515 U.S. 618 (1995)
In 1989, the Florida Bar completed a two-year study of lawyer advertising that included hearings, commissioned surveys, and review of public commentary.1 The study determined that direct-mail campaigns targeting accident victims or their survivors caused the public to lose respect for the legal profession, with lawyers sending approximately 700,000 such solicitations annually in Florida, 40 percent of which went to accident victims or survivors.2
In late 1990, the Florida Supreme Court adopted amendments to the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.3 Rule 4-7.4(b)(1) bars lawyers from sending written communications to prospective clients concerning personal injury or wrongful death actions unless the accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days earlier.4 Rule 4-7.8(a) prohibits lawyers from accepting referrals from services that engage in communications that would violate the rules if made by the lawyer.5
G. Stewart McHenry, a Florida Bar member, and his wholly owned referral service Went For It, Inc. filed this action in March 1992 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.6 They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the rules violated their commercial speech rights.7 McHenry was disbarred for unrelated reasons in October 1992, after which John T. Blakely was substituted as plaintiff.8
The District Court referred the parties' summary judgment motions to a Magistrate Judge, who recommended upholding the rules on the basis of the Bar's study.9 The District Court rejected that recommendation and entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs.10 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.12
The Bar's evidentiary submission to the District Court consisted of a 106-page summary containing statistical data from a Magid Associates survey of Florida adults, excerpts from newspaper editorials with titles such as "Scavenger Lawyers," and pages of citizen complaints describing solicitations received days after accidents or funerals.13
Whether the Florida Bar's 30-day prohibition on targeted direct-mail solicitations by lawyers to accident victims and their relatives violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments?14
Under Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557 (1980), commercial speech receives limited First Amendment protection.15 The speech must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.16 The government may regulate it only if the regulation directly advances a substantial governmental interest and is no more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.17
No. The Florida Bar possesses a substantial interest in protecting the privacy and tranquility of personal injury victims and their loved ones against intrusive contact by lawyers.18 The Bar also seeks to prevent erosion of public confidence in the legal profession.19
The Bar's two-year study documented that direct-mail campaigns targeting accident victims caused the public to lose respect for the profession.20 Lawyers mailed 700,000 solicitations annually in Florida.21 Forty percent were directed at accident victims or survivors.22
Survey data showed that 54 percent of Florida adults viewed such contact as a privacy violation.23 Forty-five percent believed it took advantage of vulnerable people.24 Twenty-seven percent reported lower regard for the legal profession after receiving the mailings.25
Newspaper editorials and citizen complaints further illustrated the negative public reaction to solicitations sent days after accidents or funerals.26
The 30-day restriction directly advances these interests by imposing a brief blackout period during which targeted solicitations are barred.27
The rule is narrowly tailored because it leaves open immediate solicitation by nonlawyers and by lawyers with preexisting relationships.28 It permits general advertising in newspapers, yellow pages, and on television.29 It applies only for a limited time rather than imposing a total ban on direct mail.30
Respondents' claim that the rule is underinclusive fails because the Bar need not regulate every form of lawyer advertising to justify this targeted measure.31
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.32 It held that the prohibition satisfies all prongs of the Central Hudson test.33
The Florida Bar's 30-day prohibition on targeted direct-mail solicitations does not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments.34
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Stevens, Souter, And Ginsburg, Jj.
Justice Kennedy dissented on the ground that the Bar failed to satisfy the Central Hudson test.35
The asserted privacy interest does not justify the restriction because recipients of direct mail are not a captive audience.36 They can simply discard the letters.37
This principle was recognized in prior cases such as Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Assn.38
The same principle applies under Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.39
The Bar's evidentiary submission was insufficient to demonstrate that the harms were real or that the ban advanced the state's interests in a direct and material way.40
The 106-page summary lacked actual surveys, sample sizes, or methodology.41
The rule was not narrowly tailored.42 It banned solicitations even for minor injuries.43 It prevented victims from receiving timely information about legal rights at a moment when prompt investigation and representation may be essential.44
In his view, the decision represented an unwarranted retreat from precedents protecting commercial speech.45 It amounted to censorship that shielded the legal profession from public scrutiny at the expense of accident victims most in need of assistance.46