Also known as: eleemosynae · eleemosynaria · eleemosynarius · eleemosynary corporation · charitable · alms-giving
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An adjective describing institutions, activities, or purposes connected with charity or not conducted for profit. The label applies when an entity receives or distributes resources without a profit motive and for public benefit.
Judge Ramirez attends a planning session for Equinox Energy's annual fundraiser benefiting local shelters. The judge helps design the event schedule and reviews investment options for the proceeds. Because the organization operates solely for charitable ends, the participation complies with judicial conduct standards.
Eugene Ellsworth transfers assets into a trust whose sole purpose is to supply food and shelter to low-income families. The document names no private beneficiaries and directs all distributions toward relief of poverty. The arrangement qualifies as a charitable trust under the governing statute.
Eastern Electric's board votes to contribute $200,000 from corporate funds to a citywide literacy program. The payment is recorded as a charitable expenditure rather than a business expense. The action falls within the corporation's statutory authority to support educational purposes.
Emmett Egan represents Edgewater Capital, a nonprofit housing developer, in a zoning appeal at one-third his usual rate. The representation advances the organization's mission of providing affordable units to low-income residents. The arrangement satisfies the pro bono guidelines for service to charitable entities.
Esme Ellington creates a trust whose income will support free medical clinics in underserved neighborhoods. The trust instrument lists no individual beneficiaries and states that its goal is the promotion of community health. The purpose satisfies the statutory categories for charitable trusts.
Elijah Edwards seeks a special-use permit to operate a residence for adults with developmental disabilities in a residential district. The city ordinance lists philanthropic or eleemosynary institutions as permitted uses subject to approval. The proposed facility qualifies for consideration under that category.
In July 1980, respondent Jan Hannah purchased a building at 201 Featherston Street in Cleburne, Texas. Hannah intended to lease the property to Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC) for use as a group home. The home would house thirteen mentally retarded men and women under constant staff supervision. The building contained four bedrooms and two baths, and CLC planned to add a half bath while complying with all applicable state and federal regulations for an Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded. The site lay in an R-3 Apartment House District. The city's zoning ordinance permitted apartment houses, boarding houses, hospitals, and nursing homes in that district without special permission. However, the ordinance required a special use permit, renewable annually after a public hearing, for hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded. The city classified the proposed group home as a hospital for the feeble-minded and informed CLC that a permit was required. After a public hearing, the City Council voted three to one to deny the application. CLC and its prospective residents filed suit in federal district court against the city and its officials. They alleged that the ordinance and its application discriminated against the mentally retarded in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court upheld the ordinance and the denial. It found that the council's decision was motivated by the residents' mental retardation yet rationally related to legitimate interests such as neighborhood safety and property values. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that mental retardation is a quasi-suspect class and that the ordinance was invalid both facially and as applied. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the equal protection issues raised by the zoning ordinance and its application to the proposed group home.
View caseNo. The term focuses on the absence of a profit motive and the charitable character of the purpose rather than formal tax status. Model rules and trust statutes apply the label to entities whose activities advance public welfare without private gain.
A judge may solicit contributions only from family members or from judges over whom the judge lacks supervisory authority. Broader solicitation is restricted to preserve judicial impartiality.
Model business corporation acts expressly authorize corporations to make donations for charitable, scientific, or educational purposes. The eleemosynary nature of the recipient confirms that the expenditure falls within this statutory power.
The trust remains eleemosynary if its purpose falls within recognized charitable categories such as relief of poverty or advancement of education, even when the immediate beneficiaries are limited. The key inquiry is whether the purpose produces a community benefit.
…speech and of the press, see Cantwell v. Connecticut , 310 U. S., at 304-307 (invalidating a licensing system for religious and charitable solicitations under which the administrator had discretion to deny a license to any cause he deemed nonreligious); Murdock v. Pennsylvania , 319 U. S. 105 (1943) (invalidating a flat tax…