dual sovereignty

In July 1971 petitioners, a class of female employees of the Department of Social Services and of the Board of Education of the City of New York, commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They sued the Department and its Commissioner, the Board and its Chancellor, and the city of New York and its Mayor, all in their official capacities. The complaint alleged that the city and its agencies had as a matter of official policy compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons. The suit sought injunctive relief and backpay for periods of unlawful forced leave. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court held petitioners' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief moot because the city and the Board had changed their maternity-leave policies after the complaint was filed. The court found that the acts complained of were unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. It denied backpay on the ground that any damages would come ultimately from the city of New York and that holding otherwise would circumvent the immunity conferred on municipalities by Monroe v. Pape. On appeal, petitioners renewed their arguments that the Board of Education was not a municipality within the meaning of Monroe v. Pape and that the District Court had erred in barring a damages award against the individual defendants. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Board was not a “person” under § 1983 because it performed a vital governmental function and had no final say over its appropriations. It also held that a damages action against officials sued in their official capacities could not proceed because any award would have to be paid by a city held not amenable to suit in Monroe v. Pape. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether local governmental officials and local independent school boards are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when equitable relief in the nature of back pay is sought against them in their official capacities. After oral argument, the Court requested the parties to address whether Monroe v. Pape should be reconsidered in light of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.

The history of public transportation in San Antonio began with private operators. In 1959 the City of San Antonio purchased the privately owned San Antonio Transit Company and replaced it with the publicly owned San Antonio Transit System. In 1978 the city transferred its facilities and equipment to appellee San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, a public mass-transit authority organized on a countywide basis. SAMTA became the major provider of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area. Between 1978 and 1980 its vehicles traveled over 26 million route miles and carried over 63 million passengers. San Antonio began receiving federal subsidies under the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964. SATS and SAMTA received over $51 million in UMTA grants from December 1970 through February 1980. This total included $12.5 million in operating grants during SAMTA's first two fiscal years. The Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted in 1938 without applying to local mass-transit employees. Congress amended the statute in 1961 to extend minimum-wage coverage to private mass-transit carriers with annual gross revenue of at least $1 million. In 1966 Congress withdrew exemptions from public hospitals, schools, and mass-transit carriers whose rates and services were subject to state regulation. The 1974 amendments provided for the progressive repeal of the surviving overtime exemption for mass-transit employees while extending FLSA coverage to virtually all state and local government employees. Following the 1976 decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, SATS informed its employees that the decision relieved it of overtime obligations under the FLSA. On September 17, 1979, the Wage and Hour Administration of the Department of Labor issued an opinion that SAMTA's operations were not constitutionally immune from the FLSA. On November 21, 1979, SAMTA filed suit against the Secretary of Labor in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas seeking declaratory relief. On the same day appellant Garcia and other SAMTA employees sued SAMTA in the same court for overtime pay under the FLSA. On November 17, 1981, the District Court granted SAMTA's motion for summary judgment. The court held that local public mass-transit systems constitute integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions. After the Supreme Court decided Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co. in 1982, the District Court's judgment was vacated and remanded. On remand the District Court adhered to its original view and again entered judgment for SAMTA in 1983. The Secretary and Garcia took direct appeals. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, restored the cases for reargument after initial argument, and requested briefing on whether the principles of the Tenth Amendment as set forth in National League of Cities v. Usery should be reconsidered.

In 1939 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania adopted an Alien Registration Act requiring every alien eighteen years of age or older, with limited exceptions, to register annually with the Department of Labor and Industry, supply specified information plus any additional details the department might direct, pay a one-dollar annual fee, receive an identification card, carry the card at all times, and exhibit it on demand by any police officer or department agent. One alien and one naturalized citizen filed suit in federal district court against state officials charged with enforcing the statute and sought an injunction against its operation. A three-judge district court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the alien plaintiff and enjoined enforcement of the Act. The case reached the Supreme Court on direct appeal under section 266 of the Judicial Code, with probable jurisdiction noted on March 25, 1940. After the district court decision but before Supreme Court review, Congress on June 28, 1940 enacted a federal Alien Registration Act that requires a single registration of aliens fourteen years of age and older, collects detailed information plus additional matters prescribed by the Commissioner with the Attorney General's approval, mandates fingerprinting of all registrants, and directs that registration records be kept secret and released only to persons or agencies designated by the Commissioner with the Attorney General's approval. The federal statute contains no requirement that aliens carry identification cards for exhibition to police or other officials and punishes only willful failure to register. The Supreme Court therefore examined the Pennsylvania statute in light of the intervening federal legislation.

Robert J. Taylor operates a bait business in Maine. In 1984 he arranged to have 158,000 live golden shiners delivered to him from outside the State even though a Maine statute prohibited the importation of live baitfish. The shipment was intercepted. A federal grand jury in the District of Maine indicted Taylor for violating and conspiring to violate the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A), which criminalizes the importation of fish taken or possessed in violation of state law. Maine intervened in the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) to defend the constitutionality of its statute, asserting that the ban protected the State's fisheries from parasites and nonnative species that might accompany shipments of live baitfish. Taylor moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the import ban unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce. The District Court conducted an evidentiary hearing before a Magistrate at which three scientific experts testified for the prosecution and one testified for the defense. The prosecution experts described two principal risks: three types of parasites prevalent in out-of-state baitfish but uncommon in Maine's wild fish population, and nonnative species that could be inadvertently included in shipments and could compete with, prey upon, or otherwise disrupt Maine's native fish. They further testified that no satisfactory inspection or sampling procedures existed for baitfish because of their small size, the large quantities shipped, and the absence of standardized techniques comparable to those developed for salmonids. Taylor's expert disputed the severity of the risks and stated that professional baitfish farmers using freshly drained ponds could largely avoid commingled species. The District Court found the statute constitutional and denied the motion to dismiss. Taylor entered a conditional plea of guilty under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2), reserving the right to appeal the constitutional ruling. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed. Maine appealed to the Supreme Court, which set the case for plenary review and postponed consideration of Taylor's challenges to appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) and to Maine's standing as an intervenor. The District Court's findings rested on the Magistrate's weighing of the expert testimony, including the prosecution witnesses' statements that inspection for parasites would require destruction of the fish and that no scientifically accepted sampling methods had been developed for baitfish, as well as the absence of any estimate from Taylor's expert of the time or cost required to develop such methods.