Also known as:but-for test · but for causation · but-for causation · sine qua non test · actual cause test
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A factual causation standard under which conduct qualifies as a cause of a result when the result would not have occurred in the absence of that conduct.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Homicide Charge After Delayed Death
Bruce Baldwin stabbed a rival during a street fight. The victim lingered in intensive care for eighteen months before succumbing to complications from the wound. Prosecutors could not charge homicide under the year-and-a-day rule even though the stabbing satisfied but-for causation.
Retaliation Claim After Termination
Brendan Burns filed an internal complaint alleging discrimination at his hospital employer. Three weeks later the hospital fired him. In his subsequent Title VII suit, the court examined whether the complaint was the but-for reason for the discharge rather than documented performance issues.
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar570 U.S. 338, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013)
The University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, a teaching hospital affiliated with the University of Texas, hired Naiel Nassar, a physician of Middle Eastern descent, first as a medical resident in 2001 and later as an assistant professor in the Department of Internal Medicine in 2006. Nassar's direct supervisor was Dr. Michael Levine, the Chief of Infectious Disease Medicine, and he also worked with Dr. Brian Becherer, the Medical Director of the hospital's employee health clinic.
In 2007 and 2008, Nassar complained to his supervisors that he was being subjected to discrimination and harassment by Levine on the basis of his religion and ethnic heritage. In July 2008, Nassar was offered and accepted a position as a full-time faculty member in the Department of Internal Medicine. In August 2008, Nassar resigned from his faculty position in a letter stating that the primary reason for his departure was the hostile work environment created by Levine's harassment.
After Nassar resigned, Becherer sent a letter to the state medical board reporting that Nassar had resigned while under investigation for professional misconduct involving alleged improper billing practices. Nassar filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas alleging two claims under Title VII: status-based discrimination on the basis of his race, religion, and national origin, and retaliation for complaining about Levine's conduct.
The case proceeded to trial before a jury. The District Court instructed the jury that Nassar could prevail on his retaliation claim if he showed that retaliation was a motivating factor in the hospital's decision to send the letter to the medical board. The jury found for Nassar on both claims and awarded him $3,000 in backpay and $400,000 in compensatory damages, which the District Court reduced to $300,000 pursuant to the statutory cap. The hospital appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the retaliation verdict on the theory that the motivating-factor standard applied. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Brianna Burke purchased shares in a cable company after the firm and its suppliers issued misleading statements about revenue. When the truth emerged the stock fell sharply. Burke sued the suppliers, alleging their statements were a but-for cause of her losses.
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific Atlanta, Inc.552 U.S. 148, 158 (2008)
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, served as lead plaintiff in a class action filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri on behalf of purchasers of Charter Communications, Inc., common stock. The suit named as defendants Charter itself, some of its executives, its independent auditor Arthur Andersen LLP, and two other companies that had acted as both suppliers and customers of Charter. Charter, a cable operator, engaged in a variety of fraudulent accounting practices throughout 2000 so that its quarterly reports would meet Wall Street expectations for subscriber growth and operating cash flow.
By late 2000 Charter executives realized that these practices would still leave the company short of projected operating cash flow by fifteen to twenty million dollars. To close the gap, Charter entered into arrangements with Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., and Motorola, Inc., under which Charter overpaid the respondents twenty dollars for each digital cable converter box it purchased through the end of the year. In return, the respondents agreed to purchase advertising time from Charter at prices higher than fair value, with the transactions documented through backdated contracts and false statements about increased production costs.
The arrangements had no economic substance, yet Charter recorded the advertising purchases as revenue and capitalized its purchases of the set-top boxes, thereby inflating reported revenues and operating cash flow by approximately seventeen million dollars on financial statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and disseminated to the public. Respondents had no role in preparing or disseminating Charter's financial statements, and they recorded the transactions as a wash on their own books under generally accepted accounting principles. It is alleged that respondents knew or were in reckless disregard of Charter's intention to use the transactions to mislead research analysts and investors.
The District Court granted respondents' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the allegations showed at most aiding and abetting by respondents. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment.
Bradley Banks's apartment was searched after officers failed to knock and announce. Police recovered a firearm. The defense argued that the illegal manner of entry was a but-for cause of the seizure, requiring suppression of the evidence.
Hudson v. Michigan547 U.S. 586 (2006)
Police officers obtained a search warrant authorizing a search for drugs and firearms at the home of petitioner Booker T. Hudson in Michigan. Upon arriving to execute the warrant, the officers knocked on the door and announced their presence. They waited only three to five seconds before turning the knob of the unlocked front door and entering Hudson's home. Inside the residence, officers discovered large quantities of drugs, including cocaine rocks in Hudson's pocket, and a loaded gun lodged between the cushion and armrest of the chair in which he was sitting.
Hudson was charged under Michigan law with unlawful drug and firearm possession. He moved to suppress all the inculpatory evidence, arguing that the officers' premature entry violated his rights. The Michigan trial court granted the motion to suppress. On interlocutory review, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed that ruling, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.
Hudson was subsequently convicted of the possession charges. He renewed his suppression claim on appeal, but the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected it and affirmed the conviction. The Michigan Supreme Court again declined review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the case.
Byron Bishop was charged with unlawful possession of a sawed-off shotgun found during a traffic stop. The government had to prove that Bishop's conduct was a but-for cause of the weapon being in the vehicle at the moment of the stop.
United States v. Miller307 U.S. 174
In 1995 Samuel Mullet purchased land in Jefferson County, Ohio. That land became the Bergholz Amish community in 2001 when a sufficient number of ordained ministers qualified it as a separate Amish church district. The new community appointed Mullet as its bishop. As bishop, Mullet controlled all aspects of life in the Bergholz compound and had the ability to order the shunning of community members who failed to follow the tenets of their Amish faith.
In 2006 Mullet excommunicated several church members who questioned Bergholz community practices and his leadership. Included in the group were Lavern and Mattie Troyer, whose son Aden was married to Mullet's daughter Wilma, as well as Melvin and Anna Shrock, whose son Emanuel was married to Mullet's daughter Linda. The excommunications led to family divisions, including a divorce and a custody dispute. Amish bishops from across the country met and voted unanimously to reverse the excommunications.
From September 6 to November 9, 2011, several Bergholz community members committed five separate attacks on nine different individuals connected to the community by family or religious ties. The assailants sliced off the men's beards and cut the women's hair. The victims were seen as Amish hypocrites by the assailants.
A federal grand jury indicted sixteen members of the Bergholz community for violating and conspiring to violate the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, as well as other charges. At trial, the government presented evidence that the assaults were motivated by the victims' religion, while the defendants presented evidence of personal and family disputes as alternative motives. The jury convicted all sixteen defendants of at least one hate-crime violation.
The district court instructed the jury that the victims' religion need only be a significant motivating factor even if other reasons existed. The defendants twice requested a but-for causation instruction, which the court rejected. The defendants appealed their convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Bianca Baker was terminated shortly after her employer learned she was transgender. She sued under Title VII, claiming her status was the but-for cause of the discharge rather than any legitimate business reason.
Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020)
The three cases consolidated before the Supreme Court arose when employers fired long-time employees shortly after the employees revealed their homosexual or transgender status.
Gerald Bostock worked for Clayton County, Georgia, as a child welfare advocate whose leadership earned the county national awards. After a decade with the county, Bostock began participating in a gay recreational softball league. Influential community members then made disparaging comments about his sexual orientation, and he was fired for conduct unbecoming a county employee.
Donald Zarda worked as a skydiving instructor at Altitude Express in New York for several seasons. After mentioning that he was gay, he was fired days later.
Aimee Stephens worked at R. G. & G. R. Harris Funeral Homes in Michigan, presenting as male when hired. After two years she began treatment for gender dysphoria and wrote a letter stating she planned to live and work full-time as a woman. The funeral home fired her before she left for vacation.
Each employee sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex. The Eleventh Circuit held that Title VII does not prohibit employers from firing employees for being gay and dismissed Bostock's suit as a matter of law. The Second Circuit allowed Zarda's claim to proceed on the ground that sexual orientation discrimination violates Title VII. The Sixth Circuit reached the same conclusion in Stephens's case regarding transgender status.
Both Zarda and Stephens passed away during the proceedings, but their estates continued to press the claims. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement among the courts of appeals over the scope of Title VII's protections for homosexual and transgender persons.
Does the but-for test require the defendant's conduct to be the sole cause of the harm?
No. Multiple acts or omissions can each satisfy the but-for test when the harm would not have occurred in its actual manner without any one of them.
Supporting sources
How does the but-for test apply to omissions in criminal cases?
An omission satisfies but-for causation when the defendant had a duty to act and the harmful result would not have occurred when and as it did if the defendant had performed that duty.
Supporting sources
What role does the but-for test play before proximate cause analysis?
The but-for test establishes factual causation as a threshold step. Only after factual causation is shown do courts consider whether additional limits such as remoteness or foreseeability preclude liability.
Can the but-for test be satisfied when an intervening act also contributes to the result?
Yes. An intervening act does not defeat but-for causation if the result would still not have occurred without the defendant's earlier conduct.
Supporting sources
490 U.S. 22 (1989)
…to mean that gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions. To construe the words "because of" as colloquial shorthand for "but-for causation," as does Price Waterhouse, is to misunderstand them. But-for causation is a hypothetical construct. In determining whether a particular factor was a but-forcause of a given event, we…