Also known as:codefendants · co-defendant · co-defendants · joint defendant
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A defendant joined with one or more others in the same lawsuit or criminal prosecution.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Recorded Conversation Between Codefendants
Cecilia Cabrera and Caitlin Crowley were indicted together on drug charges. After indictment, officers arranged for an informant to record a conversation in which Crowley made statements implicating Cabrera in the charged offense. The recording was introduced at trial against Cabrera.
Qualified Immunity Claim by Codefendant Officials
Colin Chambers and Craig Caldwell, two government officials, were sued together in a civil rights action. Chambers moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds while Caldwell remained in the case on related claims arising from the same conduct.
In 1968, Ernest Fitzgerald, a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force, testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress that a new transport plane, the C-5A, was substantially over its projected cost. This testimony apparently embarrassed the Department of Defense and the Air Force. Shortly thereafter, Fitzgerald's job was abolished in a reorganization of the Air Force. Fitzgerald brought suit against a number of officials of the Executive Branch, including petitioners Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield.
Fitzgerald alleged that Harlow and Butterfield had participated in a conspiracy to violate his constitutional and statutory rights by arranging to have him dismissed from his position in the Air Force in retaliation for his testimony. As evidence of Harlow's involvement, Fitzgerald relied on a series of conversations in which Harlow discussed Fitzgerald's dismissal with Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. He also relied on a recorded conversation in which the President later voiced a tentative recollection that Harlow was "all for canning" Fitzgerald.
As evidence against Butterfield, Fitzgerald cited a May 1969 White House memorandum. In it Butterfield claimed to have learned that Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy purchasing practices" by exposing these practices to public view. Fitzgerald also cited communications between Butterfield and Haldeman in December 1969 and January 1970 as evidence that Butterfield participated in the conspiracy to conceal his unlawful discharge and prevent his reemployment.
Harlow asserted that Secretary Seamans had advised him that considerations of efficiency required Fitzgerald's removal by a reduction in force. Harlow had no reason to believe that a conspiracy existed. Butterfield stated that he was not involved in any decision concerning Fitzgerald's employment status until more than a month after the termination had been scheduled and announced publicly. Butterfield never communicated his views about Fitzgerald to any official of the Defense Department.
The District Court denied the motions of Harlow and Butterfield for summary judgment based on absolute Presidential immunity or, alternatively, qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed in part and remanded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Carlos Castillo was convicted after his codefendant testified against him at trial. Castillo later claimed his lawyer provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the codefendant's credibility during cross-examination.
Strickland v. Washington466 U.S. 668 (1984)
In September 1976, respondent David Washington committed a series of crimes over a ten-day period in the Miami area that included three brutal stabbing murders along with torture, kidnapping, severe assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, and theft.
After his two accomplices were arrested, Washington surrendered to police and gave a lengthy statement confessing to the third criminal episode. The State of Florida indicted him for kidnapping and murder and appointed an experienced criminal lawyer to represent him.
Washington waived his right to a jury trial against counsel's advice and pleaded guilty to all charges, including the three capital murder counts. In the plea colloquy he stated that he had committed a string of burglaries but had no significant prior criminal record and that he had been under extreme stress caused by his inability to support his family.
Counsel spoke with Washington about his background, contacted his wife and mother by telephone, but did not seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric examination. At the sentencing hearing before the trial judge, counsel's strategy relied primarily on the plea colloquy to convey remorse and emotional stress and argued that these factors justified sparing Washington the death penalty. Counsel successfully moved to exclude Washington's rap sheet and decided not to request a presentence report because it would have included his criminal history.
The trial judge found multiple aggravating circumstances for each murder and no mitigating circumstances, sentencing Washington to death on each of the three murder counts. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal.
Washington sought collateral relief in state court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on six grounds including failure to request a psychiatric report, investigate and present character witnesses, and seek a presentence investigation report. He submitted fourteen affidavits from friends, neighbors, and relatives willing to testify and two reports from a psychiatrist and psychologist. The state trial court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed.
Washington then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. After an evidentiary hearing at which trial counsel testified, the District Court denied relief, concluding that although counsel made errors in judgment by failing to investigate mitigating evidence further, no prejudice resulted. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for application of a new framework it developed for analyzing ineffectiveness claims. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the proper standards for judging claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a capital sentencing proceeding.
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Codefendant Manufacturer
Carmen Choi sued a Taiwanese tube manufacturer and its codefendant valve supplier in California court after a motorcycle accident. The valve supplier argued that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over it because its contacts with the forum were too attenuated.
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty.480 U.S. 102 (1987)
In September 1978 Gary Zurcher lost control of his Honda motorcycle on Interstate Highway 80 in Solano County, California, and collided with a tractor. Zurcher suffered severe injuries while his passenger and wife Ruth Ann Moreno was killed.
In September 1979 Zurcher filed a product liability action in the Superior Court of California for Solano County against Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co., Ltd., the Taiwanese manufacturer of the motorcycle tube, and other defendants. Zurcher alleged that defects in the tire, tube, and sealant caused the accident.
Cheng Shin filed a cross-complaint seeking indemnification from Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., the Japanese manufacturer of the tube’s valve assembly. Zurcher’s claims against Cheng Shin and the other defendants were eventually settled and dismissed, leaving only Cheng Shin’s indemnity action against Asahi.
Asahi is a Japanese corporation. It manufactures tire valve assemblies in Japan and sells them to Cheng Shin and other tire manufacturers for use as components in finished tire tubes, with all sales to Cheng Shin taking place in Taiwan. Asahi sold Cheng Shin 150,000 valve assemblies in 1978, 500,000 in 1979, 500,000 in 1980, 100,000 in 1981, and 100,000 in 1982. Those sales accounted for 1.24 percent of Asahi’s income in 1981 and 0.44 percent in 1982. Cheng Shin alleged that approximately 20 percent of its United States sales occur in California.
In 1983 an attorney for Cheng Shin examined valve stems at one cycle store in Solano County and found that of 115 tire tubes, 12 Asahi-marked valve stems were incorporated into Cheng Shin tubes. An affidavit from a Cheng Shin manager stated that discussions with Asahi had covered worldwide sales including the United States. Asahi’s president stated the company never contemplated that its limited sales would subject it to lawsuits in California. The Superior Court denied Asahi’s motion to quash service of summons. The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ commanding the Superior Court to quash service. The California Supreme Court reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Canyon Construction employees Colin Chambers and Craig Caldwell were arrested together for vagrancy while walking near a job site late at night. Both challenged the statute as unconstitutionally vague after being charged in the same proceeding.
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville[405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972).]
The case involves eight defendants convicted under a Jacksonville, Florida vagrancy ordinance. Margaret Papachristou, Betty Calloway, Eugene Eddie Melton, and Leonard Johnson were arrested early on a Sunday morning and charged with vagrancy by prowling by auto while riding in Calloway's car after leaving a restaurant. Jimmy Lee Smith and Milton Henry were charged with vagrancy as vagabonds after being stopped while waiting for a friend to lend them a car for a job application. Henry Edward Heath and a codefendant were arrested for loitering and common thief when they arrived at a residence. Thomas Owen Campbell was charged with being a common thief after being stopped for speeding near his home. Hugh Brown was charged with disorderly loitering on the street and resisting arrest with violence after leaving a hotel.
The ordinance defined vagrants to include rogues and vagabonds or dissolute persons who go about begging, common gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers, persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame gaming houses or places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, and persons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children.
The facts of the arrests were stipulated by the parties. Papachristou was enrolled in a job-training program, Calloway was a teacher and owned the car, Melton was a Vietnam veteran and student, and Johnson was a warehouse worker and lifelong resident. Smith was a part-time worker and political organizer with a common-law wife and children, while Henry was a high school student. Heath had lived in Jacksonville all his life and worked at an automobile body shop. Campbell reached his home early in the morning. Brown was observed leaving a downtown hotel and was reputed to be a thief and narcotics pusher, with packets of heroin found during the search.
All eight defendants were convicted in the municipal court. Their convictions were affirmed by the Florida Circuit Court in a consolidated appeal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the challenges to the ordinance.
Cedar Creek Farms owners Cecilia Cabrera and Carlos Castillo were charged together with unlawful possession of a sawed-off shotgun. The indictment alleged that both defendants had jointly acquired and stored the weapon on farm property.
United States v. Miller307 U.S. 174
In 1995 Samuel Mullet purchased land in Jefferson County, Ohio. That land became the Bergholz Amish community in 2001 when a sufficient number of ordained ministers qualified it as a separate Amish church district. The new community appointed Mullet as its bishop. As bishop, Mullet controlled all aspects of life in the Bergholz compound and had the ability to order the shunning of community members who failed to follow the tenets of their Amish faith.
In 2006 Mullet excommunicated several church members who questioned Bergholz community practices and his leadership. Included in the group were Lavern and Mattie Troyer, whose son Aden was married to Mullet's daughter Wilma, as well as Melvin and Anna Shrock, whose son Emanuel was married to Mullet's daughter Linda. The excommunications led to family divisions, including a divorce and a custody dispute. Amish bishops from across the country met and voted unanimously to reverse the excommunications.
From September 6 to November 9, 2011, several Bergholz community members committed five separate attacks on nine different individuals connected to the community by family or religious ties. The assailants sliced off the men's beards and cut the women's hair. The victims were seen as Amish hypocrites by the assailants.
A federal grand jury indicted sixteen members of the Bergholz community for violating and conspiring to violate the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, as well as other charges. At trial, the government presented evidence that the assaults were motivated by the victims' religion, while the defendants presented evidence of personal and family disputes as alternative motives. The jury convicted all sixteen defendants of at least one hate-crime violation.
The district court instructed the jury that the victims' religion need only be a significant motivating factor even if other reasons existed. The defendants twice requested a but-for causation instruction, which the court rejected. The defendants appealed their convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Does the rule of unanimity require every codefendant to file a separate written consent to removal?
Yes. When removal is based on the general removal statute, each properly served codefendant must join in or clearly consent on the record, typically by signing the notice or filing a separate written consent. A bare assertion by one defendant that the others consent is insufficient.
Supporting sources
When does admission of a non-testifying codefendant's confession violate the Confrontation Clause?
Admission violates the Clause in a joint trial when the confession directly implicates the defendant, even with a limiting instruction. Redactions that obviously point to the defendant or interlocking confessions do not cure the violation.
Supporting sources
May a later-served codefendant remove after an earlier-served codefendant's thirty-day period has expired?
Yes. Each codefendant has its own thirty-day removal window measured from its own service. A later-served codefendant may file a timely notice, and earlier-served codefendants may consent even after their own periods have closed.
Supporting sources
Does a cross-claim between codefendants create federal-question jurisdiction for removal?
No. Original jurisdiction must appear on the face of the plaintiff's complaint. A cross-claim filed by one codefendant against another cannot supply the federal question needed to support removal when the plaintiff's claims are purely state-law matters.
Supporting sources
384 U.S. 436 (1966)
…made it unnecessary to delve at length into the facts. The facts of the defendant's case there, however, paralleled those of his co-defendants, whose confessions were found to have resulted from continuous and coercive interrogation for 27 hours, with denial of requests for friends or attorney. See United States v. Murphy , 222…