401 U.S. 532 (1971)
Lou Bertha Patterson gave birth to Rita Vincent on March 15, 1962, in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana.1 On May 10, 1962, Patterson and Ezra Vincent jointly executed a Louisiana State Board of Health form before a notary public acknowledging that Vincent was the natural father of the child.2
This acknowledgment occurred under Louisiana procedures but did not alter the child's status for purposes of intestate succession.3 Ezra Vincent died intestate on September 16, 1968, in Rapides Parish, Louisiana, leaving substantial property within the state but no will to direct its distribution.4 Lou Bertha Labine, as guardian and tutrix of Rita Vincent, petitioned the state court for the appointment of an administrator for Vincent's estate, a declaration that Rita Vincent was the sole heir, and an order directing support and maintenance payments for the child.5 In the alternative, the petition sought a declaration of entitlement to $150 per month in support under Louisiana law.6
The administrator of the succession answered the petition by claiming that Vincent's relatives were entitled to the entire estate.7 The trial court ruled that the father's collateral relations took the property and dismissed the petition with costs.8 It also denied the support claim in light of Social Security payments of $60 per month and Veterans Administration payments of $40 per month available to the child.9
The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, affirmed the judgment, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana denied a petition for writ of certiorari.10 The child's guardian appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.11
Whether Louisiana's intestate succession laws that bar an acknowledged illegitimate child from sharing equally with legitimate children in the father's estate violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment?12
Under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state possesses broad power to regulate the disposition of property left within its borders upon death.13 A state may also promote family life through classifications in its intestate succession laws.14 Such classifications are permissible so long as they rest on a rational basis and do not create an insurmountable barrier to inheritance by an illegitimate child.15
No. The established facts show that Lou Bertha Patterson gave birth to Rita Vincent on March 15, 1962, and that Ezra Vincent and Patterson executed a formal notarial acknowledgment of paternity on May 10, 1962, which did not confer rights of legitimate children under Louisiana law.16 When Vincent died intestate on September 16, 1968, the trial court applied Louisiana Civil Code Articles 206 and 919 to award the entire estate to the father's collateral relations, excluding the acknowledged but unlegitimated child, and denied support in light of the child's receipt of Social Security and Veterans Administration benefits. This outcome follows directly from the state's deliberate legislative choice to limit natural children's intestate rights to cases where no descendants, ascendants, collaterals, or surviving spouse exist, a choice that advances the state's interest in encouraging formal family structures and orderly property transmission without erecting an insurmountable barrier, because Vincent could have executed a will or legitimated the child by marriage.17
Louisiana's intestate succession laws do not violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.18
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan concurred in the opinion of the Court.19 He emphasized that it is entirely reasonable for Louisiana to provide that a man who has entered into a marital relationship thereby undertakes obligations to any resulting offspring beyond those which he owes to the products of a casual liaison.20 Harlan viewed the claim that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits enforcement of marital obligations in either the mandatory or the suppletive form as little short of frivolous.21
Joined by Justices Douglas, White, And Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented.22 He maintained that Louisiana's intestate succession laws plainly violate the Equal Protection Clause insofar as they treat illegitimate children whose fathers have publicly acknowledged them differently from legitimate children.23 Brennan argued that the Court excluded such children from the Clause's protection to uphold discredited moral prejudices of bygone centuries.24
He concluded that the discrimination punishes innocent children for the fault of their parents without any rational basis, particularly where parentage was formally acknowledged and undisputed.25