certified public accountant (CPA)

In 1939 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania adopted an Alien Registration Act requiring every alien eighteen years of age or older, with limited exceptions, to register annually with the Department of Labor and Industry, supply specified information plus any additional details the department might direct, pay a one-dollar annual fee, receive an identification card, carry the card at all times, and exhibit it on demand by any police officer or department agent. One alien and one naturalized citizen filed suit in federal district court against state officials charged with enforcing the statute and sought an injunction against its operation. A three-judge district court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the alien plaintiff and enjoined enforcement of the Act. The case reached the Supreme Court on direct appeal under section 266 of the Judicial Code, with probable jurisdiction noted on March 25, 1940. After the district court decision but before Supreme Court review, Congress on June 28, 1940 enacted a federal Alien Registration Act that requires a single registration of aliens fourteen years of age and older, collects detailed information plus additional matters prescribed by the Commissioner with the Attorney General's approval, mandates fingerprinting of all registrants, and directs that registration records be kept secret and released only to persons or agencies designated by the Commissioner with the Attorney General's approval. The federal statute contains no requirement that aliens carry identification cards for exhibition to police or other officials and punishes only willful failure to register. The Supreme Court therefore examined the Pennsylvania statute in light of the intervening federal legislation.

In 1989 Congress enacted the Ethics Reform Act, which amended § 501(b) of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 to provide that an individual may not receive any honorarium while that individual is a Member, officer or employee. The term honorarium was defined as a payment of money or any thing of value for an appearance, speech or article. The prohibition included an express exception for actual and necessary travel expenses. It contained an implicit exception for books. The ban applied to nearly all employees in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The respondents are the National Treasury Employees Union and several individual career civil servants employed full time by Executive departments and agencies below grade GS-16. The individual respondents had previously received compensation for writing or speaking on topics unrelated to their duties. These included a mail handler who lectured on the Quaker religion, an aerospace engineer who lectured on black history for $100 per lecture, a microbiologist who earned almost $3,000 per year reviewing dance performances, and a tax examiner who wrote articles about the environment. In 1992 the respondents filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the constitutionality of the honoraria ban. Pursuant to a stipulation with the Government, the District Court certified the Union as the representative of a class composed of all Executive Branch employees below grade GS-16 who would receive honoraria but for the statute. The District Court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment, held the statute unconstitutional insofar as it applies to Executive Branch employees, and enjoined enforcement against any such employee. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the judgment as to the individual respondents and the class but upheld the statute as applied to high-level officials. It also severed the application of the ban to the Executive Branch from the remainder of the statute. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In 1989, the Florida Bar completed a two-year study of lawyer advertising that included hearings, commissioned surveys, and review of public commentary. The study determined that direct-mail campaigns targeting accident victims or their survivors caused the public to lose respect for the legal profession, with lawyers sending approximately 700,000 such solicitations annually in Florida, 40 percent of which went to accident victims or survivors. In late 1990, the Florida Supreme Court adopted amendments to the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. Rule 4-7.4(b)(1) bars lawyers from sending written communications to prospective clients concerning personal injury or wrongful death actions unless the accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days earlier. Rule 4-7.8(a) prohibits lawyers from accepting referrals from services that engage in communications that would violate the rules if made by the lawyer. G. Stewart McHenry, a Florida Bar member, and his wholly owned referral service Went For It, Inc. filed this action in March 1992 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the rules violated their commercial speech rights. McHenry was disbarred for unrelated reasons in October 1992, after which John T. Blakely was substituted as plaintiff. The District Court referred the parties' summary judgment motions to a Magistrate Judge, who recommended upholding the rules on the basis of the Bar's study. The District Court rejected that recommendation and entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Bar's evidentiary submission to the District Court consisted of a 106-page summary containing statistical data from a Magid Associates survey of Florida adults, excerpts from newspaper editorials with titles such as "Scavenger Lawyers," and pages of citizen complaints describing solicitations received days after accidents or funerals.

Residents of New York City receiving financial aid under the federally assisted program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or under New York State's general Home Relief program brought this action in the District Court for the Southern District of New York against the state and city officials who administered those programs. At the time the suits were filed, New York had no requirement of prior notice or hearing of any kind before termination of financial aid. The suits prompted the State Commissioner of Social Services to amend the Department of Social Services regulations. The amendment required local officials proposing to discontinue or suspend a recipient's aid to follow either subdivision (a) or subdivision (b) of § 351.26. The City of New York elected to follow subdivision (b). It promulgated Procedure No. 68-18. Under that procedure a caseworker who doubts a recipient's continued eligibility first discusses the doubts with the recipient. The caseworker then recommends termination to a unit supervisor. If the supervisor concurs, the recipient receives a letter stating the reasons for the proposed termination and notifying the recipient that within seven days he may request review by a higher official and may submit a written statement. The reviewing official decides whether to discontinue aid. Aid stops immediately upon affirmation, and the recipient is notified in writing of the reasons. The city's procedure contains no provision for the recipient's personal appearance before the reviewing official, for oral presentation of evidence, or for confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses. The letter sent to the recipient states that he may request a post-termination fair hearing before an independent state hearing officer. At the hearing the recipient may appear personally, offer oral evidence, confront and cross-examine witnesses, and have a record made. If the recipient prevails, all funds erroneously withheld are paid. A recipient whose aid is not restored after the fair hearing may obtain judicial review under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. The District Court held that only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing would satisfy due process. The court rejected the argument that the combination of the post-termination fair hearing and the informal pre-termination review was constitutionally adequate. Only the Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York appealed. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1969.