Also known as: class action suit · class-action suits · class action suits · class action · class suit
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A procedural device permitting one or more representative plaintiffs to litigate claims on behalf of a larger group of similarly situated persons. Certification requires satisfaction of Rule 23(a) prerequisites together with one of the Rule 23(b) categories. The resulting judgment binds all class members who have not opted out.
Cassandra Cooper and other policyholders sue Cardinal Insurance in federal court alleging improper denial of hurricane claims. Separate suits would risk conflicting rulings on whether the insurer must adjust all similar policies the same way. The court certifies the class under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) to avoid incompatible standards of conduct for the company.
Christopher Collins brings a diversity action in federal court on behalf of New York credit-card holders seeking statutory interest. A state statute would bar class treatment for those claims. The court applies Rule 23 to certify the class because the federal rule governs procedure and does not alter substantive rights.
Cody Callahan and neighboring landowners sue Copperfield Mining for dust and noise that interferes with use of their properties. The complaint proceeds as a class action under the Restatement provision allowing a member of the affected class to represent the public interest in abating the nuisance.
Corinne Cho files suit against Crown Pharmaceuticals on behalf of patients who received a recalled drug. Common questions about the drug's defect and the company's warnings predominate over individual issues of causation and damages. The court certifies the class under Rule 23(b)(3) because the class mechanism is superior for resolving the controversy efficiently.
Inmates at a state correctional facility bring a class action alleging systemic Eighth Amendment violations in disciplinary practices. The court allows the suit to proceed on behalf of the entire inmate population because the challenged policies affect the class uniformly.
In September 1971, an inmate uprising occurred at New York State’s Attica Correctional Facility, resulting in the killing of 32 inmates and the wounding of many others during the recapture of the prison. Plaintiffs, consisting of present and former inmates of Attica, the mother of an inmate who was killed, and New York State Assemblyman Arthur O. Eve, commenced a purported class action in the Southern District of New York against state officials including the Governor of New York, the State Commissioner of Correctional Services, the Executive Deputy Commissioner of the State Department of Correctional Services, the Superintendent at Attica, State Police, Corrections Officers, and other officials, as well as the United States Attorney for the Western District of New York. The complaint alleges that before, during, and after the revolt and recapture, the defendants committed, conspired to commit, or aided and abetted in the commission of crimes against the inmates, including intentional subjection to cruel treatment prior to the riot, unprovoked killings by state officers during recovery, assaults and beatings after surrender, theft or destruction of personal property, and malicious denial of medical assistance to over 400 wounded inmates. Robert E. Fischer was appointed by the Governor as a Deputy State Attorney General to supersede the District Attorney of Wyoming County and investigate crimes relating to the takeover and recapture with a specially convened grand jury. The complaint asserts that Fischer has not investigated and does not intend to investigate any crimes committed by state officers. It further asserts that because of his appointment by the Governor he cannot neutrally investigate the responsibility of the Governor and other state officers. With respect to the United States Attorney, the complaint alleges that he has not arrested, investigated, or instituted prosecutions against any of the state officers for alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, despite the duty under 42 U.S.C. § 1987. Plaintiffs sought relief in the nature of mandamus requiring the State of New York to submit a plan for independent investigation and prosecution, appointment of an impartial prosecutor and judge, and requiring the United States Attorney to investigate, arrest, and prosecute the state officers. The district court, Judge Lloyd F. MacMahon, dismissed the complaint for failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted, and plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit.
View caseCynthia Cortez serves as class representative in a successful civil-rights suit against a state agency. After judgment, her counsel petitions for fees under the prevailing-party statute. The court awards reasonable fees calculated under the lodestar method for work performed on behalf of the class.
In 1972, respondents, representing all persons involuntarily confined at the Forensic Unit of the Fulton State Hospital in Fulton, Missouri, filed a three-count complaint in the District Court for the Western District of Missouri against petitioners, who are officials at the Forensic Unit and members of the Missouri Mental Health Commission. Count I challenged the constitutionality of treatment and conditions at the Forensic Unit. Count II challenged the placement of patients in the Biggs Building without procedural due process. Count III sought compensation for patients who performed institution-maintaining labor. Count II was resolved by a consent decree in December 1973. Count III largely was mooted in August 1974 when petitioners began compensating patients for labor pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act. In April 1975 respondents voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit and filed a new two-count complaint. Count I again related to the constitutionality of treatment and conditions at the Forensic Unit. Count II sought damages based on the Thirteenth Amendment for the value of past patient labor. In July 1976 respondents voluntarily dismissed this backpay count. Finally, in August 1977 respondents filed an amended one-count complaint specifying the conditions that allegedly violated their constitutional right to treatment. In August 1979, following a three-week trial, the District Court held that an involuntarily committed patient has a constitutional right to minimally adequate treatment and found constitutional violations in five of six general areas, including physical environment, individual treatment plans, least restrictive environment, visitation, telephone, and mail privileges, and seclusion and restraint. With respect to staffing, the sixth general area, the District Court found that the Forensic Unit's staffing levels, which had increased during the litigation, were minimally adequate. Petitioners did not appeal the District Court's decision on the merits. In February 1980 respondents filed a request for attorney's fees for the period from January 1975 through the end of the litigation. Their four attorneys claimed 2,985 hours worked and sought payment at rates varying from $40 to $65 per hour, amounting to approximately $150,000, and also requested that the fee be enhanced by 30 to 50 percent. The District Court determined that respondents were prevailing parties and awarded a fee of $133,332.25 after reducing the number of hours claimed by one attorney by 30 percent and declining to adopt an enhancement factor. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed on the basis of the District Court's memorandum opinion and order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA court may decline when the state claims substantially predominate over any federal claim in scope, proof, or number of issues. Predominance is measured by the practical focus of the litigation rather than formal pleading labels.
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Yes. Rule 23 controls because it regulates procedure and does not abridge or modify substantive rights under the Rules Enabling Act.
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Every properly joined and served defendant must join in or unambiguously consent to removal on the federal record within the removal period. A statement by one defendant that another does not oppose removal is insufficient.
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Yes. Once the class is certified, the action may proceed even if the representative's personal claim is resolved, provided an adequate representative remains.
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…follow if Dr. Hallford's intervention were on behalf of a class. His complaint in intervention does not purport to assert a class suit and makes no reference to any class apart from an allegation that he "and others similarly situated" must necessarily guess at the meaning of Art. 1196. His application for leave to…