490 U.S. 22 (1989)
Ann Hopkins served as a senior manager in Price Waterhouse's Office of Government Services in Washington, D.C., for five years before the partners there proposed her for partnership in 1982.1
Of the firm's 662 partners, only seven were women, and Hopkins was the only woman among the 88 candidates proposed for partnership that year.2 Thirteen partners supported her bid, eight recommended denial, three suggested holding her candidacy, and eight had no informed opinion.3 She was neither offered nor denied admission to the partnership; instead, her candidacy was held for reconsideration the following year.4
Hopkins had played a key role in securing a $25 million contract with the Department of State, which her office described as an outstanding performance carried out virtually at the partner level.5 Partners praised her as an outstanding professional with strong character, independence, and integrity, and clients found her extremely competent, intelligent, and productive.6 Nevertheless, partners criticized her interpersonal skills, describing her as overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to work with, and impatient with staff.7
Some partners' comments reflected sex stereotyping, including calling her "macho," suggesting she "overcompensated for being a woman," advising her to take a course at charm school, and recommending that she walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.8 Dr. Susan Fiske, a social psychologist, testified that the subjective evaluations and Hopkins' status as the only woman candidate made it likely that critical remarks stemmed from sex stereotyping.9 The District Court found that Price Waterhouse had unlawfully discriminated against Hopkins on the basis of sex by giving effect to partners' sex-stereotyped comments.10 The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of liability but required the employer to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the same decision absent discrimination.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the proper allocation of burdens in mixed-motives Title VII cases.12
Whether an employer violates Title VII when gender plays a motivating part in an employment decision?13
Title VII forbids an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's sex.14 The words "because of" mean that gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions.15 Congress meant to obligate the plaintiff to prove that the employer relied upon sex-based considerations in coming to its decision.16 When an employer considers both gender and legitimate factors at the time of making a decision, that decision was "because of" sex.17
Yes. Ann Hopkins served as a senior manager in Price Waterhouse's Office of Government Services in Washington, D.C., for five years before the partners there proposed her for partnership in 1982.18
Of the firm's 662 partners, only seven were women, and Hopkins was the only woman among the 88 candidates proposed for partnership that year. Thirteen partners supported her bid, eight recommended denial, three suggested holding her candidacy, and eight had no informed opinion. She was neither offered nor denied admission to the partnership; instead, her candidacy was held for reconsideration the following year.
Hopkins had played a key role in securing a $25 million contract with the Department of State, which her office described as an outstanding performance carried out virtually at the partner level. Partners praised her as an outstanding professional with strong character, independence, and integrity, and clients found her extremely competent, intelligent, and productive. Nevertheless, partners criticized her interpersonal skills, describing her as overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to work with, and impatient with staff.
Some partners' comments reflected sex stereotyping, including calling her "macho," suggesting she "overcompensated for being a woman," advising her to take a course at charm school, and recommending that she walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry. Dr. Susan Fiske, a social psychologist, testified that the subjective evaluations and Hopkins' status as the only woman candidate made it likely that critical remarks stemmed from sex stereotyping. The District Court found that Price Waterhouse had unlawfully discriminated against Hopkins on the basis of sex by giving effect to partners' sex-stereotyped comments. Hopkins showed that the partnership solicited evaluations from all of the firm's partners, that it generally relied very heavily on such evaluations in making its decision, that some of the partners' comments were the product of stereotyping, and that the firm in no way disclaimed reliance on those particular comments.19
An employer violates Title VII when gender plays a motivating part in an employment decision.20
Related opinions on this issue
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment.21 She agreed that the burden of persuasion should shift to the employer to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision absent consideration of gender.22
In my view, in order to justify shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant, a disparate treatment plaintiff must show by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision. She would retain the McDonnell Douglas framework but supplement it for cases with direct evidence of discriminatory animus.23
She stressed that stray remarks or comments by nondecisionmakers would not suffice to shift the burden.24
Justice White concurred in the judgment.25 He stated that the Mt. Healthy approach applies to determine the proper causation analysis in this case.26 The plaintiff must show that the unlawful motive was a substantial factor in the adverse employment action.27
The burden then shifts to the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision even in the absence of the unlawful motive.28 He agreed that the Court of Appeals had erred by requiring clear and convincing evidence rather than a preponderance.29
Whether the employer must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken gender into account?30
Once a plaintiff shows that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving that it would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed gender to play such a role.31 The employer must make this showing by a preponderance of the evidence.32 Conventional rules of civil litigation apply in Title VII cases.33 Exceptions requiring clear and convincing evidence are uncommon.34
Yes. The courts below required the employer to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the same decision in the absence of discrimination.35 This was error because the better rule is that the employer must make this showing by a preponderance of the evidence.36 Price Waterhouse had shown that interpersonal skills were a legitimate concern.37
It must now show that this reason standing alone would have induced it to make the same decision.38 The case is remanded so that the determination can be made under the preponderance standard.39
The employer must prove the same-decision defense by a preponderance of the evidence.40
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice And Justice Scalia
Justice Kennedy dissented.41 He argued that the established McDonnell Douglas and Burdine framework should continue to govern the order of proof in Title VII disparate-treatment cases.42 He contended that the plurality's approach creates confusion and complexity in an area of the law already difficult for the bench and bar.43
He maintained that the plaintiff should bear the burden of persuasion throughout the litigation, including on the issue of causation.44 He would have remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Price Waterhouse.45