509 U.S. 502 (1993)
St. Mary's Honor Center, a halfway house operated by the Missouri Department of Corrections and Human Resources, hired Melvin Hicks as a correctional officer in August 1978.1 Hicks, who is black, received a promotion to shift commander, one of six supervisory positions at the facility, in February 1980.2
In 1983 the department conducted an investigation of St. Mary's administration that produced extensive supervisory changes the following January.3 John Powell became chief of custody and Hicks's immediate supervisor, while Steve Long became superintendent.4 Beginning in March 1984 Hicks was subjected to repeated disciplinary actions.5 He was suspended for five days on March 3 for violations committed by his subordinates, received a letter of reprimand on March 21 after an inmate brawl during his shift, was demoted from shift commander to correctional officer for failing to log a vehicle use on March 19, and was discharged on June 7 after a heated exchange with Powell on April 19.6
Hicks filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against St. Mary's and Long. He alleged that the demotion and discharge violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they were motivated by his race.7 The case proceeded through discovery to a full bench trial.
After trial the District Court entered judgment for the defendants.8 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.10
Whether the trier of fact's rejection of the employer's asserted reasons for its action compels judgment for the plaintiff under Title VII?11
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework an employment discrimination plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case.12 The burden of production then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.13 If the employer does so the presumption drops and the plaintiff must prove both that the proffered reason is false and that discrimination was the real reason.14 Rejection of the employer's reasons permits the trier of fact to infer intentional discrimination but does not compel judgment for the plaintiff; the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff at all times.15
No. The District Court found that Hicks established a prima facie case by proving he is black, was qualified for the position of shift commander, was demoted and discharged, and the position was filled by a white man.16 St. Mary's met its burden of production by introducing evidence of two legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons consisting of the severity and accumulation of rules violations committed by Hicks.17 The District Court, sitting as trier of fact, found that although the proffered reasons were not the true reasons, the plaintiff had failed to prove that race was the determining factor and that the actions were personally rather than racially motivated.18 Those findings are not clearly erroneous.19
The Court of Appeals therefore erred when it held that rejection of the employer's reasons compelled judgment for the plaintiff as a matter of law.20
The trier of fact's rejection of the employer's asserted reasons for its action does not compel judgment for the plaintiff under Title VII.21
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Blackmun, And Justice Stevens Except As To Part I
Justice Souter dissented on the ground that the majority's holding is at odds with the interpretation of Title VII that our cases have consistently upheld.22 He argued that the McDonnell Douglas framework was designed to sharpen the inquiry into intentional discrimination.23 If the factfinder rejects the employer's proffered reasons as not credible, it must find that the employer is lying to cover up a discriminatory purpose.24 In such circumstances the factfinder should infer that the real reason was the one the plaintiff alleges.25
Souter concluded that the majority's approach will make it more difficult for plaintiffs to prove their cases and is contrary to the broad remedial purpose of Title VII.26