Also known as: business days · working day · banking day
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A day on which most institutions conduct business. The term typically excludes Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.
Boreal Energy received a signed demand from shareholder Bradley Banks to inspect corporate records. Banks specified that he wished to inspect the documents five business days later at the principal office. The corporation treated the notice period as satisfied because the intervening days were all weekdays when banks and exchanges operated normally.
Bayside Shipping held a demand note from Beatrice Brown. The company presented the note for payment on a Tuesday after a Monday holiday. Because Tuesday qualified as a business day, the maker could not claim the presentment was untimely under rules treating demand paper as due on any business day.
The Farmers Cooperative of Arkansas and Oklahoma operated as an agricultural cooperative with roughly 23,000 members prior to its 1984 bankruptcy filing. To fund its general business operations, the Co-Op issued promissory notes payable on demand by the holder. These notes carried no collateral or insurance but featured a variable interest rate reset monthly to remain above rates offered by local banks and savings institutions. The Co-Op promoted the notes to both members and nonmembers as part of an "Investment Program," with newsletter advertisements highlighting more than $11 million in assets backing the investments and describing them as safe, secure, and available when needed. After the Co-Op filed for bankruptcy in 1984, more than 1,600 holders possessed notes valued at $10 million in total. Petitioners, a class of these note holders, brought suit against Arthur Young & Co., the accounting firm that had audited the Co-Op's financial statements and the predecessor to respondent Ernst & Young. Petitioners asserted that Arthur Young deliberately deviated from generally accepted accounting principles when valuing one of the Co-Op's principal assets, a gasohol plant, in an effort to overstate the entity's assets and net worth. They further claimed that accurate treatment of the plant in the audits would have disclosed the Co-Op's insolvency and deterred their purchases of the notes. Petitioners succeeded at trial on both their federal claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and their state securities claims, resulting in a $6.1 million judgment. On appeal, Arthur Young contended that the demand notes did not qualify as securities under either the federal statute or Arkansas law, rendering the antifraud provisions inapplicable. The Eighth Circuit agreed and reversed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the federal issue.
View caseBoulder Construction launched a tender offer and notified the state regulator twenty business days before the offer could become effective. The company counted only days when major financial institutions remained open, excluding the intervening weekend and a federal holiday.
MITE Corp. and its wholly owned subsidiary MITE Holdings, Inc., both Delaware corporations with principal executive offices in Connecticut, initiated a cash tender offer for all outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet & Machine Co., a publicly held Illinois corporation, on January 19, 1979, by filing a Schedule 14D-1 with the Securities and Exchange Commission. MITE offered $28 per share, approximately $4 above the prevailing market price, but did not register the offer under the Illinois Business Take-Over Act. On the same day MITE filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Illinois Secretary of State James Edgar, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Illinois Act was preempted by the Williams Act and violated the Commerce Clause, together with temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief. Chicago Rivet responded three days later by suing in Pennsylvania to enjoin the offer under that state's takeover disclosure law, but its efforts there proved unsuccessful. On February 1, 1979, the Illinois Secretary of State notified MITE of his intent to issue a cease-and-desist order. The following day Chicago Rivet informed MITE it would file suit in Illinois state court, and the district court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Secretary from enforcing the Illinois Act against MITE's tender offer. MITE published its nationwide tender offer in the February 5, 1979, edition of the Wall Street Journal. Chicago Rivet simultaneously offered to purchase approximately 40 percent of its own shares at $30 per share. On February 9 the district court entered final judgment declaring the Illinois Act preempted by the Williams Act and violative of the Commerce Clause, and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The parties then entered an agreement withdrawing both offers and granting MITE thirty days to examine Chicago Rivet's books and records. On March 2, 1979, MITE announced it would not proceed with any tender offer. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseBirchwood Apparel sold handguns and waited five business days after receiving a purchaser's form before completing the transfer. The dealer excluded Saturday and Sunday from the count, treating only the five weekdays as business days under the applicable federal timing rule.
In 1993 Congress amended the Gun Control Act of 1968 by enacting the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which directed the Attorney General to create a national instant background-check system by November 30, 1998, and imposed interim requirements on firearms dealers and chief law enforcement officers until that system became operational. Under the interim scheme a dealer proposing to transfer a handgun had to obtain a sworn Brady Form from the purchaser, verify the purchaser's identity, forward notice and a copy of the form to the CLEO of the purchaser's residence, and wait five business days before completing the sale unless the CLEO notified the dealer that the transfer would not violate the law. Jay Printz, CLEO for Ravalli County, Montana, and Richard Mack, CLEO for Graham County, Arizona, filed separate federal actions challenging the constitutionality of the interim provisions that required CLEOs to perform background checks and related tasks. In each case the district court held that the obligation imposed on CLEOs was unconstitutional but severable from the remainder of the Act, leaving in place a voluntary background-check system. The Ninth Circuit consolidated the appeals and reversed, holding that none of the Brady Act's interim provisions violated the Constitution. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseBella Barnes sought a judicial bypass for parental consent. The trial court issued its decision within three days and the entire appellate process concluded within eight business days. The court excluded weekends when calculating the eight-day limit.
The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989, established several requirements governing the performance of abortions within the Commonwealth. The Act required a woman seeking an abortion to provide informed consent after receiving specific information from a physician or counselor at least twenty-four hours before the procedure. It mandated that a minor obtain the informed consent of one parent, subject to a judicial bypass option. It further required a married woman to sign a statement confirming that she had notified her husband of her planned abortion, unless certain exceptions applied. The Act also imposed reporting obligations on facilities providing abortion services and defined a medical emergency exception to the various requirements. Before any of these provisions took effect, the petitioners brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The petitioners were five abortion clinics and one physician representing himself as well as a class of physicians who provide abortion services. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and challenged each provision as unconstitutional on its face. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction. After conducting a three-day bench trial, the District Court held all the provisions unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against their enforcement by Pennsylvania. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It adopted the District Court's factual findings and legal analysis except with respect to the spousal notification requirement. The Court of Appeals upheld the spousal notification requirement as constitutional and applied the undue burden standard in evaluating the provisions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.
View caseBrittany Bell deposited a check at her bank after the posted cutoff hour on a Friday. The bank treated the item as received on the next banking day, which was the following Monday because Saturday and Sunday did not qualify as business days.
The National Labor Relations Board initiated proceedings after Los Angeles Newsboys Local Industrial Union No. 75 filed four petitions for investigation and certification regarding newsboys distributing papers for four Los Angeles daily newspapers published by the respondents, including Hearst Publications, Inc. Hearings were held in a consolidated proceeding, after which the Board found that the regular full-time newsboys were employees under the Act, designated appropriate units, and ordered elections. The union was selected as representative by majorities of the eligible newsboys and was certified. When the respondents refused to bargain, the Board instituted proceedings under section 10 of the Act, held a hearing, found violations of sections 8(1) and 8(5), and ordered the respondents to cease and desist and to bargain collectively. Upon the respondents' petitions for review and the Board's petitions for enforcement, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, with one judge dissenting, set aside the Board's orders. The court rejected the Board's analysis, independently examined whether the newsboys were employees, applied common-law standards, and concluded they were not. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question. The findings showed that the newsboys, generally mature men dependent on their sales for support, worked full-time at established spots under the supervision of district managers employed by the publishers. The publishers fixed the prices at which the newsboys bought and sold the papers, provided credit for papers, allowed returns for unsold copies, and controlled the allocation of papers and sales areas. District managers assigned spots, prescribed hours, and enforced standards through sanctions including dismissal. The newsboys received compensation as the difference between purchase and sale prices, with the publishers effectively controlling their earnings. They formed stable groups with little turnover, unlike casual bootjackers. Checkmen among them performed additional duties for small salaries. The Board found the newsboys integral to the publishers' distribution system.
View caseNo. A business day excludes Saturdays and Sundays because most institutions are closed on those days.
A shareholder must give signed written notice at least five business days before the desired inspection date. Only days when institutions are open count toward the five-day period.
Supporting sources
The period is extended to the next business day. Courts and statutes treat the deadline as falling on the first day institutions are open after the non-business day.
…woman's application, and the entire procedure, including appeal to Pennsylvania Superior Court, is to last no longer than eight business days. The parental consent requirement does not apply in the case of a medical emergency. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3206 (1990). See Appendix to opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., ante ,…