fact in issue

Two minors brought suit against Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, claiming they suffered limb reduction birth defects because their mothers had taken Bendectin, a drug prescribed for morning sickness to about 17.5 million pregnant women in the United States between 1957 and 1982. Limb reduction defects occur in fewer than one birth out of every 1000. Scientists do not know the mechanism by which any teratogen causes such defects. The plaintiffs offered testimony from three groups of experts. One group proposed to testify to a statistical link between Bendectin ingestion during pregnancy and limb reduction defects based on reanalyses of published studies that had reported no such association. A second group proposed to testify that Bendectin causes limb reduction defects in humans because it causes such defects in laboratory animals. A third group proposed to testify based on the similarity of Bendectin's chemical structure to other drugs suspected of causing birth defects. The district court granted summary judgment to Merrell Dow after excluding the plaintiffs' expert testimony. The Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed, and remanded for consideration under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. On remand, the Ninth Circuit examined the affidavits and prior trial testimony of the plaintiffs' experts. None of the experts had studied the effect of Bendectin on limb reduction defects before being hired to testify in this or related cases. None had published his work on Bendectin in a scientific journal. The only review their work had received was by judges and juries. Plaintiffs' epidemiological experts made vague assertions of a statistically significant relationship between Bendectin and birth defects but did not state that the relative risk exceeded two. With the exception of Dr. Palmer, the remaining experts were willing to testify only that Bendectin is capable of causing birth defects. Dr. Palmer alone was willing to testify that Bendectin did cause the limb defects in each of the children, based on his review of the plaintiffs' medical records and his conclusion that Bendectin is a teratogen.

In October 1981, The Investigator magazine published two articles entitled "The Private World of Willis Carto" and "Yockey: Profile of an American Hitler," along with a shorter introductory article. These articles portrayed respondent Liberty Lobby, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation and self-described citizens' lobby, and its founder Willis A. Carto as neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and Fascist. Respondents filed a diversity libel action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against petitioners Jack Anderson, the publisher, Bill Adkins, and the Investigator Publishing Co., alleging that 28 statements and 2 illustrations in the articles were false and derogatory. Following discovery, petitioners moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. In support, they submitted an affidavit from Charles Bermant, the author of the articles, stating that he had spent substantial time researching from a wide variety of sources and believed the facts to be truthful, along with an appendix detailing sources for each allegedly libelous statement. Respondents opposed the motion, asserting inaccuracies and that Bermant had relied on patently unreliable sources, and presented evidence that editor William McGaw had told Adkins before publication that the articles were terrible and ridiculous. The District Court held that respondents were limited-purpose public figures to whom the New York Times standards applied. After reviewing the evidence, the District Court granted summary judgment to petitioners. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed as to 21 statements and reversed as to 9. It held that the requirement that actual malice be proved by clear and convincing evidence need not be considered at the summary judgment stage. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the holding conflicted with decisions of several other Courts of Appeals.

During a 1967 adjudicatory hearing conducted pursuant to section 742 of the New York Family Court Act, a judge in New York Family Court found that the twelve-year-old appellant had entered a locker and stolen one hundred twelve dollars from a woman's pocketbook. The petition which charged appellant with delinquency alleged that his act, if done by an adult, would constitute the crime or crimes of larceny. The judge acknowledged that the proof might not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but relied on section 744(b) of the New York Family Court Act, which provides that any determination at the conclusion of an adjudicatory hearing that a juvenile did an act or acts must be based on a preponderance of the evidence. After a subsequent dispositional hearing, appellant was ordered placed in a training school for an initial period of eighteen months, subject to annual extensions of his commitment until his eighteenth birthday, six years in appellant's case. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, First Judicial Department, affirmed without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals then affirmed by a four-to-three vote, expressly sustaining the constitutionality of section 744(b). The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.