Also known as: attendant circumstances elements · attendant circumstance element · attendant circumstances
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A material element of an offense consisting of a background fact or condition accompanying the prohibited conduct or result. The element must be proved for liability but does not describe the conduct itself or its consequences. Culpability as to the element is assessed under the definitions of purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence that apply to attendant circumstances.
Ava Adebayo, operations director at Apollo Energy, received a warning that mixed industrial refuse might contain hazardous materials. She directed drivers to dump the loads anyway while privately hoping the hazardous waste was present because it would cut disposal costs. In a prosecution requiring purpose as to the attendant circumstance of hazardous waste presence, her internal hope satisfies the mental state for that element.
Arthur Abrams submitted a forged medical bill using what he believed was Claudia's active insurance policy number. The policy had been canceled months earlier, an unknown factual condition. Charged with common-law attempt to commit insurance fraud, Arthur cannot raise factual impossibility as a defense because his mistake concerned only an attendant circumstance.
Amber Alonzo, manager at Artemis Logistics, received an architect's memo warning that converted storerooms lacked required fire exits. She approved the conversion while suspecting noncompliance and hoping inspectors would overlook it. In a prosecution requiring knowledge as to the attendant circumstance of fire-exit compliance, her awareness that the circumstance existed satisfies the mental state.
Albert Allen retrieved what he believed were lethal pills, crushed them, and added the powder to Ruby's drink before gesturing for her to return. The pills were actually harmless sugar. Charged with attempted murder, Albert is guilty because he purposely engaged in conduct that would have constituted the crime if the attendant circumstances had been as he believed them to be.
Audrey Ashton bit Anthony Arnold during an altercation, believing the bite could transmit a fatal disease. The belief concerned an attendant circumstance of the battery. In a prosecution for attempted murder, the court assesses whether the defendant's subjective belief about that circumstance supports the required mental state for attempt liability.
Gregory Smith was committed to the Camden County jail on April 14, 1989, for trial on robbery charges. In September 1988 he had tested positive for HIV and knew of his infection. Jailers placed him in a special blood alert area. Before June 11, 1989, Smith repeatedly threatened corrections officers that he would bite or spit on them to kill them or give them AIDS. He had discussed his HIV status with guards and a local reporter while seeking transfer to a state prison for better medical care. On May 5, 1989, Smith kicked his cell door. After officers restrained him, he threatened to bite and spit while showing his teeth. On May 17 he again resisted officers. He threatened to take one of us the fuck out. He promised to have an officer killed by his brothers. He later spat at another officer while trying to bite him. On June 11 officers escorted Smith to Cooper Hospital after he claimed a fall. At the hospital he became disruptive. He grabbed a metal cylinder. During the struggle he bit Officer Waddington's hand, causing puncture wounds visible in photographs taken days later. Throughout the incident Smith repeatedly threatened to bite and give the officers AIDS so they would die. Waddington was treated by Dr. Zimmerman who prescribed an oral antibiotic and administered hepatitis B immunoglobulin. Since the incident, Waddington has undergone continued testing for HIV. As of the time of trial in April 1990, the tests had been negative. Additional incidents occurred on June 12 and October 17, 1989, in which Smith again threatened officers with his HIV status while resisting restraint. At the April 1990 trial the State presented Dr. Porwancher, who testified that transmission of HIV by bite was possible on rare occasions based on case reports in Lancet and a Soviet study. Defendant's expert Dr. Condoluci testified that the chance was extremely remote and cited studies showing no transmissions in documented bite cases. Smith testified that he knew HIV could be transmitted only sexually, by transfusion, or by needles. He believed transmission by bite was impossible. Mental health worker Eugene Niblack confirmed he had told Smith biting was extremely difficult if not impossible. Smith denied biting or threatening the officers and claimed the officers lied. The jury convicted Smith on April 11, 1990, of attempted murder of Waddington, aggravated assault on both officers, and terroristic threats. Judge Mariano imposed an aggregate twenty-five-year term with twelve-and-one-half years of parole ineligibility. Smith appealed to the Superior Court, Appellate Division.
View caseAnthony Arnold, an engineer at Avalon Pharmaceuticals, embedded undisclosed backdoor code in software sold to clients. The statute is silent on mens rea. Prosecutors must prove some culpable mental state as to each material element, including the attendant circumstance that the code was undisclosed and access-enabling.
Petitioner Dickerson was indicted for bank robbery, conspiracy to commit bank robbery, and using a firearm in the course of committing a crime of violence. Before trial, Dickerson moved to suppress a statement he had made at a Federal Bureau of Investigation field office on the grounds that he had not received Miranda warnings before being interrogated. The District Court granted his motion to suppress, and the Government took an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. That court reversed the District Court's suppression order. It agreed that petitioner had not received Miranda warnings before making his statement but held that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 governed the admissibility of the statement. The Fourth Circuit concluded that Miranda was not a constitutional holding and that Congress could therefore have the final say on admissibility. Two years after Miranda was decided, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501, which provides that a confession shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given and directs the trial judge to consider specified factors in determining voluntariness. Because of the importance of the questions raised by the Court of Appeals' decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA person acts purposely with respect to an attendant circumstance when aware of its existence or when believing or hoping that it exists. This standard focuses on the actor's mental attitude toward the background fact rather than any desire for broader harm.
No. The common law denies a factual impossibility defense when the defendant's mistake concerns an attendant circumstance and the conduct would have constituted the completed crime if the facts had been as the defendant believed them to be.
Knowledge exists when the actor is aware that the circumstance exists. Awareness of a high probability that the circumstance is present is generally sufficient unless the actor actually believes it does not exist.
A person is guilty of attempt if, acting with the required culpability, the person purposely engages in conduct that would constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as the person believed them to be.