471 U.S. 419, 105 S. Ct. 2084, 85 L. Ed. 2d 434 (1985)
Frank Liparota was the co-owner with his brother of Moon's Sandwich Shop in Chicago, Illinois.1 The Department of Agriculture had not authorized his restaurant to accept food stamps.2 Liparota was indicted for acquiring and possessing food stamps in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1).3
At trial, the Government proved that on three occasions Liparota purchased food stamps from an undercover Department of Agriculture agent for substantially less than their face value.4 On the first occasion, the agent informed Liparota that she had $195 worth of food stamps to sell and accepted his offer of $150, consummating the transaction in a back room of the restaurant with Liparota's brother.5 A similar transaction occurred one week later in which the agent sold $500 worth of coupons for $350.6 Approximately one month later, Liparota bought $500 worth of food stamps from the agent for $300.7
In submitting the case to the jury, the District Court rejected Liparota's proposed specific intent instruction, which would have required the Government to prove that the defendant knowingly did an act which the law forbids, purposely intending to violate the law.8 The District Court instead instructed the jury that when the word knowingly is used it means that the defendant realized what he was doing and was aware of the nature of his conduct and did not act through ignorance, mistake, or accident.9 The court further instructed that the Government had to prove the defendant acquired and possessed food stamp coupons for cash in a manner not authorized by federal statute or regulations.10 It also instructed that the defendant knowingly and willfully acquired the food stamps.11 The jury returned a verdict of guilty.12
Liparota appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.13 He argued that the District Court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that specific intent is required in a prosecution under 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1).14 The Court of Appeals rejected Liparota's arguments.15 Because this decision conflicted with recent decisions of three other Courts of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.16
Whether in a prosecution under 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) the Government must prove that the defendant knew that he was acting in a manner not authorized by statute or regulations?17
Absent indication of contrary purpose in the language or legislative history of the statute, we believe that § 2024(b)(1) requires a showing that the defendant knew his conduct to be unauthorized by statute or regulations.18
Yes. The rule applies directly to the established facts because the District Court rejected Liparota's proposed specific intent instruction.19 Instead, the court told the jury only that knowledge meant the defendant realized what he was doing and was aware of the nature of his conduct.20 The facts show that Liparota was indicted and convicted after purchasing food stamps on three occasions from an undercover agent at a discount.21
Yet the instructions required no finding that he knew the manner of acquisition was unauthorized by statute or regulations.22 The Court of Appeals rejected Liparota's arguments. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.23
In a prosecution under 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1), the Government must prove that the defendant knew that his acquisition or possession of food stamps was in a manner unauthorized by statute or regulations.24
Related opinions on this issue
Justice White dissented on the ground that the most natural reading of the statute limits the word knowingly to the verbs to which it is attached.25 He relied on the Court's prior decision in United States v. Yermian to reach this conclusion about the statutory language.26
White further argued that even if knowingly extends through the sentence, the statute requires only awareness of the aspects of his conduct rendering the acquisition or possession unauthorized.27 This creates a defense of mistake of fact rather than ignorance of the law.28 He noted that the comparison between section 2024(b)(1) and section 2024(c) does not support a knowledge-of-illegality requirement because subsection (c) likewise does not require the defendant to know that the presentation itself is illegal.29 White emphasized the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse and observed that the legislative history contains no mention of any requirement of knowing illegality.30