Also known as: dangerous propensity · vicious propensity
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A characteristic or known tendency of an animal or product to cause particular types of harm. The tendency triggers strict liability for a possessor or supplier when the harm flows from that tendency, even if the utmost care was exercised to prevent injury.
Crestline Bank rented a tiger from a collector and placed it in a reinforced glass cage in the lobby for a client event. The tiger lunged, shattered the glass, and injured Avery. Avery recovers from Crestline under strict liability because the injury resulted from the tiger's characteristic tendency to attack.
Pine Ridge Wildlife Rescue kept a rescued jaguar in an enclosure near a public trail. Flooding weakened the fence and the jaguar escaped, then mauled Evan while he jogged. Evan recovers from the nonprofit because the mauling resulted from a dangerous propensity characteristic of jaguars.
Prairie Pets sold hand-raised fennec foxes in a suburban mall and allowed Lena to handle one. The fox bit Lena severely. Lena recovers on a strict liability theory because the bite resulted from the fox's abnormally dangerous propensity of which the store had reason to know.
Diana Dawson purchased an SUV whose tires had a known tendency to separate under highway speeds. The tread separated, causing her to lose control and crash. Dawson recovers because the injury resulted from the tires' dangerous propensity of which the manufacturer had reason to know.
Around 2:30 a.m. on June 20, 2007, neighbors reported a fire that had erupted at the home of the Tinchers in Downingtown, Pennsylvania. Investigators concluded that a lightning strike near the Tinchers’ home caused a small puncture in the corrugated stainless steel tubing transporting natural gas to a fireplace. The CSST was part of the TracPipe System manufactured and sold by Omega Flex. The resulting fire burned for over an hour and caused significant damage to the home and belongings. Following the fire, the Tinchers reported the incident to their insurer, United Services Automobile Association. USAA compensated the Tinchers for their loss up to the limit of their policy and received an assignment of liability claims. The Tinchers suffered an additional out-of-pocket loss because a portion of their claimed loss exceeded the limits of the USAA policy. In January 2008, the Tinchers filed a complaint against Omega Flex in the Chester County Court of Common Pleas. They asserted claims premised upon theories of strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty, with the strict liability claim based on Section 402A of the Second Restatement. The case proceeded to a jury trial in October 2010 before Judge Ronald C. Nagle. The Tinchers offered expert testimony that the CSST walls were only one-hundredth of an inch thick and therefore inherently defective because lightning-generated currents were highly likely to perforate them. Omega Flex presented its own experts who testified that the TracPipe System met all applicable industry standards. They also stated that the lightning strike lacked sufficient energy to cause the puncture and that an attempted bonding clamp found disconnected after the fire may have prevented the incident if properly installed. After the close of evidence, the trial court denied Omega Flex’s motions for nonsuit and directed verdict. On October 20, 2010, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Tinchers on the strict liability claim. The jury awarded compensatory damages totaling $958,895.85 plus delay damages. The jury found for Omega Flex on the negligence claim. Omega Flex filed post-trial motions that the trial court denied, leading to entry of judgment. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment in September 2012. The Supreme Court granted Omega Flex’s petition for allowance of appeal limited to the question of whether to replace the strict liability analysis of the Second Restatement with that of the Third Restatement.
View caseDevon Drake took a prescription drug whose manufacturer knew of its tendency to cause severe adverse reactions in some patients. Drake suffered the reaction and sued. Drake recovers because the harm resulted from the drug's dangerous propensity of which the manufacturer had reason to know.
Plaintiffs in these consolidated actions were exposed to the drug diethylstilbestrol, known as DES, while in utero after their mothers ingested the drug during pregnancy to prevent miscarriage. Because multiple manufacturers produced DES according to the same formula, the plaintiffs could not identify the specific manufacturer responsible for the particular DES taken by their mothers. The plaintiffs filed suit in the San Francisco Superior Court against numerous drug manufacturers, with typical complaints naming 170 or more defendants. These cases were designated as complex litigation, with pretrial rulings issued in a lead case numbered 830-109 that would apply to at least 69 related actions. The complaints alleged that the defendants manufactured DES from the same formula, that the drug was unsafe for use in preventing miscarriage, and that the manufacturers knew it contained a cancer-causing substance yet failed to provide warnings to users or their physicians. In addition to claims for negligence, the plaintiffs asserted causes of action for strict liability based on design defects in DES, as well as breach of express and implied warranty and fraud. Where they could not identify the specific manufacturer, the plaintiffs sought to hold liable those defendants who had manufactured a substantial share of the DES market. The trial court sustained demurrers to the strict liability design defect claims. It ruled that breach of warranty and fraud claims could not be pursued under the market share theory, while also determining that any liability would be several rather than joint. The Court of Appeal reviewed the trial court's pretrial rulings through writ proceedings and affirmed those determinations. The Supreme Court of California granted review to consider the questions presented by the litigation.
View caseDylan Duffy worked with insulation products whose manufacturer knew of their tendency to release harmful fibers. Duffy developed an asbestos-related disease and sued. Duffy recovers because the disease resulted from the products' dangerous propensity of which the manufacturer had reason to know.
Workers employed at industrial sites such as Jersey Central Power and Light Company, Hercules, Inc., and Research Cottrell, Inc. were exposed to asbestos products for varying periods between the 1930s and the 1970s. These workers received no warnings, handling instructions, or safety equipment to protect them from the hazards associated with the material. The exposures resulted in diagnoses of asbestosis, mesothelioma, and other asbestos-related illnesses, which appeared only after long latent periods. The affected workers or their surviving widows initiated personal injury and wrongful death actions against manufacturers and distributors including Johns-Manville Products Corp. Six consolidated cases were filed in Middlesex County and assigned to a single trial judge. Jarusewicz involved eighteen power company workers employed between 1930 and 1981, Beshada involved twenty-one pipefitters from 1935 onward, Blazewicz and Hann involved employees of Research Cottrell from 1936 to 1979, Beckwith was brought by the widow of an electrician, and Crilley was a wrongful death action. On September 9, 1981, plaintiffs in four of the cases moved for partial summary judgment to strike the state-of-the-art defense, and the remaining plaintiffs joined the motion. The trial court denied the motion, leading plaintiffs to seek leave to appeal from the Appellate Division, which was denied, and ultimately the Supreme Court of New Jersey granted leave to appeal on February 25, 1982 in five cases and later in the Crilley case.
View caseNo. The possessor of a wild animal is strictly liable for harm that results from a dangerous propensity characteristic of the species, regardless of whether the possessor had actual knowledge.
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A possessor of a domestic animal faces strict liability only when the possessor knows or has reason to know the animal has dangerous propensities abnormal to its class. Wild-animal liability attaches to any characteristic dangerous propensity of the species without a separate knowledge requirement.
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No. Strict liability applies even when the possessor has exercised the utmost care to prevent the animal from causing harm.
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The plaintiff must show that the possessor knew or had reason to know the animal possessed dangerous propensities abnormal to its class and that the harm resulted from that propensity.
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…in its product because it was defectively designed, as that term is defined in Barker , or because of a failure to warn of its dangerous propensities even though such dangers were neither known nor scientifically knowable at the time of distribution; (2) to determine that liability attaches only if a manufacturer fails to warn of…