Also known as: ex-delicto · from a tort · arising from tort
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A claim or cause of action arising from a tort or other civil wrong rather than from a contractual promise.
Ella Emerson suffered permanent injuries when Echelon Security's employee negligently caused a vehicle collision. At trial the jury calculated her projected lost wages over the next twenty years and reduced that total to present value before entering judgment.
Elliot Edmonds's attorney deliberately concealed a settlement offer to punish him after a billing dispute. Because the attorney acted with intent to cause harm, Elliot recovered the full amount of damages despite later refusing a renewed offer.
Ezra Eastman was fired after refusing to falsify records. He sued his employer alleging the discharge violated public policy and framed the claim as one arising from breach of a legal duty rather than from any promise in his employment contract.
Interactive Data Corporation hired John Foley in June 1976 as an assistant product manager at a starting salary of $18,500. As a condition of employment Foley signed a confidential and proprietary information agreement. The company's president told Foley that if he performed his job well he would have a long and rewarding employment with the firm. Over the next six years and nine months Foley received steady salary increases, promotions, bonuses, awards, and superior performance evaluations, rising to branch manager of the Los Angeles office with an annual salary of $56,164 plus a merit bonus. In January 1983 Foley learned that his new supervisor, Robert Kuhne, was under investigation by the FBI for embezzlement from his former employer, Bank of America. Foley reported the information to Vice President Richard Earnest because he was worried about working for Kuhne in a supervisory position. Earnest told Foley not to discuss rumors and to forget what he had heard. In early March 1983 Kuhne informed Foley that the company had decided to replace him for performance reasons and offered a transfer to another division. Foley was later told he could continue as branch manager if he agreed to a performance plan, but when Kuhne met with him the next day Kuhne instead gave Foley the choice of resigning or being fired. Foley was discharged on March 13, 1983. Foley filed suit against Interactive Data Corporation alleging three causes of action: tortious discharge in violation of public policy, breach of an implied-in-fact contract to terminate only for good cause, and tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The superior court sustained the company's demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the action. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted review.
View caseElena Estrada sued the city after its employees violated her constitutional rights during an arrest. She brought the claim directly against the municipality under a theory that treated the conduct as a civil wrong for which the entity could be held responsible.
In July 1971 petitioners, a class of female employees of the Department of Social Services and of the Board of Education of the City of New York, commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They sued the Department and its Commissioner, the Board and its Chancellor, and the city of New York and its Mayor, all in their official capacities. The complaint alleged that the city and its agencies had as a matter of official policy compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons. The suit sought injunctive relief and backpay for periods of unlawful forced leave. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court held petitioners' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief moot because the city and the Board had changed their maternity-leave policies after the complaint was filed. The court found that the acts complained of were unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. It denied backpay on the ground that any damages would come ultimately from the city of New York and that holding otherwise would circumvent the immunity conferred on municipalities by Monroe v. Pape. On appeal, petitioners renewed their arguments that the Board of Education was not a municipality within the meaning of Monroe v. Pape and that the District Court had erred in barring a damages award against the individual defendants. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Board was not a “person” under § 1983 because it performed a vital governmental function and had no final say over its appropriations. It also held that a damages action against officials sued in their official capacities could not proceed because any award would have to be paid by a city held not amenable to suit in Monroe v. Pape. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether local governmental officials and local independent school boards are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when equitable relief in the nature of back pay is sought against them in their official capacities. After oral argument, the Court requested the parties to address whether Monroe v. Pape should be reconsidered in light of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
View caseAn ex delicto action arises from a tort or breach of a legal duty imposed by law, while an ex contractu action arises from breach of a promise contained in a contract.
Yes. When the tortfeasor intended the harm or acted with reckless disregard, the plaintiff is not barred from full recovery even if the plaintiff later failed to mitigate, unless the plaintiff intentionally or heedlessly failed to protect his own interests after learning of the danger.
A lump-sum award for future pecuniary losses is measured by the present worth of the full amount of the loss that would have been received at the later time.
…of the nature of the action contrasts with our Tameny analysis, in which we deemed the public-policy-based cause of action as "ex delicto," or arising "from a breach of duty growing out of the contract," rather than "from a breach of a promise set forth in the contract" or "ex contractu." (27 Cal.3d at p. 175.) As we…