Also known as: descent and distribution statutes · statute of descent and distribution · statutes of descent and distribution · intestacy statute · intestate succession statute
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A statute prescribing the order in which a decedent's property passes to heirs when the decedent dies without a valid will. The statute supplies default rules that vest title by operation of law, with real property governed by the law of the situs and personal property governed by the law of the decedent's domicile at death.
Delilah Duran owned a large ranch and died without a will. The probate court applied the descent and distribution statute of the state where the ranch was located. Title vested directly in her son Darius Dixon by operation of law even though no deed was ever signed after her death.
Destiny Davis died intestate after being killed by her brother Demetrius Douglas. The probate court applied the descent and distribution statute to determine whether the slayer could inherit any portion of the estate. The statute's rules controlled the distribution among the remaining heirs once the court resolved the slayer's eligibility.
Howard Mahoney died intestate on May 6, 1961, of gunshot wounds. His wife, Charlotte Mahoney, was tried for the murder of Howard Mahoney in the Addison County Court and was convicted by jury of the crime of manslaughter in March, 1962. She is presently serving a sentence of not less than 12 nor more than 15 years at the Women’s Reformatory in Rutland. Howard Mahoney left no issue, and was survived by his wife and his father and mother. His father, Mark Mahoney, was appointed administrator of his estate which at the present time amounts to $3,885.89. After due notice and hearing, the Probate Court for the District of Franklin entered a judgment order decreeing the residue of the Estate of Howard Mahoney, in equal shares, to the father and mother of the decedent. An appeal from the judgment order and decree has been taken here by the appellant widow. The cause now before us is here on a direct appeal from the Probate Court. Findings of fact were made below from which it appears that the judgment of the probate court decreeing the estate of Howard Mahoney to his parents, rather than to his widow, was based upon a finding of the felonious killing of her husband by Mrs. Mahoney. The Probate Court used the record of the conviction of the appellant for manslaughter for its determination that the appellant had feloniously killed her husband. In Vermont, an indictment for murder can result in a jury conviction on either voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. The legislature has provided the sentences that may be passed upon a person convicted of manslaughter, but provides no definition of that offense, nor any statutory distinction between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.
View caseDeborah Dunn died intestate survived by a marital daughter and a nonmarital son whose paternity had been acknowledged. The probate court applied the descent and distribution statute to decide whether the nonmarital son could take as an heir. The statute's classification rules determined the final distribution of the estate.
Lou Bertha Patterson gave birth to Rita Vincent on March 15, 1962, in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana. On May 10, 1962, Patterson and Ezra Vincent jointly executed a Louisiana State Board of Health form before a notary public acknowledging that Vincent was the natural father of the child. This acknowledgment occurred under Louisiana procedures but did not alter the child's status for purposes of intestate succession. Ezra Vincent died intestate on September 16, 1968, in Rapides Parish, Louisiana, leaving substantial property within the state but no will to direct its distribution. Lou Bertha Labine, as guardian and tutrix of Rita Vincent, petitioned the state court for the appointment of an administrator for Vincent's estate, a declaration that Rita Vincent was the sole heir, and an order directing support and maintenance payments for the child. In the alternative, the petition sought a declaration of entitlement to $150 per month in support under Louisiana law. The administrator of the succession answered the petition by claiming that Vincent's relatives were entitled to the entire estate. The trial court ruled that the father's collateral relations took the property and dismissed the petition with costs. It also denied the support claim in light of Social Security payments of $60 per month and Veterans Administration payments of $40 per month available to the child. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, affirmed the judgment, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana denied a petition for writ of certiorari. The child's guardian appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseDaphne Doyle died intestate after her husband had preserved sperm for later use. The probate court applied the descent and distribution statute to decide whether a child conceived and born after the husband's death qualified as an heir. The statute's definition of children controlled whether the posthumous child received a share of the estate.
In January 1993, Lauren Woodward and her husband Warren Woodward, who had been married for approximately three and one-half years and remained childless, learned that Warren had leukemia. The couple arranged for a quantity of Warren's semen to be medically withdrawn and preserved through a process known as sperm banking before he began treatment. Warren underwent an unsuccessful bone marrow transplant and died in October 1993, after which Lauren was appointed administratrix of his estate. In October 1995, Lauren gave birth to twin girls who had been conceived through artificial insemination using Warren's preserved semen. In January 1996, she applied to the Social Security Administration for child's insurance benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) and mother's benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 402(g)(1). The SSA denied the claims on the ground that the twins were not the husband's children within the meaning of the Act. In February 1996, while pursuing appeals from the SSA denial, Lauren filed a complaint for correction of birth record in the Probate and Family Court against the clerk of the city of Beverly, seeking to add Warren as the father on the twins' birth certificates. In October 1996, a Probate Court judge entered a judgment of paternity based on stipulations of voluntary acknowledgment of parentage and ordered the birth certificates amended to declare Warren the children's father. An administrative law judge conducted a de novo hearing. The judge concluded that the children did not qualify for benefits because they were not entitled to inherit from Warren under Massachusetts intestacy and paternity laws. The SSA appeals council affirmed that decision. Lauren appealed to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The court certified the question regarding the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children under Massachusetts intestacy law to the Supreme Judicial Court because the parties agreed that a determination under state law was dispositive and no directly applicable precedent existed.
View caseReal property is distributed according to the descent and distribution statute of the state where the property is located. Personal property is distributed according to the statute of the state where the decedent was domiciled at death.
Any probate property not effectively disposed of by will passes by intestacy and is distributed to the decedent's heirs according to the statute.
No deed from the decedent is required. Title passes by operation of law under the statute, although a fiduciary may later execute a deed to perfect record title.
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Some statutes expressly prevent a person who willfully kills the decedent from taking by descent or distribution.
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Modern statutes generally allow nonmarital children to inherit once paternity is established, though older statutes sometimes imposed absolute bars that raised equal-protection challenges.
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…spite of his crime. The reasoning for so deciding is that devolution of the property of a decedent is controlled entirely by the statutes of descent and distribution; further, that denial of the inheritance to the slayer because of his crime would be imposing an additional punishment for his crime not provided by statute, and would violate the…