Also known as: Article III · Art 3 · Article 3 · U.S. Const. art. III · Article III judiciary
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
The constitutional provision vesting the judicial power of the United States in one supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may ordain and establish. Judges of those courts hold office during good behavior with compensation that may not be diminished. The provision limits Congress's authority to assign traditional private-rights disputes to non-Article III tribunals and requires plaintiffs to demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury for standing.
Select any source to read its text and confirm it supports the definition.
Andre Antoine, a taxpayer, sued in federal district court alleging that a federal statute authorizing expenditures for certain programs violated the Constitution. He claimed only that the government was not following the law and that all citizens shared his interest in lawful spending. The court dismissed the action because the asserted injury was not concrete and particularized.
Artemis Logistics sued a federal agency in district court under a federal statute for improper cargo fees. Three local vendors then intervened asserting state-law contract claims arising from the same fee schedule and negotiations. The district court exercised authority over the vendors' claims because they formed part of the same constitutional case or controversy.
Aether Technologies filed for bankruptcy and asserted a prepetition state-law breach-of-contract claim against a private counterparty in the Article I bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court purported to enter final judgment on the claim. The district court held that the assignment of this traditional private-rights dispute to a non-Article III tribunal exceeded constitutional limits.
Ava Adebayo sued a company alleging violation of a federal privacy statute after it disclosed her data in a manner that created no actual or threatened injury. She alleged only the statutory violation itself. The court dismissed for lack of standing because the asserted injury was neither particularized nor concrete.
Aurora Biotech challenged fines imposed by an executive-branch tribunal that both promulgated cybersecurity standards and adjudicated violations. The tribunal's members served fixed terms without life tenure or salary protection. The court upheld the structure because the tribunal performed both administrative and judicial functions within a legislative regulatory scheme.
Albert Allen, a voter, sued state officials alleging that legislative districts violated equal protection by diluting his vote. The defendants argued the claim presented a nonjusticiable political question. The court held that the claim satisfied Article III requirements because it presented a case or controversy capable of judicial resolution.
A plaintiff must demonstrate an injury in fact that is both particularized and concrete. A bare statutory violation or a generalized grievance shared by all citizens is insufficient. The injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct and redressable by a favorable decision.
Supporting sources
Congress may create hybrid Article I bodies that combine rulemaking and adjudication within a legislative regulatory scheme even though their judges lack life tenure and salary protection. It may not assign wholesale traditional private-rights disputes such as state-law contract claims between private parties to non-Article III courts.
…In that situation we thought that the requirements of standing should be strict, lest the standards of "case or controversy" in Article III of the Constitution become blurred. Here those doubts are removed by reason of a criminal conviction for serving married couples in violation of an aiding-and-abetting statute. Certainly…
…adequate safeguards against abuse), vacated, Lee v. Oregon , 107 F. 3d 1382 (CA9 1997) (concluding that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing). Lee , of course, is not before us, any more than it was before the Court of Appeals below, and we offer no opinion as to the validity of the Lee courts' reasoning. In Vacco…
…confrontation, and cross-examination. [^maj-14]: (Black n. 1) Amdts. V, VI, U. S. Constitution. [^maj-15]: (Black n. 2) Art. III, § 2, cl. 3; Amdt. VI, U. S. Constitution. [^maj-16]: (Black n. 3) The Fifth Amendment applies this limitation to the Federal Government and the Fourteenth Amendment imposes the same…
…function of the separation of powers. Much of the “political question” doctrine is inextricably tied to the history and text of Article III and the “case or controversy” limitation on federal judicial power. But it is also clear that the doctrine is not a fixed or mechanical rule. In Marbury v. Madison , 1 Cranch 137, the…
…of issues for judicial decision. In light of the regulation vesting authority in the Special Prosecutor and the usual scope of Article III
Supporting sources
Once a district court has original jurisdiction over a civil action it may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over additional claims that form part of the same case or controversy. The claims must share a common nucleus of operative fact. The statute expressly extends this authority to claims involving joinder or intervention of additional parties when original jurisdiction rests on a federal question.
Supporting sources
No. Congress cannot eliminate the case-or-controversy requirement by statute. A plaintiff must still show a concrete and particularized injury in fact even when a statute authorizes suit. A purely procedural violation divorced from any actual or threatened harm does not suffice.
Supporting sources