244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917)
The Southern Pacific Company, a Kentucky corporation, operated both a railroad as a common carrier and the steamship El Oriente plying between New York and Galveston, Texas.1 It maintained an office at Pier 49, North River, New York City.2
On August 15, 1914, Christen Jensen was employed by the company to move cargo destined to and from other states.3 He operated a small electric freight truck on the steamship El Oriente, which was berthed for discharging and loading at Pier 49 in navigable waters of the United States.4
Jensen's work consisted of driving the truck into the vessel where it was loaded with lumber that formed part of the cargo being transported from Galveston to New York.5 He then drove the truck out of the vessel upon a gangway connecting the ship to the pier approximately ten feet away and unloaded the lumber on the pier.6 After approximately three hours, while driving the loaded truck out of the port in the side of the vessel and onto the gangway, the truck became jammed against the guide pieces.7 Jensen reversed direction at third or full speed backward into the hatchway, failed to lower his head, struck the ship at the top line, and suffered a broken neck that caused his immediate death.8
Jensen left surviving his widow Marie Jensen, then twenty-nine years of age, and his children Howard Jensen, age seven, and Evelyn Jensen, age three.9 His average weekly wage was $19.60.10 On October 9, 1914, the New York Workmen's Compensation Commission, upon a claim regularly presented by the widow, made findings that the injury was accidental, arose out of and in the course of employment, and was not due to intoxication or willful intent.11 The Commission awarded compensation at the rate of $5.87 weekly to the widow during widowhood, $1.96 weekly to each child until age eighteen, and $100 for funeral expenses under chapter 67 of the Consolidated Laws as amended.12
The Southern Pacific Company timely objected to the award on multiple constitutional and statutory grounds.13 The appellate division approved the award without opinion, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed that action in 215 N.Y. 514.14
Whether the Federal Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908 applies to determine the liability of an interstate railroad carrier for injuries sustained by an employee while operating a freight truck to load and unload cargo on its steamship plying between New York and Texas?15
The Federal Employers' Liability Act applies only to common carriers by railroad while engaging in interstate commerce and to employees suffering injury while employed by such carrier in such commerce.16 The statute does not extend to maritime carriage merely because the vessel is owned by a railroad company.17
No. The Act's text limits its reach to railroad operations and work having direct and substantial connection with them.18 This is shown by its careful limitation after the 1906 statute was invalidated and by its reference to boats only as adjuncts to railroad equipment.19 The Southern Pacific Company operated the steamship El Oriente between New York and Galveston as a separate maritime enterprise.20 Christen Jensen's work consisted solely of moving cargo on that vessel by driving an electric truck between the hold and Pier 49.21
Because the employment lacked any direct connection to railroad operations, the Federal Employers' Liability Act supplies no rule of liability here.22
The Federal Employers' Liability Act does not apply.23
Whether the New York Workmen's Compensation Act may be applied to award compensation for the death of an employee engaged in moving cargo on a vessel berthed in navigable waters of the United States when the employment is part of interstate commerce?24
State workmen's compensation statutes may not be applied to maritime injuries because they work material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law and interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations.25 The remedy provided is unknown to the common law and is not saved by the saving clause in the Judiciary Act.26
No. Article III, Section 2 extends federal judicial power to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.27 Congress holds paramount power to fix the maritime law that prevails throughout the country.28 The work of a stevedore moving cargo between a berthed vessel and a pier is maritime in nature.29 The employment contract is maritime, and the injury occurred on navigable waters.30
Application of the New York statute would subject foreign ships to varying state obligations, destroying the uniformity the Constitution was designed to establish.31 The remedy created by the statute is of a character wholly unknown to the common law and incapable of enforcement by ordinary court processes, so it is not saved to suitors.32 The Southern Pacific Company operated the El Oriente in interstate commerce.33 Jensen moved cargo destined to and from other states, and the Commission awarded compensation under the state act.34
That award therefore conflicts with the Constitution and is invalid.35
The New York Workmen's Compensation Act may not be applied.36
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Holmes dissented on the ground that the saving clause preserves state power to impose liability for acts done upon navigable waters and to enforce it in the state's own courts.37 The common law of the state, supplemented by statute, supplies the rule of decision when admiralty courts themselves adopt common-law principles.38 He concluded that nothing in the Constitution prevents a state from creating a right to compensation for maritime injuries so long as Congress has not enacted inconsistent legislation.39
Holmes further observed that the liability created by the New York act ends in a money judgment.40 The mode of ascertaining the amount cannot matter if any liability can be imposed that was not known to the maritime law.41
Joined by Justices Brandeis And Clarke
Justice Pitney, joined by Justices Brandeis and Clarke, dissented on the ground that the constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction was intended only to establish concurrent judicial power and did not impose substantive maritime rules upon state courts exercising their historic concurrent jurisdiction.42 He emphasized that the saving clause and the unbroken practice of state courts applying their own laws demonstrate that states remain free to modify rules governing maritime torts until Congress acts.43 Pitney drew upon the history of the Judiciary Act and numerous precedents showing that state statutes may create rights enforceable in state courts for maritime torts.44
He stressed that the effect of the decision cannot logically be confined to interstate or foreign commerce and would deprive states of police power over navigable waters lying wholly within their limits.45