Also known as: attendant circumstance elements · attendant circumstances element · attendant circumstances elements · attendant circumstances · circumstance element
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A material element of an offense consisting of a background fact or condition that accompanies the prohibited conduct or result. The element is established when the actor is aware of the circumstance, believes it exists, or hopes it exists, depending on the required culpability level for that element.
Rosa Diaz approved converting storerooms into guest rooms after receiving an architect's memo stating the rooms lacked required secondary exits. She told owners the rooms were safe but privately admitted she suspected noncompliance and hoped inspectors would overlook it. In a prosecution requiring purpose as to the attendant circumstance of code compliance, her belief and hope that the exits were noncompliant satisfies the mental state for that element.
Lance submitted a forged medical bill using what he believed was Claudia's active policy number. The policy had been canceled months earlier, making any payout impossible. Charged with common-law attempt, he cannot raise factual impossibility as a defense because the policy status was an attendant circumstance and his conduct would have completed the crime if the facts had been as he believed.
Luis received a title report noting a possible unrecorded lien on the condo project. He assured buyers title was clear while secretly hoping the lien still existed and would surface only after closing. For an offense requiring purpose regarding the attendant circumstance of the lien's existence, his hope that the lien remained satisfies the mental state.
Mary crushed what she believed were lethal pills and added the powder to Ruby's drink, then placed the glass where Ruby would see it. A coworker discarded the glass before Ruby drank. Mary is guilty of attempted murder because she purposely engaged in conduct that would have constituted the crime if the attendant circumstance of the pills' lethality had been as she believed.
A defendant bit the victim during an altercation and later claimed he could not have known the bite would prove fatal. The attendant circumstance of the bite's potential lethality is evaluated under the defendant's actual belief at the time. His subjective understanding of that circumstance determines whether the required mental state attaches to the element.
Gregory Smith was committed to the Camden County jail on April 14, 1989, for trial on robbery charges. In September 1988 he had tested positive for HIV and knew of his infection. Jailers placed him in a special blood alert area. Before June 11, 1989, Smith repeatedly threatened corrections officers that he would bite or spit on them to kill them or give them AIDS. He had discussed his HIV status with guards and a local reporter while seeking transfer to a state prison for better medical care. On May 5, 1989, Smith kicked his cell door. After officers restrained him, he threatened to bite and spit while showing his teeth. On May 17 he again resisted officers. He threatened to take one of us the fuck out. He promised to have an officer killed by his brothers. He later spat at another officer while trying to bite him. On June 11 officers escorted Smith to Cooper Hospital after he claimed a fall. At the hospital he became disruptive. He grabbed a metal cylinder. During the struggle he bit Officer Waddington's hand, causing puncture wounds visible in photographs taken days later. Throughout the incident Smith repeatedly threatened to bite and give the officers AIDS so they would die. Waddington was treated by Dr. Zimmerman who prescribed an oral antibiotic and administered hepatitis B immunoglobulin. Since the incident, Waddington has undergone continued testing for HIV. As of the time of trial in April 1990, the tests had been negative. Additional incidents occurred on June 12 and October 17, 1989, in which Smith again threatened officers with his HIV status while resisting restraint. At the April 1990 trial the State presented Dr. Porwancher, who testified that transmission of HIV by bite was possible on rare occasions based on case reports in Lancet and a Soviet study. Defendant's expert Dr. Condoluci testified that the chance was extremely remote and cited studies showing no transmissions in documented bite cases. Smith testified that he knew HIV could be transmitted only sexually, by transfusion, or by needles. He believed transmission by bite was impossible. Mental health worker Eugene Niblack confirmed he had told Smith biting was extremely difficult if not impossible. Smith denied biting or threatening the officers and claimed the officers lied. The jury convicted Smith on April 11, 1990, of attempted murder of Waddington, aggravated assault on both officers, and terroristic threats. Judge Mariano imposed an aggregate twenty-five-year term with twelve-and-one-half years of parole ineligibility. Smith appealed to the Superior Court, Appellate Division.
View caseOfficers questioned a suspect without first providing Miranda warnings. The suspect later sought to suppress statements on the ground that the attendant circumstance of custody had not been properly addressed. The analysis turns on whether the officers were aware of or believed the circumstance of custodial interrogation existed at the time of questioning.
Petitioner Dickerson was indicted for bank robbery, conspiracy to commit bank robbery, and using a firearm in the course of committing a crime of violence. Before trial, Dickerson moved to suppress a statement he had made at a Federal Bureau of Investigation field office on the grounds that he had not received Miranda warnings before being interrogated. The District Court granted his motion to suppress, and the Government took an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. That court reversed the District Court's suppression order. It agreed that petitioner had not received Miranda warnings before making his statement but held that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 governed the admissibility of the statement. The Fourth Circuit concluded that Miranda was not a constitutional holding and that Congress could therefore have the final say on admissibility. Two years after Miranda was decided, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501, which provides that a confession shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given and directs the trial judge to consider specified factors in determining voluntariness. Because of the importance of the questions raised by the Court of Appeals' decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View casePurpose requires that the actor is aware of the circumstance or believes or hopes that it exists. Knowledge requires only that the actor is aware that the circumstance exists. Both standards treat the circumstance as a background fact rather than conduct or a result.
Supporting sources
No. Factual impossibility, including a mistake about an attendant circumstance, is not a defense when the defendant's conduct would have constituted the completed crime if the facts had been as the defendant believed them to be.
Supporting sources
An attendant circumstance is a background condition that must exist for the offense to occur but does not describe the actor's conduct or the harm produced by that conduct. Examples include the existence of a lien, the compliance status of a building, or the lethality of a substance the actor believes is present.
Supporting sources
Yes. It is enough that the actor believes or hopes the circumstance exists as part of achieving a larger objective. The mental state attaches even if the actor would have preferred the circumstance not to exist.
Supporting sources