Also known as: attendant circumstances
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A material element of an offense that is neither conduct nor a result of conduct. It is a background fact or condition that must exist in conjunction with the prohibited conduct or result for the crime to occur.
Lena directed drivers to dump loads after an explicit warning that hazardous materials might be included. She privately hoped the waste contained the prohibited substances because it would cut costs. The statute treats the presence of hazardous waste as an attendant circumstance. Lena's hope satisfies the purposeful mental state required for that element.
Lance submitted a forged claim using what he believed was Claudia's active policy number. The policy had actually been canceled months earlier. At common law the unknown cancellation is treated as a factual condition about an attendant circumstance. The mistake supplies no defense to the attempt charge.
Diaz received a memo stating that converted rooms lacked required fire exits. He suspected noncompliance and hoped inspectors would overlook it. The statute requires knowledge as to the attendant circumstance of code compliance. Diaz's awareness meets that standard.
Lance filed the forged bill believing the policy number authorized payment. The number actually belonged to a canceled contract. Under the attempt provision the conduct would constitute the crime if the attendant circumstance of an active policy had existed as believed. The belief supports attempt liability.
A buyer acquired a refrigerator believing it was stolen property. The item was not in fact stolen. The court treated the stolen status as an attendant circumstance. The mistaken belief about that circumstance supported attempt liability under the governing statute.
Gregory Smith was committed to the Camden County jail on April 14, 1989, for trial on robbery charges. In September 1988 he had tested positive for HIV and knew of his infection. Jailers placed him in a special blood alert area. Before June 11, 1989, Smith repeatedly threatened corrections officers that he would bite or spit on them to kill them or give them AIDS. He had discussed his HIV status with guards and a local reporter while seeking transfer to a state prison for better medical care. On May 5, 1989, Smith kicked his cell door. After officers restrained him, he threatened to bite and spit while showing his teeth. On May 17 he again resisted officers. He threatened to take one of us the fuck out. He promised to have an officer killed by his brothers. He later spat at another officer while trying to bite him. On June 11 officers escorted Smith to Cooper Hospital after he claimed a fall. At the hospital he became disruptive. He grabbed a metal cylinder. During the struggle he bit Officer Waddington's hand, causing puncture wounds visible in photographs taken days later. Throughout the incident Smith repeatedly threatened to bite and give the officers AIDS so they would die. Waddington was treated by Dr. Zimmerman who prescribed an oral antibiotic and administered hepatitis B immunoglobulin. Since the incident, Waddington has undergone continued testing for HIV. As of the time of trial in April 1990, the tests had been negative. Additional incidents occurred on June 12 and October 17, 1989, in which Smith again threatened officers with his HIV status while resisting restraint. At the April 1990 trial the State presented Dr. Porwancher, who testified that transmission of HIV by bite was possible on rare occasions based on case reports in Lancet and a Soviet study. Defendant's expert Dr. Condoluci testified that the chance was extremely remote and cited studies showing no transmissions in documented bite cases. Smith testified that he knew HIV could be transmitted only sexually, by transfusion, or by needles. He believed transmission by bite was impossible. Mental health worker Eugene Niblack confirmed he had told Smith biting was extremely difficult if not impossible. Smith denied biting or threatening the officers and claimed the officers lied. The jury convicted Smith on April 11, 1990, of attempted murder of Waddington, aggravated assault on both officers, and terroristic threats. Judge Mariano imposed an aggregate twenty-five-year term with twelve-and-one-half years of parole ineligibility. Smith appealed to the Superior Court, Appellate Division.
View caseOfficers questioned a suspect without fresh warnings after an earlier interview. The prior warnings were treated as an attendant circumstance bearing on voluntariness. The Court examined whether the circumstance of continuous custody altered the legal effect of the earlier warnings.
Petitioner Dickerson was indicted for bank robbery, conspiracy to commit bank robbery, and using a firearm in the course of committing a crime of violence. Before trial, Dickerson moved to suppress a statement he had made at a Federal Bureau of Investigation field office on the grounds that he had not received Miranda warnings before being interrogated. The District Court granted his motion to suppress, and the Government took an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. That court reversed the District Court's suppression order. It agreed that petitioner had not received Miranda warnings before making his statement but held that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 governed the admissibility of the statement. The Fourth Circuit concluded that Miranda was not a constitutional holding and that Congress could therefore have the final say on admissibility. Two years after Miranda was decided, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501, which provides that a confession shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given and directs the trial judge to consider specified factors in determining voluntariness. Because of the importance of the questions raised by the Court of Appeals' decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View casePurpose exists when the actor is aware of the circumstance or believes or hopes that it exists. The mental state focuses on the background fact itself rather than on any desire for broader harm.
Supporting sources
No. The common law denies the defense when the defendant could not complete the offense because of an unknown factual condition. If the circumstances had been as the defendant believed, the conduct would have been criminal.
Supporting sources
An attendant circumstance is any material element that is neither conduct nor a result. It is typically expressed by nouns or adjectives that describe a background fact required for the offense to occur.