Also known as: enumerated powers · enumerate power · enumerating power · express powers
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A political power specifically delegated to a governmental branch by a constitution.
Congress passes a statute authorizing the Treasury to charter a national bank to handle federal tax collections and debt payments. Enzo Eastwood, a state banker, challenges the charter in federal court. The court upholds the statute because the chartering power implements Congress's taxing and borrowing authorities.
Maryland imposes a tax solely on the operations of the national bank chartered by Congress. The bank's cashier refuses to pay. The Supreme Court invalidates the tax because it burdens an instrument created to execute enumerated federal fiscal powers.
In April 1816, Congress passed an act entitled "An act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States." The Bank organized in Philadelphia pursuant to the act and in 1817 established a branch in the City of Baltimore that from that time until May 1, 1818, transacted business by issuing bank notes, discounting promissory notes, and performing other customary operations under the authority of the corporate body established at Philadelphia. On February 11, 1818, the General Assembly of Maryland passed an act entitled "An act to impose a tax on all banks, or branches thereof, in the State of Maryland, not chartered by the legislature." The Maryland statute provided that any such branch could not lawfully issue notes except upon stamped paper of specified denominations furnished by the Treasurer of the Western Shore, or could relieve itself from that requirement by paying annually in advance to the Treasurer the sum of $15,000. Officers offending against the provisions forfeited $500 for each offense, and persons circulating unstamped notes forfeited up to $100, with penalties recoverable by indictment or action of debt. James W. McCulloch, cashier of the Baltimore branch, on the days set forth in the declaration issued bank notes to George Williams in Baltimore in part payment of a promissory note discounted by the branch, and those notes were not issued on stamped paper as prescribed by the Maryland act; neither the bank nor its branch had paid the $15,000 in advance before or since the issuance of those notes. John James, who sued as well for himself as for the State of Maryland, brought an action of debt against McCulloch in the County Court of Baltimore County to recover the penalties. The parties submitted a statement of agreed facts to the court, which rendered judgment against McCulloch; the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed that judgment, and McCulloch brought the cause to the Supreme Court of the United States by writ of error.
View caseWashington enacts a statute criminalizing physician-assisted suicide. Esther Eisenberg, a terminally ill patient, claims a liberty right to assistance. The Court rejects the claim because no enumerated power or fundamental right supports overriding the state's traditional authority.
Washington has prohibited assisting suicide since its territorial days. In 1854, the first Territorial Legislature outlawed assisting another in the commission of self-murder. The current statute, Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060, provides that a person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide, and classifies it as a class C felony punishable by up to five years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. Washington's Natural Death Act, enacted in 1979, states that the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment at a patient's direction shall not constitute a suicide, but the state has consistently rejected efforts to legalize physician-assisted suicide, including a 1991 ballot initiative defeated by voters. The respondents in this case are four physicians who practice in Washington and treat terminally ill patients, three terminally ill patients who sought to end their lives with physician assistance and have since died, and Compassion in Dying, a nonprofit organization that counsels people considering physician-assisted suicide. The physicians declared that they would assist their patients in ending their lives if not for the assisted-suicide ban. Petitioners are the State of Washington and its Attorney General. In January 1994, the respondents filed this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. They sought a declaration that Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060 is unconstitutional on its face and an injunction against its enforcement. The District Court held that the statute was unconstitutional. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed that decision, but the full court sitting en banc reversed the panel and affirmed the District Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View caseCongress enacts a statute prohibiting possession of firearms within one thousand feet of a school. Elijah Edwards, a high-school senior, is charged after carrying a handgun to class. The Court strikes down the statute because possession near schools is not economic activity connected to any enumerated commerce power.
In March 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun and five bullets. Acting on an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted Lopez, who admitted possessing the weapon. Local police arrested him and charged him under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The following day, state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. A federal grand jury indicted him on one count of knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone. Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress's power to legislate control over public schools. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the statute was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate activities affecting commerce because the business of schools affects interstate commerce. After a bench trial, the court found Lopez guilty and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and two years of supervised release. Lopez appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the conviction, holding that the statute was beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View caseNew London authorizes eminent domain to assemble parcels for a private redevelopment project expected to increase tax revenue. Edith Eberhardt, a homeowner, objects that the taking serves no public use. The Court upholds the action because economic development qualifies as a permissible purpose under the Takings Clause when tied to enumerated powers.
In the late 1990s the city of New London, Connecticut, confronted severe economic decline after the 1996 closure of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, which had employed more than 1,500 people. The city's unemployment rate stood nearly double the state average and its population had dropped below 24,000 residents from a 1970 high of 30,000. State and local officials therefore designated the Fort Trumbull peninsula for targeted economic revitalization. In 1998 the New London Development Corporation, a private nonprofit entity, was reactivated to prepare a redevelopment plan covering roughly 90 acres. The plan divided the area into seven parcels designated for a waterfront conference hotel and marinas, retail and entertainment space, research and office facilities, parking and park support, residential units, a Coast Guard museum, and additional office and retail uses. The city council formally approved the plan in January 2000 and authorized the NLDC to acquire needed parcels by purchase or, if necessary, by eminent domain. Petitioners Susette Kelo, Wilhelmina Dery, and seven other owners held fifteen properties within parcels 3 and 4A; ten of those parcels were occupied by the owners or their family members and none was alleged to be blighted. After negotiations with the NLDC failed, the corporation initiated condemnation proceedings against the remaining properties in November 2000. In December 2000 the petitioners filed suit in New London Superior Court asserting that the proposed takings violated the public-use limitation of the Fifth Amendment. Following a seven-day bench trial the Superior Court entered a permanent restraining order barring condemnation of the parcel 4A properties but denied relief as to the parcel 3 properties. Both sides appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, which upheld the validity of all challenged takings. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the federal constitutional question.
View caseCongress enacts a statute allowing one house to veto an executive suspension of deportation. Jagdish Rai Chadha, an alien whose deportation was suspended, faces removal after the veto. The Court invalidates the one-house veto because it constitutes legislative action that must follow the bicameral and presentment requirements attached to enumerated powers.
In 1966 Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian born in Kenya who held a British passport, was lawfully admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa that expired on June 30, 1972. In October 1973, the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service informed Chadha that he had remained longer than permitted and was therefore deportable. Chadha conceded deportability but applied for suspension under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. On June 25, 1974, an Immigration Judge acting on behalf of the Attorney General suspended Chadha's deportation and adjusted his status to permanent resident after finding that he satisfied the statutory criteria of seven years' continuous presence, good moral character, and extreme hardship. A report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress as required by the Act. On December 16, 1975, the House of Representatives passed a resolution disapproving the suspension for Chadha and five other aliens on the ground that they did not meet the statutory requirements, particularly as to hardship. Pursuant to the House resolution, the Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings. Chadha moved to terminate them on constitutional grounds, but the Immigration Judge ruled that he lacked authority to declare the resolution unconstitutional and ordered Chadha deported. Chadha appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which likewise held that it had no authority to pass on the constitutionality of the resolution and dismissed the appeal. Chadha then filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Immigration and Naturalization Service appeared and urged the court to hold the House resolution unconstitutional. After inviting briefs from the Senate and House as amici curiae, the Court of Appeals held the resolution unconstitutional because it was a legislative act that failed to satisfy the requirements of Article I, sections 1 and 7, and set aside the deportation order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the consolidated cases to address the constitutional question.
View caseNo. The Constitution grants the national government only enumerated powers. Control over public-school curriculum remains with the states because education is not among the powers delegated to Congress.
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Yes. Congress possesses enumerated powers to borrow money and to lay uniform duties for the general welfare. Once revenue is raised under those powers, Congress may allocate the funds to particular projects without violating uniformity requirements.
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Yes. Regulation of local utilities and energy generation within a state is not an enumerated federal power. Absent a valid federal statute that preempts state law, the authority remains with the states.
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No. The duty regulates interstate commerce and satisfies the uniformity requirement for excises. Congress may spend the proceeds for the general welfare even if the benefits are distributed unevenly.
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Yes. Supervision of state officials is a power reserved to the states. Nothing in the Constitution requires a state to lend its personnel to federal programs absent a valid federal directive.
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