492 U.S. 229, 109 S. Ct. 2893, 106 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1989)
Petitioners, customers of respondent Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., filed this putative class action in 1986 in the District Court for the District of Minnesota against Northwestern Bell, some of its officers and employees, five members of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, and other unnamed individuals and corporations.1 The MPUC is the state body responsible for determining the rates that Northwestern Bell may charge.2
Petitioners alleged that between 1980 and 1986 Northwestern Bell sought to influence MPUC members by making cash payments to commissioners, negotiating with them regarding future employment, and paying for parties, meals, tickets to sporting events, and airline tickets, thereby causing approval of rates higher than a fair and reasonable amount.3 Based upon these factual allegations, petitioners asserted a pendent state-law bribery claim under Minnesota law together with four RICO counts alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), (b), (c), and (d), each premised on a pattern of racketeering activity involving predicate acts of bribery.4
The District Court granted respondents' motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and dismissed the complaint, finding that the allegations described only a single scheme and relying on Eighth Circuit precedent that required multiple illegal schemes.5 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding that a single fraudulent effort or scheme is insufficient.6
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals over the meaning of RICO's pattern requirement.7
Whether a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO requires proof that the predicate acts were part of multiple separate illegal schemes?8
RICO's pattern element requires proof that predicate acts are related and amount to or threaten continued criminal activity; a multiple-scheme requirement is not supported by the statute's text or legislative history and introduces unwarranted rigidity.9
No. The Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's requirement of multiple illegal schemes because the statute demands only relationship plus continuity, and the scheme concept appears nowhere in the Act's language or history.10 Petitioners alleged that between 1980 and 1986 Northwestern Bell made cash payments, negotiated future employment, and provided meals, tickets, and travel to MPUC members to secure excessive rates.11 These predicate acts of bribery share a common purpose of influencing rate decisions and extended over at least six years, facts that may establish both relatedness and continuity without any need to plead separate schemes.12 The District Court and Court of Appeals therefore erred in dismissing the complaint on the single-scheme ground.13
A pattern of racketeering activity under RICO does not require proof that the predicate acts were part of multiple separate illegal schemes.14
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice, Justice O'connor, And Justice Kennedy
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment reversing the Court of Appeals.15 He agreed that nothing in the statute supports the proposition that predicate acts constituting part of a single scheme can never support a RICO cause of action.16
Scalia nevertheless criticized the majority's continuity-plus-relationship formulation as providing little more guidance than the statutory text itself.17 He observed that the added requirement of a threat of continuity increases rather than reduces vagueness for litigants and lower courts.18 Scalia emphasized that the Court's approach leaves potential defendants with even less predictability about RICO's reach, particularly troubling because the statute carries criminal penalties that demand a high degree of certainty.19
Whether two predicate acts of racketeering activity are by themselves sufficient to establish a pattern under RICO?20
While RICO requires at least two predicate acts within ten years, two acts alone are necessary but not sufficient; the acts must also be related and demonstrate continuity or its threat.21
No. Section 1961(5) sets only a minimum numerical threshold, and the legislative history confirms that proof of two acts without more does not establish a pattern.22 Petitioners alleged multiple bribes in varying forms over a six-year period directed at the same MPUC members for the common objective of obtaining excessive rates.23 These facts may satisfy the additional requirements of relationship and continuity, but the mere existence of two or more predicate acts would not automatically do so.24
Two predicate acts of racketeering activity are not by themselves sufficient to establish a pattern under RICO.25
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice, Justice O'connor, And Justice Kennedy
Justice Scalia noted that the statutory definition implies two acts are necessary but not sufficient to form a pattern.26 He found the majority's guidance on continuity unhelpful and likely to increase vagueness in application of the statute.27
He stressed that the Court's added emphasis on a threat of continuity does little to resolve the statute's ambiguity.28 It may actually heighten uncertainty for lower courts and litigants attempting to apply the pattern requirement in both civil and criminal contexts.29 Scalia warned that the lack of clarity is particularly problematic given RICO's criminal applications, which require a high degree of certainty in the law.30
Whether RICO's pattern requirement applies only when the predicate acts are characteristic of organized crime or an organized-crime-type perpetrator?31
RICO's pattern requirement contains no organized-crime limitation; the statute's text and legislative history demonstrate that Congress deliberately chose broad language applicable to both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises.32
No. The Court declined to impose an organized-crime nexus because no such restriction appears in the statute and because Congress rejected efforts to confine the Act to traditional mob activity.33 Petitioners' allegations involve a telephone company and state utility commissioners engaging in bribery to affect rates, conduct that falls outside any conventional organized-crime setting yet remains subject to RICO analysis under the relationship-and-continuity test.34
RICO's pattern requirement does not apply only when the predicate acts are characteristic of organized crime or an organized-crime-type perpetrator.35
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice, Justice O'connor, And Justice Kennedy
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment reversing the Court of Appeals. Although his primary focus was the vagueness of the pattern requirement overall, he agreed that restrictive readings lack statutory support and that the statute reaches conduct beyond traditional organized crime. Scalia stressed that the majority's approach, by retaining broad but unclear standards for continuity and relationship, leaves the statute's reach even less predictable for litigants and courts.
This uncertainty affects application to legitimate enterprises such as the telephone company and utility regulators involved here, underscoring the need for clearer congressional guidance rather than judicial narrowing.