Also known as: exculpatory materials · Brady material · exculpatory evidence
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Evidence favorable to the accused that tends to negate guilt or mitigate punishment. The prosecution must disclose such material upon request or when it comes to the prosecutor's attention. Suppression of the evidence violates due process regardless of good or bad faith.
Naveen, held as an enemy combatant at a remote U.S. base, learns of new digital logs showing he never accessed the targeted systems. The review board refuses to consider the logs. Naveen petitions for habeas relief to introduce the material and contest the factual basis for his indefinite detention.
Mackenzie faces tampering charges after a utility investigation. The prosecutor receives an internal audit showing software errors caused the meter anomalies without employee action. The prosecutor continues the case on access evidence alone and does not turn over the report to defense counsel.
Ethan faces assault charges after a bar fight. A reliable witness statement recorded shortly after the incident describes another person starting the altercation. The trial court applies the hearsay rule to exclude the statement. Ethan argues the exclusion deprives him of a fair opportunity to present critical evidence.
Elise is charged with deliberate homicide after a fatal shooting. She seeks to introduce evidence of extreme intoxication to show she lacked the required mental state. The state statute precludes the evidence. Elise contends the categorical bar prevents her from presenting material evidence negating an element of the offense.
On July 12, 1992, respondent James Egelhoff was camping in the Yaak region of northwestern Montana with Roberta Pavola and John Christenson to pick mushrooms. The three sold the mushrooms they had collected and spent the rest of the day and evening drinking in bars and at a private party in Troy, Montana. After leaving the party after 9 p.m. in Christenson's 1974 Ford Galaxy station wagon, the drinking continued, as Egelhoff was seen buying beer at 9:20 p.m. and recalled passing a bottle of Black Velvet with Christenson. Around midnight, officers of the Lincoln County sheriff's department discovered the station wagon stuck in a ditch along U.S. Highway 2. Pavola and Christenson were in the front seat, each dead from a single gunshot to the head. Egelhoff lay in the rear of the car, alive and yelling obscenities, with a blood-alcohol content of .36 percent measured over an hour later. His .38-caliber handgun lay on the floor near the brake pedal with four loaded rounds and two empty casings, and he had gunshot residue on his hands. Egelhoff was charged with two counts of deliberate homicide under Montana law requiring that he purposely or knowingly caused the deaths of another human being. At trial he claimed an unidentified fourth person must have committed the murders, that his extreme intoxication rendered him physically incapable of committing them, and that it accounted for his inability to recall the events. The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 45-2-203 that it could not consider respondent's intoxicated condition in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense. The jury found Egelhoff guilty on both counts and the court sentenced him to 84 years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed the convictions. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseEmanuel is convicted on drug charges after a confidential informant testifies. The defense later learns the informant received a reduced sentence in exchange for cooperation. The prosecutor never disclosed the deal. Emanuel moves to set aside the conviction on the ground that the withheld information was material to the informant's credibility.
In October 1977 respondent Hughes Anderson Bagley was indicted in the Western District of Washington on fifteen counts of violating federal narcotics and firearms statutes. On November 18, 1977, twenty-four days before trial, Bagley filed a discovery motion requesting the names and addresses of government witnesses, their prior criminal records, and any deals, promises or inducements made to witnesses in exchange for their testimony. The government's response identified James F. O'Connor and Donald E. Mitchell as its two principal witnesses and stated that each had been paid $250 for information and expenses. It produced forms signed by both men entitled "Contract for Purchase of Information and Payment of Cash Reward" showing the $250 payments. O'Connor and Mitchell were state law-enforcement officers employed by the Milwaukee Railroad as private security guards. Between April and June 1977 they assisted the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in an undercover investigation of Bagley. At the December 1977 bench trial O'Connor and Mitchell testified that they had observed Bagley selling a handgun to a third person and test-firing several weapons. The district court found Bagley guilty on the narcotics charges, acquitted him on the firearms charges, and sentenced him to a total of twenty years' imprisonment, all but two years of which were suspended. In mid-1980 Bagley filed requests under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act and received copies of additional ATF contracts that O'Connor and Mitchell had signed on May 3, 1977. Each contract was entitled "Contract for Purchase of Information and Payment of Lump Sum Therefor." The printed portion stated that the vendor would provide information to ATF and that upon accomplishment of the objective the United States would pay a sum commensurate with services and information rendered. The typewritten description stated that each man would provide information regarding violations committed by Bagley, purchase evidence for ATF, work undercover, assist in gathering evidence, and testify against the violator in federal court. The contracts also provided for monthly payments of $300 up to a maximum of $3,000 and a $2,500 reward for information leading to arrest and conviction. On the basis of the newly obtained contracts Bagley moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence, alleging that the government's failure to disclose the contracts violated his right to due process. After an evidentiary hearing before a magistrate, the district court denied the motion, finding beyond a reasonable doubt that disclosure of the agreements would have had no effect on its finding of guilt. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseEva is charged with possession of a controlled substance found in a car she occupied with three others. A statutory presumption treats the presence of drugs as possession by every occupant. Eva offers testimony that the drugs belonged to one passenger alone. The trial court instructs the jury on the presumption without allowing the defense evidence to rebut it.
In March 1973, three adult male respondents and a sixteen-year-old girl were traveling in a Chevrolet on the New York State Thruway when the car was stopped for speeding. Police observed two loaded handguns weighing approximately six pounds in an open handbag on the front floor or seat beside the girl, who admitted the bag belonged to her. A machinegun and heroin were discovered in the trunk after it was pried open. The four were tried together in Ulster County Court for possession of the handguns and trunk items. The trial judge instructed the jury regarding the statutory presumption that the presence of firearms in the automobile constituted evidence of possession by all occupants. The jury found the three adult males guilty of handgun possession but acquitted everyone of the trunk charges. The convictions were affirmed by the Appellate Division without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed. The respondents sought federal habeas corpus relief in the Southern District of New York. The district court granted the writ on the ground that the presumption could not support the convictions on these facts. The Second Circuit affirmed the grant of the writ, though on the basis that the statute was unconstitutional on its face. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the procedural and substantive issues raised by the lower federal courts' decisions.
View caseNo. The obligation arises whenever the prosecutor knows of evidence that tends to negate guilt or mitigate the offense, whether or not the defense has made a request. The duty is triggered by the prosecutor's knowledge of the information.
No. If the prosecutor knows of scientific evidence that eliminates any factual link between the defendant and the charged conduct, filing or continuing the case violates the duty to refrain from prosecuting charges known to lack probable cause.
No. The prosecutor must still disclose information known to tend to negate guilt unless a protective order is obtained from the court. The privilege assertion alone does not suspend the disclosure obligation.
No. The constitutional obligation to disclose material exculpatory evidence applies to trial proceedings. A convicted defendant has no freestanding due process right to post-conviction discovery of such material.
…to introduce crucial, relevant evidence: " In the absence of any valid state justification, exclusion of this kind of exculpatory evidence deprives a defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor's case encounter and survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing." 476 U. S., at 690-691 (emphasis added) (internal…