Also known as: analogs · analogous · analogously · analogy · analogue · analogous reasoning
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
A different material or sequence that produces the same functional result as a specified material when used in a particular manner. Patent applicants frequently claim analogs to block competitors from achieving identical outcomes through minor substitutions.
A different material or sequence that produces the same functional result as a specified material when used in a particular manner. Patent applicants frequently claim analogs to block competitors from achieving identical outcomes through minor substitutions.
Aaron Adams published an editorial criticizing a city official's performance. The official sued for libel. The court extended the actual-malice standard to the editorial by treating the public criticism as analogous to statements made by officials acting within the scope of their duties.
An interest in a thing other than land that receives the same legal treatment as a corresponding estate in land. The concept permits doctrines governing land estates to extend to personal property through functional equivalence.
An interest in a thing other than land that receives the same legal treatment as a corresponding estate in land. The concept permits doctrines governing land estates to extend to personal property through functional equivalence.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
L. B. Sullivan is one of three elected Commissioners of the City of Montgomery, Alabama. He has duties including supervision of the Police Department. He brought this civil libel action against the New York Times Company and four individual petitioners who were Alabama clergymen. The suit sought $500,000 in damages based on a full-page advertisement entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices" that appeared in the New York Times on March 29, 1960. A jury in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County awarded Sullivan the full amount claimed against all petitioners. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the judgment. The advertisement was signed by the Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South. It described widespread non-violent demonstrations by Southern Negro students and an unprecedented wave of terror against them. Two paragraphs formed the basis of the claim. One alleged that after students sang on the State Capitol steps their leaders were expelled, truckloads of police ringed the Alabama State College Campus, and the dining hall was padlocked to starve students into submission. The other stated that Southern violators had bombed Dr. King's home, assaulted him, arrested him seven times, and charged him with perjury. The text appeared over the names of 64 persons. It was endorsed by the individual petitioners among others. Sullivan contended that the references to police referred to him in his supervisory capacity. Six Montgomery residents testified that they read the statements as referring to him. However, several statements were inaccurate. The students sang the National Anthem rather than "My Country, 'Tis of Thee." The expulsions were for a different incident. The dining hall was not padlocked. Dr. King had been arrested only four times. The bombings occurred before Sullivan's tenure with police efforts to apprehend the perpetrators. The Times published the advertisement for approximately $4800. It acted upon an order from a New York advertising agency. The agency provided a letter from A. Philip Randolph certifying authorization. The Times made no efforts to confirm its accuracy against its own news files. Sullivan served written demands for retraction on the petitioners pursuant to Alabama law. None of the individual petitioners responded as they had not authorized use of their names. The Times did not retract. It published a retraction only upon demand by Governor John Patterson after learning more facts. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the separate petitions of the individual petitioners and the Times due to the importance of the constitutional issues involved.
View case1 common questions
The patent sense refers to a substitute material that achieves identical functional results. The property sense refers to an interest in personal property that receives the same doctrinal treatment as a land estate under a condition subsequent.
Supporting sources
Abigail Alvarez transferred specialized manufacturing equipment to Alliance Holdings subject to the condition that the equipment be used only for noncompetitive purposes. When Alliance Holdings began producing rival goods, Abigail sought to terminate the transfer. The court recognized her retained interest as a power of termination because the equipment lease created an interest analogous to a defeasible estate in land.
Andrew Avery lived with his granddaughter in a single-family zone that limited occupancy to nuclear families. He challenged the ordinance as irrational. The court compared the restriction to prior cases involving extended-family living arrangements and found the definition of family unconstitutionally narrow.
In early 1973, Mrs. Inez Moore received a notice of violation from the city of East Cleveland. The notice stated that her grandson John Moore, Jr., was an illegal occupant of her home. It directed her to comply with the housing ordinance. Mrs. Moore lived in her East Cleveland home together with her son Dale Moore, Sr., and her two grandsons Dale Moore, Jr., and John Moore, Jr. John came to live with her after his mother's death when he was less than one year old. When she failed to remove John from the home, the city filed a criminal charge against her. Mrs. Moore moved to dismiss the charge. She claimed that the ordinance was constitutionally invalid on its face. Her motion was overruled. Upon conviction she was sentenced to five days in jail and a $25 fine. The East Cleveland ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. The ordinance defined family to include only a husband or wife of the nominal head of the household, unmarried children of the head or spouse provided they have no children residing with them, a parent of the head or spouse, or not more than one dependent child of the head or spouse along with that child's spouse and dependent children. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction after giving full consideration to her constitutional claims. The Ohio Supreme Court denied review of the case. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of her appeal.
View caseAnika Anand was prosecuted under a federal statute banning firearms near schools. She argued the law exceeded congressional power. The court refused to treat school safety as analogous to economic regulation of interstate commerce and struck down the statute.
In March 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun and five bullets. Acting on an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted Lopez, who admitted possessing the weapon. Local police arrested him and charged him under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The following day, state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. A federal grand jury indicted him on one count of knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone. Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress's power to legislate control over public schools. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the statute was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate activities affecting commerce because the business of schools affects interstate commerce. After a bench trial, the court found Lopez guilty and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and two years of supervised release. Lopez appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the conviction, holding that the statute was beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
Adrian Aguilar, special prosecutor, subpoenaed presidential tapes. The President asserted a privilege analogous to legislative immunity. The court rejected the claim, holding that no express constitutional provision created such protection for confidential communications.
On March 1, 1974, a grand jury returned an indictment charging seven named individuals with offenses including conspiracy to defraud the United States and to obstruct justice. Although not designated in the indictment, the grand jury named President Richard M. Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator. On April 18, 1974, upon motion of the Special Prosecutor, a subpoena duces tecum was issued to the President requiring production of tapes, memoranda, papers, transcripts, or other writings relating to precisely identified meetings between the President and others. The President publicly released edited transcripts of 43 conversations on April 30, 1974, including 20 subject to the subpoena. On May 1, 1974, the President's counsel filed a motion to quash the subpoena under Rule 17(c) along with a claim of privilege. At a subsequent hearing, further motions to expunge the grand jury's action naming the President as an unindicted co-conspirator and for protective orders were filed by counsel for the President. On May 20, 1974, the District Court denied the motion to quash and ordered production of the materials by May 31, 1974. The court rejected claims that the dispute was a nonjusticiable intra-executive conflict and that the Judiciary lacked authority to review executive privilege. On May 24, 1974, the President appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the Special Prosecutor petitioned for certiorari before judgment, which was granted. The case was set for argument on July 8, 1974. The proceeding is a pending federal criminal prosecution in United States v. Mitchell et al. set for trial on September 9, 1974.
Antonio Alvarado and his partner sought a marriage license. The state relied on historical definitions of marriage. The court rejected the analogy to prior restrictions on interracial marriage and held that the fundamental right to marry extends to same-sex couples.
The petitioners were fourteen same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners were deceased. They lived in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee. Those states defined marriage as a union between one man and one woman under their constitutions and statutes. The petitioners filed suits in federal district courts in their home states. They sought marriage licenses or recognition of marriages lawfully performed elsewhere. James Obergefell and John Arthur traveled from Ohio to Maryland to marry aboard a medical transport plane because Arthur suffered from ALS; Obergefell later sought to be listed as surviving spouse on Arthur's death certificate. April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse, Michigan nurses, adopted three children but could not both serve as legal parents under state adoption rules. Army Reserve Sergeant Ijpe DeKoe and Thomas Kostura married in New York before DeKoe's deployment to Afghanistan and later settled in Tennessee. Each district court ruled in the petitioners' favor. The respondents appealed. The Sixth Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed the district court judgments. The petitioners sought certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. Same-sex couples had begun establishing families after substantial cultural and political developments in the late twentieth century. Earlier litigation had addressed the legal status of gays and lesbians, including challenges that reached the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v. Texas.
2 common questions
A court may supply a reasonable term under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 204 when parties omit an essential condition. The supplied term is labeled constructive to distinguish it from express or implied-in-fact conditions created by the parties.
Supporting sources
Yes. The interpretation given to demand language in a promise to pay money follows by analogy from the UCC rule that a claim on a demand instrument arises on its date or date of issue.
Supporting sources