collateral order rule

In 2007 Norman Carpenter, a former shift supervisor at a Mohawk manufacturing facility, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia alleging that Mohawk had terminated him in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1985(2) and Georgia laws. According to Carpenter’s complaint, his termination followed an e-mail he sent to a member of Mohawk’s human resources department stating that the company was employing undocumented immigrants. At the time Carpenter sent the e-mail, he was unaware that Mohawk stood accused in a pending class-action lawsuit, Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., No. 4:04-cv-00003-HLM (ND Ga., Jan. 6, 2004), of conspiring to drive down the wages of its legal employees by knowingly hiring undocumented workers in violation of federal and state racketeering laws. Company officials directed Carpenter to meet with Mohawk’s retained counsel in the Williams case. Counsel allegedly pressured Carpenter to recant his statements about the company’s hiring practices. When Carpenter refused, Mohawk fired him under what he maintains were false pretenses. After learning of Carpenter’s complaint, the Williams plaintiffs sought an evidentiary hearing to explore his allegations. In its response, Mohawk described Carpenter’s accusations as pure fantasy and recounted the true facts of his dismissal, stating that Carpenter had attempted to have Mohawk hire an undocumented worker, that retained counsel had interviewed him during an immediate investigation, and that the company had terminated him for blatantly violating company policy. While those events unfolded in the Williams case, discovery proceeded in Carpenter’s separate action. Carpenter moved to compel Mohawk to produce information concerning his meeting with retained counsel and the company’s termination decision. Mohawk maintained that the requested information was protected by the attorney-client privilege. The District Court agreed that the privilege applied but granted the motion to compel after concluding that Mohawk had implicitly waived the privilege through its representations in the Williams case. The court declined to certify its order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b). The court stayed the ruling to allow Mohawk to pursue other appellate avenues, including a petition for mandamus or an appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Mohawk filed a notice of appeal and a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Eleventh Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291, holding that the District Court’s ruling did not qualify as an immediately appealable collateral order under Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541. The Eleventh Circuit also denied the mandamus petition. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits concerning the availability of collateral appeals in the attorney-client privilege context.

In January 2001, shortly after assuming office, President George W. Bush issued a memorandum establishing the National Energy Policy Development Group. The Group was directed to develop a national energy policy designed to help promote dependable, affordable, and environmentally sound production and distribution of energy. The President assigned agency heads and assistants, all federal employees, to serve as members of the committee. He authorized the Vice President, as chairman, to invite other officers of the Federal Government to participate as appropriate. Five months later the NEPDG issued a final report and, according to the Government, terminated all operations. Following publication of the report, Judicial Watch, Inc., and the Sierra Club filed separate actions in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that were later consolidated. The plaintiffs alleged that the NEPDG had failed to comply with the procedural and disclosure requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Non-federal employees including private lobbyists regularly attended and fully participated in non-public meetings. Respondents contend that the regular participation of the non-Government individuals made them de facto members of the committee. The suits named Vice President Cheney, the NEPDG, government officials who served on the committee, and the alleged de facto members as defendants. The suit seeks declaratory relief and an injunction requiring them to produce all materials allegedly subject to FACA's requirements. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. It dismissed respondents' claims against the non-Government defendants. Because the NEPDG had been dissolved, it could not be sued as a defendant, and the claims against it were dismissed as well. The District Court held that FACA's substantive requirements could be enforced against the Vice President and other Government participants on the NEPDG under the Mandamus Act and against the agency defendants under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court allowed respondents to conduct a tightly reined discovery to ascertain the NEPDG's structure and membership. The District Court denied in part the motion to dismiss and ordered respondents to submit a discovery plan. Petitioners including the Vice President sought a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to vacate the discovery orders, direct the District Court to rule on the basis of the administrative record, and dismiss the Vice President from the suit. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for a writ of mandamus and the Vice President's attempted interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

On July 18, 2004, near midnight, Lieutenant Joseph Forthman of the West Memphis, Arkansas, Police Department pulled over a white Honda Accord driven by Donald Rickard because the car had only one operating headlight. Kelly Allen rode in the passenger seat. Forthman noticed an indentation roughly the size of a head or a basketball in the windshield, asked Rickard if he had been drinking, and received a negative response. Rickard failed to produce his driver's license upon request and appeared nervous, prompting Forthman to direct him to step out of the car. Rickard instead sped away. Forthman gave chase and was soon joined by five other police cruisers driven by Sergeant Vance Plumhoff and Officers Jimmy Evans, Lance Ellis, Troy Galtelli, and John Gardner. The pursuit proceeded east on Interstate 40 toward Memphis, Tennessee. The vehicles attained speeds over 100 miles per hour, passed more than two dozen other vehicles, and officers attempted without success to stop Rickard using a rolling roadblock. Rickard eventually exited the interstate in Memphis and made a quick right turn that caused contact between his car and Evans' cruiser. Rickard's car spun out into a parking lot and collided with Plumhoff's cruiser. Rickard put the car into reverse in an attempt to escape. Evans and Plumhoff exited their cruisers and approached, with Evans pounding on the passenger-side window while holding his gun. Rickard's car made contact with another cruiser, its tires began spinning, and the vehicle rocked back and forth with its bumper flush against a police cruiser. Plumhoff fired three shots into Rickard's car. Rickard then reversed in a 180-degree arc, maneuvered onto another street, and continued fleeing, forcing Ellis to step to his right to avoid the vehicle. As Rickard fled down that street, Gardner and Galtelli fired twelve additional shots. Rickard lost control of the car and crashed into a building. Rickard and Allen both died from some combination of gunshot wounds and injuries suffered in the crash. Rickard's minor daughter, through her mother as parent and next friend, filed a suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the six officers, the mayor, and the chief of police of West Memphis, alleging that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The officers moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, which the District Court denied. The officers appealed. A Sixth Circuit motions panel initially dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction but later granted rehearing and left the jurisdictional issue for the merits panel. The merits panel affirmed the District Court's order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In 1970, the Federal Bureau of Investigation learned that members of the East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives had planned to blow up heating tunnels linking federal office buildings in Washington, D.C. The group had also discussed kidnapping National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. On November 6, 1970, then Attorney General John Mitchell authorized a warrantless wiretap on the telephone of William Davidon, a Haverford College physics professor and group member. The stated purpose was gathering intelligence in the interest of national security. The FBI installed the tap in late November 1970 and it remained in place until January 6, 1971. During that period the Government intercepted three conversations between Davidon and respondent Keith Forsyth. Forsyth learned of the wiretap in 1972 while facing unrelated criminal charges. He moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3504 for disclosure of any electronic surveillance to which he had been subjected. The Government's response revealed that Forsyth had participated in conversations overheard during surveillance expressly authorized by the President acting through the Attorney General. An affidavit from then Attorney General Richard Kleindienst stated the surveillance was authorized under the President's national security authority in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3). Shortly after this Court decided United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), Forsyth filed suit against Mitchell and other defendants in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. He alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment and Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. He sought compensatory, statutory, and punitive damages. Discovery and preliminary proceedings continued for five and a half years. By early 1978 both parties had filed motions for summary judgment. The District Court found no genuine dispute that the FBI had informed Mitchell of the ECCSL plots, that Mitchell had authorized the warrantless tap on Davidon's phone, and that the ostensible purpose was national-security intelligence gathering. The court rejected Mitchell's claim to absolute prosecutorial immunity under Imbler v. Pachtman but held that he could assert qualified immunity. Neither side had established the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to his good faith, so the court denied both summary-judgment motions. Mitchell appealed the denial of absolute immunity. The Third Circuit remanded for further factfinding on whether the authorization was necessary to a decision to initiate a criminal prosecution. On remand the District Court held a hearing and concluded that Mitchell's authorization was not intended to facilitate any prosecutorial decision. After this Court decided Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the District Court reconsidered qualified immunity, denied Mitchell's motion for summary judgment, granted Forsyth's motion on liability, and scheduled proceedings on damages. Mitchell again appealed. The Third Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over the absolute-immunity denial but that the qualified-immunity denial was not appealable under the collateral-order doctrine, and it remanded for further proceedings. Mitchell petitioned for certiorari, which this Court granted.

In August 1998, respondents George Lane and Beverly Jones filed this action against the State of Tennessee and several Tennessee counties. They alleged past and ongoing violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Both respondents are paraplegics who use wheelchairs for mobility. They claimed that they were denied access to and the services of the state court system by reason of their disabilities. Lane alleged that he was compelled to appear to answer a set of criminal charges on the second floor of a county courthouse that had no elevator. At his first appearance, Lane crawled up two flights of stairs to get to the courtroom. When Lane returned to the courthouse for a hearing, he refused to crawl again or to be carried by officers to the courtroom. He consequently was arrested and jailed for failure to appear. Jones, a certified court reporter, alleged that she has not been able to gain access to several county courthouses. As a result, she has lost both work and an opportunity to participate in the judicial process. Respondents sought damages and equitable relief. The State moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that it was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The District Court denied the motion without opinion, and the State appealed. The United States intervened to defend Title II's abrogation of the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. On April 28, 2000, after the appeal had been briefed and argued, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit entered an order holding the case in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett. In Garrett, the Supreme Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment bars private suits seeking money damages for state violations of Title I of the ADA. It left open the question whether the Eleventh Amendment permits suits for money damages under Title II. Following the Garrett decision, the Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, heard argument in a Title II suit brought by a hearing-impaired litigant. The litigant sought money damages for the State's failure to accommodate his disability in a child custody proceeding. A divided court permitted the suit to proceed despite the State's assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Following the en banc decision in Popovich, a panel of the Court of Appeals entered an order affirming the District Court's denial of the State's motion to dismiss in this case. The order explained that respondents' claims were not barred because they were based on due process principles. In response to a petition for rehearing arguing that Popovich was not controlling because the complaint did not allege due process violations, the panel filed an amended opinion. It explained that the Due Process Clause protects the right of access to the courts. It also explained that the evidence before Congress when it enacted Title II established that physical barriers in government buildings, including courthouses and in the courtrooms themselves, have had the effect of denying disabled people the opportunity to access vital services and to exercise fundamental rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. The panel did not, however, categorically reject the State's submission. It instead noted that the case presented difficult questions that cannot be clarified absent a factual record, and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and now reviews the case.