Against Women Act civil remedy provision after an alleged gender-motivated assault on a college campus. The complaint alleged only local conduct with no interstate commerce nexus. The defendant moved to dismiss. The court granted the motion because the statute supplied no cause of action on these facts.
In September 1994 Christy Brzonkala enrolled as a student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. Within thirty minutes of meeting fellow students Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, both members of the varsity football team, Brzonkala alleges that the two men assaulted and repeatedly raped her. Morrison allegedly told Brzonkala after the attack that she had better not have any diseases. He later announced in a dormitory dining room that he liked to get girls drunk and made other vulgar remarks about women. Brzonkala became severely emotionally disturbed and depressed after the incident. She sought assistance from a university psychiatrist who prescribed antidepressant medication. She stopped attending classes and withdrew from the university. In early 1995 she filed a complaint against Morrison and Crawford under the university's Sexual Assault Policy. Virginia Tech conducted a hearing under its Sexual Assault Policy and a second hearing under its Abusive Conduct Policy. The first found Morrison guilty of sexual assault and suspended him for two semesters. The second hearing again found him guilty but changed the offense description to using abusive language. University officials later set aside the punishment. In December 1995 Brzonkala sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. Her complaint alleged that the attack violated 42 U.S.C. §13981, the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, which creates a federal cause of action for compensatory and punitive damages against persons who commit crimes of violence motivated by gender. She also asserted Title IX claims against the university. The district court dismissed the Title IX claims for failure to state a claim. It also dismissed the §13981 claim on the ground that Congress lacked authority to enact the provision under either the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed in part, but the en banc Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact §13981. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the constitutionality of the civil remedy provision.
View caseFernando Farrell sued Hartford Fire Insurance Co. in federal court alleging a conspiracy among foreign insurers that affected only overseas markets. The complaint contained no facts showing a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on United States commerce. Hartford moved to dismiss. The court granted the motion because the pleading failed to state a claim under the statute.
In the late 1970s, ISO, an association of approximately 1,400 domestic property and casualty insurers that serves as the almost exclusive source of support services for CGL insurance in the United States, began revising its 1973 standard CGL policy form. The 1973 form provided occurrence-based coverage for sudden and accidental pollution and did not cap defense costs. Primary insurers including Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Allstate Insurance Company, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, and CIGNA Corporation sought four changes: a shift to claims-made coverage with a retroactive date, elimination of pollution coverage, and a legal defense cost cap. After ISO proposed 1984 forms that omitted some of these changes, Hartford persuaded General Reinsurance Corporation, the largest American reinsurer, to procure the modifications or derail the program. The Reinsurance Association of America agreed to boycott the 1984 forms unless the changes were added, and domestic and London reinsurers informed ISO they would withhold reinsurance until the forms were altered. ISO then withdrew the 1984 forms and adopted 1986 forms containing a retroactive date and pollution exclusion; it later withdrew support services for the 1973 form. Separate agreements among London reinsurers required primary insurers to switch to claims-made policies and excluded pollution coverage from reinsurance contracts covering North American risks. Nineteen states and many private plaintiffs filed 36 complaints alleging that these actions violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. The cases were consolidated in the Northern District of California. The District Court granted motions to dismiss in 1989, holding the conduct fell within McCarran-Ferguson immunity and applying international comity to the foreign defendants. The Ninth Circuit reversed in 1991. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1992.
View caseFatima Flores sued National Australian Bank in federal court under section 10(b) for alleged misstatements made entirely in Australia that affected only Australian investors. The complaint alleged no domestic purchase or sale of securities. The bank moved to dismiss. The court granted the motion because the statute did not reach the foreign conduct pleaded.
In February 1998 National Australia Bank Limited acquired HomeSide Lending, Inc., a mortgage-servicing company headquartered in Florida. HomeSide's business was to receive fees for servicing mortgages, essentially the administrative tasks associated with collecting mortgage payments. HomeSide calculated the present value of its mortgage-servicing rights by using valuation models designed to take the likelihood of early repayment into account. From 1998 until 2001 National's annual reports and other public documents touted the success of HomeSide's business, and respondents Frank Cicutto, Kevin Race, and Hugh Harris did the same in public statements. HomeSide, Race, Harris, and another HomeSide senior executive manipulated HomeSide's financial models, thereby making the rates of early repayment unrealistically low and causing the mortgage-servicing rights to appear more valuable than they really were. On July 5, 2001 National announced that it was writing down the value of HomeSide's assets by $450 million, and then again on September 3 by another $1.75 billion. The prices of both Ordinary Shares and ADRs slumped. As relevant here, petitioners Russell Leslie Owen and Brian and Geraldine Silverlock, all Australians, purchased National's Ordinary Shares in 2000 and 2001 before the write-downs. Robert Morrison, an American investor in National's ADRs, also brought suit, but his claims were dismissed by the District Court because he failed to allege damages. Petitioners did not appeal that decision. They sued National, HomeSide, Cicutto, and the three HomeSide executives in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for alleged violations of sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5. Respondents moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The District Court granted the former motion. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed on similar grounds. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseFabian Flynn sued Blue Chip Stamps alleging he was deterred from buying shares by a misleading prospectus. The complaint contained no allegation that Flynn had actually purchased or sold any securities. Blue Chip moved to dismiss. The court granted the motion because the pleading failed to state a claim under the statute.
In 1963 the United States filed a civil antitrust action against Old Blue Chip Stamp Co., a company providing trading stamps to retailers, and nine retailers who owned 90 percent of its shares. In 1967 the action was terminated by entry of a consent decree. The decree contemplated a plan of reorganization whereby Old Blue Chip would merge into a newly formed corporation, Blue Chip Stamps. The holdings of the majority shareholders would be reduced. The new company would offer a substantial number of its shares of common stock to retailers who had used the stamp service in the past but were not shareholders. The offering was to be proportional to past stamp usage and packaged in units consisting of common stock and debentures. The reorganization plan was carried out. The offering was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Act of 1933. A prospectus was distributed to all offerees as required by section 5 of that Act. Somewhat more than 50 percent of the offered units were actually purchased. In 1970, two years after the offering, Manor Drug Stores, a former user of the stamp service and therefore an offeree of the 1968 offering, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California against Old and New Blue Chip, eight of the nine majority shareholders of Old Blue Chip, and the directors of New Blue Chip. The complaint alleged that the prospectus prepared and distributed in connection with the offering was materially misleading in its overly pessimistic appraisal of Blue Chip's status and future prospects. It further alleged that Blue Chip intentionally made the prospectus overly pessimistic. This was done to discourage the offerees from accepting the offer. The goal was so that the rejected shares might later be offered to the public at a higher price. Class members because of and in reliance on the false and misleading prospectus failed to purchase the offered units. The complaint sought on behalf of the alleged class some $21,400,000 in damages representing the lost opportunity to purchase the units, the right to purchase the previously rejected units at the 1968 price, and some $25,000,000 in exemplary damages. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief might be granted. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, a divided panel reversed the district court. After the Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA party may raise failure to state a claim in a pleading, by motion under Rule 12(c), or at trial. The defense is not waived by omission from an earlier motion.
Supporting sources
No. When federal law does not attach consequences to the defendant's conduct the plaintiff has simply failed to state a claim rather than depriving the court of jurisdiction.
The court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and determines whether the complaint contains sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim for relief.
Supporting sources
No. A magistrate judge may not hear and determine a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. That matter must be decided by a district judge.
Supporting sources