474 U.S. 52 (1985)
William Lloyd Hill pleaded guilty in an Arkansas trial court to charges of first-degree murder and theft of property.1 Under the plea agreement the State recommended concurrent prison sentences of 35 years for the murder and 10 years for the theft.2 Hill signed a written plea statement indicating that he understood the charges and consequences of pleading guilty, that his plea had not been induced by any force, threat, or promise apart from the agreement itself, that he realized the trial judge retained sole power of sentence, and that he had discussed the plea agreement with his attorney and was satisfied with the advice.3
At the plea hearing Hill recounted the events giving rise to the charges, affirmed that he had signed and understood the plea statement, reiterated that no threats or promises had been made other than the agreement, and entered guilty pleas to both charges.4 The trial judge accepted the pleas, imposed the recommended sentences, granted credit for time already served, and told Hill that he would be required to serve at least one-third of his time before becoming eligible for parole.5
More than two years later Hill filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.6 He alleged that his guilty plea was involuntary because of ineffective assistance of counsel in that his court-appointed attorney had told him he would become eligible for parole after serving one-third of his sentence.7 In fact, because Hill had previously been convicted of a felony in Florida, Arkansas law classified him as a second offender and required him to serve one-half of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole.8 Hill asked the district court to reduce his sentence to a term that would result in parole eligibility in conformance with his original expectations.9 The plea statement form completed in connection with the case indicated zero prior convictions.10
The District Court denied habeas relief without a hearing.11 A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that parole eligibility is a collateral rather than a direct consequence of a guilty plea.12 On rehearing the en banc Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court judgment by an equally divided court.13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the difference between the result reached in the present case and that reached by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Strader v. Garrison.14
In his habeas petition Hill did not allege that, had counsel correctly informed him about his parole eligibility date, he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted on going to trial.15 He alleged no special circumstances that might support the conclusion that he placed particular emphasis on his parole eligibility in deciding whether or not to plead guilty.16 His mistaken belief that he would become eligible for parole after serving one-third of his sentence would have affected his calculation of the time he likely would serve under the proposed plea agreement.17 The same mistaken belief would have affected his calculation of the time he likely would serve if he went to trial and were convicted.18
Whether the two-part standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in Strickland v. Washington applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel?19
The two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims established in Strickland v. Washington applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.20
Yes. The court determined that the justifications for imposing the prejudice requirement in Strickland are relevant in the context of guilty pleas.21 Attorney errors come in an infinite variety and are as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they are to be prejudicial.22 Requiring a showing of prejudice also serves the fundamental interest in the finality of guilty pleas identified in United States v. Timmreck.23
Applied to the established facts, Hill entered his guilty plea upon the advice of counsel in the Arkansas trial court after negotiating concurrent sentences of thirty-five years for murder and ten years for theft.24 The claim centers on whether that advice regarding parole eligibility constituted ineffective assistance.25 Therefore the Strickland test governs the analysis of the claim.26
The two-part Strickland standard applies to this guilty plea challenge.27
Whether a defendant challenging the validity of a guilty plea on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial?28
In the context of guilty pleas, to satisfy the prejudice requirement of the Strickland test, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.29
Yes. The prejudice requirement focuses on whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process.30 In other words, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for the errors he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.31 In the established facts, this requirement is applied to Hill's claim that his attorney misinformed him about parole eligibility under the plea agreement for the thirty-five year murder sentence and ten year theft sentence.32
The trial judge had informed him only that he must serve at least one-third of his time before parole eligibility.33
A defendant must make that specific showing of prejudice.34
Whether the petitioner alleged facts sufficient to satisfy the prejudice requirement when he did not claim he would have gone to trial but for counsel's erroneous advice about parole eligibility?35
A petitioner challenging a guilty plea on ineffective assistance grounds fails to satisfy the prejudice requirement if he does not allege that he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted on going to trial but for counsel's errors.36 He also fails if he does not allege special circumstances showing particular emphasis on the erroneous advice.37
No. Hill did not allege in his habeas petition that had counsel correctly informed him about his parole eligibility date he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted on going to trial.38 He alleged no special circumstances that might support the conclusion that he placed particular emphasis on his parole eligibility in deciding whether or not to plead guilty. His mistaken belief that he would become eligible for parole after serving one-third of his sentence would seem to have affected his calculation of the time he likely would serve under the proposed plea agreement.39 The same mistaken belief would seem to have affected his calculation of the time he likely would serve if he went to trial and were convicted.40
The petitioner failed to allege facts sufficient to satisfy the prejudice requirement.41
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Stevens
Justice White concurred in the judgment.42 The plea statement form completed in connection with the case indicated zero prior convictions. There was no allegation that petitioner told his attorney about his previous Florida felony conviction.43
Without an allegation that the attorney knew of the prior conviction, there is no factual basis for suggesting that the attorney's advice was incompetent.44 If such an allegation had been made, petitioner clearly alleged more than sufficient facts that if proved would show he was prejudiced by counsel's error.45