447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982)
Workers employed at industrial sites such as Jersey Central Power and Light Company, Hercules, Inc., and Research Cottrell, Inc. were exposed to asbestos products for varying periods between the 1930s and the 1970s.1 These workers received no warnings, handling instructions, or safety equipment to protect them from the hazards associated with the material.2
The exposures resulted in diagnoses of asbestosis, mesothelioma, and other asbestos-related illnesses, which appeared only after long latent periods.3
The affected workers or their surviving widows initiated personal injury and wrongful death actions against manufacturers and distributors including Johns-Manville Products Corp.4
Six consolidated cases were filed in Middlesex County and assigned to a single trial judge.5 Jarusewicz involved eighteen power company workers employed between 1930 and 1981, Beshada involved twenty-one pipefitters from 1935 onward, Blazewicz and Hann involved employees of Research Cottrell from 1936 to 1979, Beckwith was brought by the widow of an electrician, and Crilley was a wrongful death action.
On September 9, 1981, plaintiffs in four of the cases moved for partial summary judgment to strike the state-of-the-art defense, and the remaining plaintiffs joined the motion.6 The trial court denied the motion, leading plaintiffs to seek leave to appeal from the Appellate Division, which was denied, and ultimately the Supreme Court of New Jersey granted leave to appeal on February 25, 1982 in five cases and later in the Crilley case.7
Whether defendants in a product liability case based on strict liability for failure to warn may raise a state of the art defense?8
In strict liability for failure to warn cases, knowledge of the dangerousness of the product is imputed to the defendant as a matter of law. Plaintiff need not prove that defendant knew or should have known of its dangerousness. The only issue is whether the product distributed by defendant was reasonably safe.9 A state-of-the-art defense is inconsistent with strict liability because it introduces negligence concepts by focusing on whether the manufacturer knew or could have known of the danger at the time of distribution.10
No. The imputation of knowledge to the defendants in these strict liability failure to warn cases renders it irrelevant whether the dangers of asbestos were scientifically discoverable at the time the products were marketed.11 Because the products lacked warnings, handling instructions, or safety equipment, they were not reasonably safe under the risk-utility framework established by precedent.12
The motion to strike the defense, filed on September 9, 1981, and the subsequent appellate proceedings that culminated in Supreme Court review on February 25, 1982, require rejection of the state-of-the-art defense.13 Allowing the defense would force plaintiffs to prove the scientific availability of knowledge, which contradicts the product-oriented focus of strict liability rather than any inquiry into the manufacturer's culpability.14
Defendants may not raise a state of the art defense in these strict liability failure to warn cases because the defense contradicts the imputation of knowledge and the product-focused inquiry required by precedent.15